Ethics in Practice

Sexuality

for humans; by increasing the intensity and complexity of the pleasures of intercourse, it binds the partners more firmly and makes them more fit for child-rearing. In fact, such analyses of sexual perversion as Nagel's, which correctly focus on the interruption of mutuality as central to perversion, go wrong by ignoring the evolutionary role and built-in rewards of mutuality. They fail to explain why the interruption of mutuality is disturbing.

It should also be clear that my argument permits gradations in abnormality. Behavior is the more abnormal, and the less likely to be rewarding, the more its emission tends to extinguish a genetic cohort that practices it. The less likely a behavior is to get selected out, the less abnormal it is. Those of our ancestors who found certain aspects of foreplay reinforcing might have managed to reproduce themselves sufficiently to implant this strain in us. There might be an equilibrium between intercourse and such not directly reproductive behavior. It is not required that any behavior not directly linked to heterosexual intercourse lead to maximum dissatisfaction. But the existence of these gradations provides no entering wedge for homosexuality. As no behavior is more likely to get selected out than rewarding homosexuality - except perhaps an innate tendency to suicide at the onset of puberty - it is extremely unlikely that homosexuality can now be unconditionally reinforcing in humans to any extent.

Nor does my position predict, again contrary to fact, that celibate priests will be unhappy. My view is compatible with the existence of happy celibates who deny themselves as part of a higher calling which yields compensating satisfactions. Indeed, the very fact that one needs to explain how the priesthood can compensate for the lack of family means that people do regard heterosexual mating as the natural or "inertial" state of human relations. The comparison between priests and homosexuals is in any case inapt. Priests do not simply give up sexual activity without ill-effect; they give it up for a reason. Homosexuals have hardly given up the use of their sexual organs, for a higher calling or anything else. Homosexuals continue to use them, but, unlike priests, they use them for what they are not for. ...

5 On Policy Issues

Homosexuality is intrinsically bad only in a prudential sense. It makes for unhappiness. However, this does not exempt homosexuality from the larger categories of ethics - rights, duties, liabilities. Deontic categories apply to acts which increase or decrease happiness or expose the helpless to the risk of unhappiness.

If homosexuality is unnatural, legislation which raises the odds that a given child will become homosexual raises the odds that he will be unhappy. The only gap in the syllogism is whether legislation which legitimates, endorses or protects homosexuality does increase the chances that a child will become homosexual. If so, such legislation is prima facie objectionable. The question is not whether homosexual elementary school teachers will molest their charges. Pro-homosexual legislation might increase the incidence of homosexuality in subtler ways. If it does, and if the protection of children is a fundamental obligation of society, legislation which legitimates homosexuality is a dereliction of duty. I am reluctant to deploy the language of "children's rights," which usually serves as one more excuse to interfere with the prerogatives of parents. But we do have obligations to our children, and one of them is to protect them from harm. If, as some have suggested, children have a right to protection from a religious education, they surely have a right to protection from homosexuality. So protecting them limits somebody else's freedom, but we are often willing to protect quite obscure children's rights at the expense of the freedom of others. There is a movement to ban TV commercials for sugarcoated cereals, to protect children from the relatively trivial harm of tooth decay. Such a ban would restrict the freedom of advertisers, and restrict it even though the last clear chance of avoiding the harm, and thus the responsibility, lies with the parents who control the TV set. I cannot see how one can consistently support such legislation and also urge homosexual rights, which risk much graver damage to children, in exchange for increased freedom for homosexuals. (If homosexual behavior is largely compulsive, it is falsifying the issue to present it as

balancing risks to children against the freedom of homosexuals.) The right of a homosexual to work for the Fire Department is not a negligible good. Neither is fostering a legal atmosphere in which as many people as possible grow up heterosexual.

