Lukin

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Eurasian Integration and the

Clash of Values

Alexander Lukin

Since the Enlightenment, the driving concepts of Western civilisation have been the belief in its own superiority and the theory of linear progress in human society. According to this understanding, the West (firstly Europe, and later the United States) reached the highest and most advanced level of development, with all other countries moving along the same continuum, although lagging behind and located at various stages of proximity to this ideal.

In fact, many civilisations have considered themselves superior to others. The Ancient Greeks, Romans, medieval Chinese and many others all believed that they had reached the pinnacle of social development. However, the last few centuries of industrial success and military power have reinforced the theory of the West’s superiority, with the result that Western notions of progress have long captured the thinking of most of the world.

During the Enlightenment, the West’s idea that its civilisation was superior only changed in form, shifting from the superiority of Christianity as a fundamentally new set of teachings that, with the West as its vehicle, launched a new start to history, to a more secular theory of the West leading the world in social and economic progress. In place of Christian notions of morality and the meaning of life came a new, higher ideal of building a better world through industrial development, a market economy and individual freedoms.

Alexander Lukin is Vice President of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Director of the Center for East Asian and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University).

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These ideas formed the basis of all dominant Western political doctrines of the twentieth century, from colonialism to Marxism and from Nazism to modern liberalism. And, despite the significant differences between them, all of these concepts shared the common idea that the future world would be unified, with the more ‘progressive’ West serving as its foundation and all others gradually catching up to its standards.

With the passage of time, the superiority in force that the West had enjoyed began to weaken. Western weapons systems spread throughout the world, making it increasingly difficult to control ‘undeveloped’ regions.

Decolonisation led to greater self-awareness in non-Western parts of the globe. However, the sense of national pride in most of the newly formed states initially found expression in theories calling for local development to catch up to the West, thereby granting tacit acceptance of the paradigm of Western superiority. These theories essentially sought to use Western economic accomplishments to achieve their own breakthroughs, with the aim of joining the modern (Western) world. The global split between two systems and the fact that some regimes were oriented towards the Soviet Union was of no great significance. After all, the Soviet Union also considered itself to be part of world civilisation, with the only difference being that, as the leader of world socialism, it believed that it had progressed further in social development and that the ‘capitalist world’ had fallen behind.

The Second World War lent powerful impetus to decolonisation, with the formation of major militarised entities in different parts of the world.

It also delivered a serious blow to the ideology of linear progress when a power arose in the very centre of Europe that was based on values differ- ing from commonly held Western beliefs and that threatened to destroy the traditional Western system. The victory over Nazism, which its opponents achieved through tremendous effort, did not undermine this fundamental theory, but led to the understanding that ‘progress’ could meet with strong resistance and required significant resources and work. Leaders of the vic- torious powers, especially those in the US, showed considerable political wisdom in deciding to spare no means in consolidating the Western world, even at some material expense to their own populations. In particular, this approach found expression in the ambitious and largely successful Marshall

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Plan, which made it possible to eliminate the negative consequences of Nazi rule in Western Europe and prevented another hostile force, Stalinist communism, from gaining a foothold in the region.

The struggle with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact states could not undermine the West’s confidence in the theory of linear progress, a belief that the communists also held. That struggle was only an argument over which set of values should serve as the basis for the most progressive society. The West’s victory in this struggle – achieved not through war, but as a result of communism’s internal collapse – led to a euphoria that was best expressed by Francis Fukuyama, whose famous theory of the ‘end of history’ proclaimed the ultimate success and universal rec-

ognition of Western values and the Western, progressive social order.1

The West combined this euphoria with its relative economic weakness (compared to the post-Second World War period) in its approach to the Eastern European states and former Soviet republics that had been liberated from com-

munism. Two options were theoretically possible at that point: either make a serious attempt to assimilate Russia into the Western system or else wrest away piece after piece from this centre of the inimical world in the belief that Russia had no real prospects anyway and that the future belonged to theWest.EuropeanandUSadvocatesofthefirstapproachtriedtopersuade politicians that an anti-Russian course could lead to increased hostility from Moscow and that the reward would only be several smaller states that would end up becoming part of Europe anyway. Prominent US foreign-policy theoretician George Kennan and several well-known senators and journalists were among those who lent their voices to this warning. However, their admonition went unheeded. The administrations of US presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush took the second path by expanding NATO while trying to convince Russia that the foreign forces nearing its borders did not pose a threat to its security. European Union leaders did the same thing by pushing that organisation ever closer to Russia’s borders. No consideration was given to pro-Western Russian liberals, who argued that such policies fuelled the growth of anti-Western sentiment in Russia and strength-

