9. Bystander intervention

One of the recurring images of our time is that of someone I being attacked in the middle of a city, with no-one being willing to help them. This apparent apathy or reluctance to help was shown very clearly in the case of Kitty Genovese. She was stabbed to death as she returned home from work at three o'clock in the morning. Thirty-eight witnesses watched the murder from their apartments, but none of them intervened. Indeed, only one person called the police. Even that action was only taken after he had asked advice from a friend in another part of the city.

Diffusion of responsibility

John Darley and Bibb Latane were interested in the Kitty Genovese case and in the whole issue of bystander intervention. They wondered why not one out of the numerous witnesses helped her. They argued that a victim may be in more fortunate position when there is just one bystander rather than several. In such a situation, responsibility for helping the victim falls firmly on to one person rather than being spread among many; in other words, the bystander has a sense of personal responsibility. If there are many observers of a crime, there is a diffusion of responsibility. Each person bears only small portion of the guilt for not helping, and so there is less feeling of personal responsibility.

One of the key norms in many societies is the norm of social responsibility: we should help those who need help. Darley and Latane argued that the norm of social responsibility is strongly activated when only one person observes the fate of a victim, However, it is much less likely to influence behaviour when several bystanders are present.

Darley and Latane tested their ideas in a series of studies. Participants were placed in separate rooms, and told to put on headphones. They were to discuss their personal problems, speaking into a microphone and hearing the contributions of others to the discussion over the headphones. They were led to think that there were one, two, three, or six people m the discussion. In fact, all of the apparent "contributions" of other participants were tape-recordings.

Each participant heard that one of the other people in the discussion was prone to seizures, ©specially when studying hard or taking examinations. Later on, they heard him say, "I-er-I-uh-I've got one of these-er-seuzure-er-er-tbings coming on and-and-and I could really-er-use some help so if somebody would-er-er-help-er-er-help-er-uh-uh-uh [choking sounds] ... I'm gonna die-er-er-I'm... gonna die-er-help-er-er seizure-er... [choking sounds, silence].

Of those participants who thought they were the only person to know that someone was having an epileptic fit, 100% left the room and reported the emergency. In contrast, only 62% of participants responded if they thought there were five other bystanders who knew about the epileptic fit. Participants who thought they were the only bystander responded much faster than those who thought there were five bystanders: 50% of them responded within 45 seconds of the onset of the fit, whereas none of those who believed there were five other bystanders did so.

There were two other interesting findings in the work Darley and Latane. First, the participants who believed -they were five other bystanders denied that this had affected the behaviour. Thus, we are not fully aware of the factors influenced our behaviour. Second, they found that the participants w did not report the emergency were by no means apathetic uncaring. Most of them asked the experimenter if the victi! was all right. Many of them had trembling hands and sweatiij palms. Indeed, they seemed more emotionally aroused than f subjects who reported the emergency.

Other studies

Interpreting the situation. In real life, many emergency have an ambiguous quality about them. Not surprisingly, chances of a bystander lending assistance to a victim are much greater if the situation is interpreted as a genuine emergency. This was studied by Leonard Bick-man. Participants heard bookcase apparently falling on another subject, followed bу scream. When someone else interpreted the situation as! emergency, the participant offered help much faster than wh someone else said there was nothing to worry about.

Victim characteristics

Bystanders are influenced by the characteristics of the victim. This was shown by Piliavin. They staged a number of incidents in the New York subway, in which a male victim staggered forwards and collapsed on the floor. He either carried a black cane and seemed sober, or he smelled of alcohol and carried a bottle of alcohol. Bystanders were less likely to help when the victim was drunk than when he was "ill". Drunks are regarded as responsible In their own plight, and it could be unpleasant to help a smelly drunk who may vomit or become abusive.