It is commonly asserted that legislation granting homosexuals the privilege or right to be firemen endorses not homosexuality, but an expanded conception of human liberation. It is conjectural how sincerely this can be said in a legal order that forbids employers to hire whom they please and demands hours of paperwork for an interstate shipment of hamburgers. But in any case legislation "legalizing homosexuality" cannot be neutral because passing it would have an inexpungeable speech-act dimension. Society cannot grant unaccustomed rights and privileges to homosexuals while remaining neutral about the value of homosexuality. Working from the assumption that society rests on the family and its consequences, the Judaeo-Chris- tian tradition has deemed homosexuality a sin and withheld many privileges from homosexuals. Whether or not such denial was right, for our society to grant these privileges to homosexuals now would amount to declaring that it has rethought the matter and decided that homosexuality is not as bad as it had previously supposed. And unless such rethinking is a direct response to new empirical findings about homosexuality, it can only be a revaluing. Someone who suddenly accepts a policy he has previously opposed is open to the same interpretation: he has come to think better of the policy. And if he embraces the policy while knowing that this interpretation will be put on his behavior, and ifhe knows that others know that he knows they will so interpret it, he is acquiescing in this interpretation. He can be held to have intended, meant, this interpretation. A society that grants privileges to homosexuals while recognizing that, in the light of generally known history, this act can be interpreted as a positive reevaluation of homosexuality, is signalling that it now thinks homosexuality is all right. Many commentators in the popular press have observed that homosexuals, unlike members of racial minorities, can always "stay in the closet" when applying for jobs. What homosexual

Why Homosexuality is Abnormal

rights activists really want, therefore, is not access to jobs but legitimation of their homosexuality. Since this is known, giving them what they want will be seen as conceding their claim to legitimacy. And since legislators know their actions will support this interpretation, and know that their constituencies know they know this, the Gricean effect or symbolic meaning of passing anti-discrimination ordinances is to declare homosexuality legitimate.

Legislation permitting frisbees in the park does not imply approval offrisbees for the simple reason that frisbees are new; there is no tradition of banning them from parks. The legislature's action in permitting frisbees is not interpretable, known to be interpretable and so on, as the reversal of long-standing disapproval. It is because these Gricean conditions are met in the case of abortion that legislation - or rather judicial fiatpermitting abortions and mandating their public funding are widely interpreted as tacit approval. Up to now, society has deemed homosexuality so harmful that restricting it outweighs putative homosexual rights. If society reverses itself, it will in effect be deciding that homosexuality is not as bad as it once thought.

Postscript Added 1995

I now see the foregoing argument as defective in two ways.

First, it is biased toward environmental explanations of homosexuality. Recent evidence from neuroanatomy and behavioral genetics has confirmed a significant biological factor in sexual orientation. The region of the hypothalamus which controls sexual arousal has been found to be twice as large in heterosexual as homosexual males. Identical twins reared apart are more concordant for homosexuality than fraternal twins reared apart or together, and, within families, concordance for homosexuality is greater than chance for males related on the mother's side but not the father's, suggesting sex-linkage.

However, a genetic basis for homosexuality does not imply that homosexuality is normal, for it does not imply that homosexuality has an adaptive function. The ostensible maladaptive-

Sexuality

ness of homosexuality suggests, rather, that the (poly)gene for homosexuality survives through pleiotropy, expression in more than one phenotype. The (poly)gene that codes for homosexuality presumably also codes for some other trait(s) that strongly enhance(s) fitness, although no one now knows what that trait might be. But whatever version of the pleiotropy hypothesis may prove correct, it still counts homosexuality itself as abnormal, or at least non-normal. If the homosexual phenotype survives through an adaptive correlate, homosexuality would not explain the survival of the gene that codes for it - the gene would survive by expressing the correlate - and would therefore serve no function. Homosexuality would be a side-effect fatal to any gene that coded for it alone, resembling genetic diseases like sickle-cell anemia, which has survived because its gene also confers immunity to malaria. Homosexuality would also retain its negative aspect, on the pleiotropy hypothesis, since maladaptive side-effects are not expected to be reinforcing. Enjoyment of homosexuality would not increase fitness, so there would not have been selection for its being reinforcing.