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ened the position of those who supported authoritarianism. The thinking in Western capitals was that the people in all countries intrinsically aspired to form Western-style unions and alliances, and believed in the same values that the West promoted; if the leaders of this or that country hindered this naturally progressive movement, a wave of popular protest would eventually sweep them away. What is more, the price tag for bringing Russia into the Western sphere was higher than those countries were willing to pay. Not only were the politicians of the late twentieth century less formidable individuals than those of the post-Second World War period, and more inclined to indulge the selfish interests of their citizens, but the relative weight of the

US economy as the potential donor was much lower.

Today, it is difficult to say whether a different approach to the post- communist states would have produced a more positive result for the West.

However, the course taken by Clinton and Bush significantly strengthened the authority of those forces in Moscow that believed Russia should not join Western alliances, but should instead become a strong and more independent centre of power: the core of Eurasian integration in the framework of a multipolar world. Whether such policies played a decisive role in that trend is unimportant; it shows that not just the personalities of individual poli- ticians but more fundamental differences of approach to the world stand behind Russia’s current ambitions.

International developments in the early twenty-first century demon- strated the Western mythological belief that people all over the world, regardless of their culture and historical experience, naturally and unconditionally accepted Western values, along with the political and social constructs based on them. Indeed, the West did manage to absorb several Eastern European states and former Soviet republics. There were two reasons for this: a similarity of societies resulting from the influence of modern Western ideas, and residual geopolitical fears concerning Russia as the successor to the Soviet Union. At the same time, in places such as the Baltic states, the West had to close its eyes to both the disenfranchise- ment and dissatisfaction of a significant portion of the population. In other countries, political considerations trumped cultural factors. Poland at least temporarily showed greater concern for its national security than for the

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unitary state with a single nationality, and those who consider Russian to be their mother tongue, and who constitute the majority in the east and south.

Those latter parts of the country have historically held close cultural and economic ties with Russia that their people naturally do not want to sunder. Outside forces did not foster these disagreements; they arose as internal political problems in such border states. The West’s failure to understand this, and its stubborn hold on a course opposed to Russia, has already led to the dismemberment of Georgia and could lead to the same end in Moldova and Ukraine.

Some Western analysts are aware of this problem. As early as 2009, American political-science professor Nicolai Petro wrote that ‘clearly the problem is not, as former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has put it,thatUkraineis“acountrywherenation-buildingneedsalittlehelp.”’3 The problem is that the wrong sort of nation building is being attempted: the kind that views Ukraine’s centuries-old religious and cultural affinity with Russia as an obstacle to be overcome. As Petro has argued, ‘the result has been a smouldering cultural civil war, in which large swathes of the popu- lation are engaged in destroying the very edifice that others are seeking to build, thereby condemning to ruin the structure that they both must live in.’4

Analysing the EU’s approach to the Ukrainian crisis in 2013, Petro noted:

Instead of adopting a strategy that would have allowed Ukraine to capitalize on its close cultural, religious and economic ties with Russia, and which could have also served to build deeper ties between Western Europe and Russia, from the outset European negotiators went out of their way to turn Union association into a loyalty test.5

However, the West did not heed such arguments. The US and the EU decided to apply political pressure that, in the case of Ukraine, was much more pronounced than even the pressure that Russia exerted. Whereas Russia provided the government of Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovich with substantial financial assistance, Brussels denied him such aid while constantly sending senior EU officials to Kiev to explain the joys of Western andEuropeanintegration.Atthesametime,thoseofficialsviolatedtherules

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of international diplomacy by speaking at opposition rallies in central Kiev, thereby undermining the authority of the very government they were trying to entice into the EU’s embrace and causing a great deal of irritation. The only way to understand why they would pursue such an extremely ineffec- tive approach is to recognise that it is deeply rooted in the idea that the West is naturally superior and therefore attractive to others. The fact that certain leaders do not accept that ideology and even attempt to oppose it provokes the extreme irritation and even confusion that we witness in the EU today.

Unfortunately, the negative examples of Moldova and Georgia did not teach the West anything. European and US leaders thought that they should be even more decisive in Westernising Ukraine. As a result, they gave their full support to the nationalist opposition, dominated by radical forces, which overthrew the legitimate government of Yanukovich in a coup. This outcome was not accepted in the eastern part of Ukraine, where the proRussian population revolted against a new government they considered to be illegitimate, as well as a threat to their interests and way of life. The situation in Ukraine is developing in a similar way to that in Moldova, where a Russian-speaking minority proclaimed an independent republic in one region.