Perceived similarity

It seems likely that bystanders will be most likely to help victims they perceive as similar to themselves. This is generally true, but there are some exceptions. Guertner and Dovidio used a situation in which white participants heard a victim in the next room apparently being struck by a stack of failing chairs. When it was unclear whether or not there was an emergency (there were no screams from the victim), the white participants helped a white victim faster than a black one. However, when the victim screamed and so it was clear there was an emergency, a black victim was helped as rapidly as a white victim.

How can we explain these findings? Perceived similarity is of importance, as was found in the ambiguous situation. However, the effects of perceived similarity are wiped out by the demands of the situation if it is clear that there really is an emergency.

Knowing how to help

Suppose that a passenger on a plane suddenly collapses, and one of the stewardesses asks for help. It is natural to assume that a doctor will be more likely to offer his or her services than someone who doesn't have any relevant medical skills. There is plenty of evidence to support this assumption. Huston et al. (1981) studied the characteristics of those who helped out in dangerous emergencies. There was a strong tendency for helpers to have training in relevant skins such as life-saving, first aid or self-defence.

Other activities

Bystanders do not only take account of he emergency itself. They also consider the activity they are involved in when they come upon the emergency. This was studied by Batson. They sent their participants

from one building to another to perform a task. On the way, they went past a male student slumped on the stairs, coughing and groaning. Of those participants who had been told that i was important for them to help the experimenter by performing the task, and that they were to hurry, only 10% stopped to help the student. On the other hand, 80% of the participants stopped to help if they were told that helping the experimenter was nc very important, and that there was no hurry.

Theoretical ideas

Why do we like some people but dislike others? There are several reasons. However, two major factors are the reward and costs involved. People can be rewarding because they provide fun, security, reassurance, and so on. They can be costly because they are demanding, disagreeable, time-consuming, and so on. We like people if the rewards are greater than the cost but we dislike people if the costs are greater than the reward.

According to equity theory, people in relationship consider not only their own rewards and costs, but also those of the other person. In a satisfactory relations there is fairness or equity on both sides in terms of rewards a costs.

There are other, related notions current in social psychology. It is argued that friendship should be based on equality. In other words, two friends should both enjoy about t same rewards and incur about the same costs. There is all what is known as the reciprocity norm. According to this norm, people should help those who have helped them in the past, and they should not harm those who have helped. This norm sometimes expressed as, "Scratch my back, and I'll scrath yours'

The common thread running through equity theory, notice of equality, and the reciprocity norm, is that social interaction are determined by the rewards and costs involved. In similar fashion, it is useful to consider ting rewards and costs involved in helping and not helping when trying topredict whether a bystander will help:

• Costs of helping: physical harm; delay in carrying out other

^activities,

• Costs of not helping: ignoring personal responsibility; guilt; criticism from others; ignoring perceived similarity. ^!

• Rewards of helping: praise from victim; satisfaction from having been useful if relevant skills are possessed.

• Rewards of not helping: able to continue with other activities as normal.

Piliavin made use of ideas about rewards and costs in their arousal I cost-reward model. According to this model, there are five steps that bystanders go through before deciding whether or not to assist a victim:

1. Becoming aware of someone's need for help; this depends on attention.

2. Experiencing arousal.

3. Interpreting cues and labelling one's arousal.

4. Working out the rewards and costs of different actions.

5. Making a decision and acting on it.

This model is consistent with most of the research we have discussed. In addition, the model assumes that bystanders observing an emergency are often very aroused emotionally. According to Piliavin, high arousal can make it difficult for bystanders, to think clearly what to do. As a result, they may simply not work out the rewards and costs of different actions in a systematic way.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of the arousal/cost-reward model?

PLUS

1. it is useful to regard bystander intervention as a decision-making process involving a series of stages.

2. Rewards and costs are very important in determining helping behaviour.

MINUS

The model seems of little relevance to bystanders who immediately and impulsively lend assistance.

Someone with much experience of similar emergencies (e.g. a doctor responding to someone having a heart attack) may respond smoothly and efficiently without becoming aroused