My second error was to misconstrue the normative issues involved in the homosexuality debate. In effect I attacked an Equal Rights Amendment for homosexuals, defending some legal classifications based on sexual orientation on the grounds that overturning them would signal social acceptance of homosexuality and increase its prevalence. On one hand, emphasizing genes undercuts this argument; if homosexuality is largely biological in origin, this worry is empty. (I should add, however, that, if the central role of reproduction in society's continued existence gives the state a say in sexual relations, the state may and should re-

serve the privileges of marriage for heterosexuals.)

Ironically, the more ambitious goals of current homosexual liberationists make a biology more relevant than it was fifteen years ago. What is now being demanded is civil rights for homosexuals, that is, a legal ban on private discrimination based on sexual object choice.

This demand is often based upon the idea that it is wrong to discriminate on the basis ofimmutable traits, and homosexuality is involuntary and immutable if genetic. I contest the major premise: we discriminate every day on the basis of immutable traits. Reflex speed is unchosen, but the quickest shortstop makes the team. Going on the offensive, civil rights for homosexuals violates freedom of association, which, it seems to me, is an immediate corollary of the categorical imperative. It will be replied that, on my view, civil rights for blacks and women are also illicit; that indeed is my view, although, because others will find it a reductio, it is important to stress the difference between blacks and women, on one hand, and homosexuals on the other. There is nothing abnormal about being a black or a woman, and no one is made as profoundly uncomfortable by members of the opposite sex or other races as many people are made by homosexuals. This antipathy to homosexuals - which is not "hate," a desire to harm, but merely a desire to avoid - may itself have a biological basis. This being so, it strikes me as profoundly wrong to force association with homosexuals on anyone who does not want it.

These views are developed at length in "Homosexuality, Abnormality, and Civil Rights," Public Affairs Quarter~y 10 (1996): 31-48, which expresses my current thinking on the subject.

John Corvino

Consider the following anecdote: Glenn and Stacy, a young couple who have been dating for several months, are driving home in a snowstorm after an enjoyable evening on the town. As they are crossing a bridge the traffic comes to a standstill, and they find themselves surrounded by blinding snow (though, fortunately, with a full tank of gas) waiting patiently for a clearing. Ten minutes pass, then twenty, and still there is no movement. So Glenn and Stacy do what any young lovebirds might do in such a situation: they start "making out" in the car. And despite the severe weather and the stalled traffic, they each think to themselves, "This is beautiful." For the snow is quite romantic, really, and the cold winter air is no match for the warmth of each other's touch. And so, for nearly an hour ("Were we stuck that long? Who's counting?") they snuggle and kiss and each silently concludes "Life is good."

Most of us have experiences that warrant the claim "Life is good." Not all ofthese are romantic, though many are. We believe human connection to be a valuable thing, and we desire it for ourselves and our loved ones. We are touched by Glenn and Stacy's story because it is familiar, and also because we long for it to be more familiar. We dream about finding "that special someone," and we typically hope that incidents like the above will not be isolated phenomena, but part ofa larger picture. Perhaps Glenn and Stacy will eventually marry and spend their lives to-

gether, occasionally reminiscing about that sweet and tender moment on the bridge.

The above anecdote is based on a true story. Sadly, the real-life Glenn and Stacy split up a month later, just two days before Christmas. But the more salient feature of the real-life counterparts to my story is that they were both men - on their way home from celebrating Stacy's birthday at a gay bar in New York City's Greenwich Village, stuck on the Williamsburg Bridge. The only detail I altered was their names. Suddenly, what at first appeared to be a charming little story will now strike many as controversial, even revolting. "But that's just wrong," they counter, and they are not alone in that sentiment. Indeed, no matter how right and good and beautiful the experience felt to Glenn and Stacy at the time, there are countless others who will object that the two of them are simply deceiving themselves.