The basic values of Eurasian integration

The slowing expansion of the West in these border states has deeper causes than simply the desires or intrigues of individual leaders or groups. Putin,

Yanukovich and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko all came to power through free or relatively free elections. Moldovan communist leader Vladimir Voronin won in free elections on repeated occasions. Former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, who pursued an anti-Russian course that was unusually harsh, even for a state characterised by overwhelmingly pro-Western sentiment, lost his post as a result of such elections.

This means that certain leaders have not prevented their countries from integrating with Europe, but have come to power on a wave of popular sentiment favouring a separate identity and a special relationship with Russia, and fears that Europe might absorb them too completely. The fact that politicians advocating this position remain extremely popular indicates that

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they have a broad social base: in some places, a majority of the population; in others, a significant part. Either way, ignoring the views of such a large number of people can only lead those countries to schism and conflict.

Aside from purely transitory factors influencing those sentiments, such as the Western policy towards former Soviet territories, deeper causes are also at play. These reasons lie at the very heart of the situation and can be called a ‘clash of values’ in the modern world.

Since late Roman times, Western civilisation has evolved through the centuries on a Christian foundation. However, that process has undergone a sharp departure in the last few centuries. The secularisation of society in conjunction with liberal ideology has led to the dominance

of relativist morality: a system on which no society has yet Certain been based. And, despite the diversity of the ideological and

values are religious foundations of various societies and civilisations, all

have historically held one thing in common: every religious absolute system on which those ideologies were built was itself based

on the principle that certain values are absolute. Those values sometimes differed between civilisations, giving rise to differing interpre- tations of what was good and what was bad, but the individuals in each system always knew at all times and in all settings that some things were inherently good and others inherently bad. The criteria for good and evil were usually formulated in holy texts and myths, and handed down from generation to generation within the framework of sacred traditions.

Modern Western civilisation sets the principle of relativism in opposition to the principle of absolute values. Remnants of absolute morality are still found here and there in the West. American juries traditionally decide if a person is sane based on their ability to ‘tell right from wrong’. But what exactly can be considered right or wrong in a system dominated by relativist morality, where all previously recognised criteria are brushed aside as ‘backward’ or ‘conservative’? In fact, the argument that a rejection of absolute criteria destroys the very idea of morality has been made by many religious thinkers, from the Church Fathers to Blaise Pascal and Fyodor

Dostoyevsky. It is summed up in the famous phrase: ‘if there is no God, everything is permitted’.

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What exactly is meant by ‘relativist values’? Consider this one narrow but telling example. Following an act of bestiality in 2012, Germany out- lawed sexual relations with animals, although it had been legal there since

1969. In its explanation for the legislation, the German government offered the following statement: ‘sexual activities carried out by a human on an animal can cause harm to the animal, at least in the sense of the German animal protection law, because the animal is forced into unnatural behaviour.’6 That means modern German society believes it would have been insufficient grounds to state that bestiality should be banned because it is unnatural for humans. Within the framework of modern Western ideol- ogy based on the concept of ‘human rights’, one is free to do anything that does not violate the rights of others. There is no moral constraint, only legal limits. What is more, Western society is gradually extending those rights to animals. In other words, if the animals did not suffer, it would be perfectly acceptable for humans to have sex with them.

Thisisaspecificcasewithinthegeneraltrendtowardsevaluatingactions and even building a general theory without the aid of absolute criteria sent down from above; that is, of defining justice and what is of benefit to citi- zens using human rather than superhuman standards. The West bases all of its major ethical theories on such human principles. Despite the fact that major twentieth-century Western ethical theorists Robert Nozick and John Rawls disagreed on some points (one bases the idea of justice exclusively on individual freedom and the other on a certain universal fairness), they do agree on the main point: there is no transcendent morality, only socially based mores.

Of course, the ideology of secular liberalism could be considered a type of faith in the sense that it is also based on several absolute values. After all, many of its postulates do not hold up to logical analysis and are accepted by its supporters without any need for proof.

The fundamental difference between this ideology and other systems of belief is the source of its dogma. It does not come from a higher, unknowable authority, but from an amorphous and very earthly community: the progressive forces of society, consisting of politicians, journalists, professors and the like, who impose their views on the remaining ‘underdeveloped’