Some of these objectors even claim to have had relevant similar experiences. I am reminded, for example, of a speech given by a self-professed "ex-gay" - let's call him Charles - at a campus where I once taught. Charles, who knew firsthand what he called "the homosexual lifestyle, " recounted an incident where he was engaged in a sexual experience with a stranger at a highway rest stop. There he stood, surrounded by the dreary lighting and horrible stench of a public restroom: "Suddenly I knew deep in my heart that what I was doing was wrong," he said almost

Sexuality

tearfully, "and I vowed then and there that I would change." And when Glenn (who happened also to be in the audience listening to Charles's speech) stood up to counter with his own experiences, Charles looked him in the eye and said, "Come on, you know that it's wrong."

Two stories, two experiences, two very different moral conclusions. Glenn now claims that no amount of argument will ever convince him that what happened that day on the bridge was anything other than sublime; Charles is equally firm in his convictions. Both believe that their experiences offer moral insight into homosexuality: one sees it as a means of human connection and deep personal fulfillment; the other, as a misguided addiction leading to despair and hopelessness. This paper is not written for them, at least not primarily. Rather, I address myself to the many sincere individuals who have had neither experience and remain perplexed by the issue. What moral conclusions should we reach about Glenn, Charles, and those similar to them? And to what extent (if any) should their testimony be relevant to such conclusions? In what follows I explore these questions. Although my central aim is to defend Glenn and Stacy (and more generally, homosexuality), I hope in the process to shed some light on whether and how the experience of gays and lesbians is relevant to our moral theorizing about them.

The Prima Facie Argument for Homosexuality

Let us return to our happy gay couple on the bridge. They believe that this experience is beautiful and meaningful and good, by which term they mean to indicate a positive moral assessment. We might be tempted to reply, "So what?" Their believing it to be good doesn't make it so. People often approve of wrongful acts (slavery is an excellent historical example, though there are numerous contemporary ones). Moreover, the claim that "if it feels good, do it," has been justly criticized as a shoddy excuse for all kinds of objectionable behavior. One might even argue that the fact that homosexual behavior feels "good" or

"right" or "natural" to Glenn and Stacy is just further evidence of their depravity. So if that's all we can say on their behalf, we have a fairly unconvincing case.

I think, however, that there's more to be said on their behalf. Recall the case as I initially described it. Most readers probably assumed that Glenn and Stacy were a man and a woman, even though both names are genderambiguous. (Consider Glenn Close and Stacy Keach, for example). And under that assumption, most readers probably shared a positive reaction to the story, or at least experienced no negative one. What was it about the behavior that made it seem good? There are several relevant features, I think. First, as noted above, the behavior was pleasurable. This fact is not sufficient to justify it, but all else being equal, it is certainly a point in its favor. Pleasure is in itself a good thing, although sometimes (as with drug addiction or overeating) it can have long-term bad effects. Second, the behavior opened an avenue of communication, allowing them to express affection in a manner for which mere words would have been inadequate. Third, and related, the behavior facilitated a kind of connection between the two parties: their physical intimacy both manifested and enhanced their emotional intimacy. Finally, there were no relevant negative features mentioned: the activity wasn't coerced, nor did it seem - at least under the initial description - to put them at any risk. (It would have been quite different, for instance, if they had been engaging in the activity while one of them was attempting to drive.)

Let us generalize from these reactions to the assumed-heterosexual Glenn and Stacy and consider the moral value of heterosexual activity more broadly. One might want to claim that heterosexual activity is valuable because of its role in the production of children. This is one of its values, no doubt, but it certainly is not the whole of it. Indeed, to view heterosexual activity as valuable solely as a means to producing children would be to reduce sexual partners to mere baby-making machines. Rather, hetero-

with Glenn and Stacy: it is pleasurable; it is a form of communication; it manifests and en-

hances intimacy between persons. These are reasons why activities such as kissing, cuddling, and caressing can be morally valuable even when they do not lead to intercourse. And they are reasons why heterosexual intercourse is valuable even when (as in the vast majority of cases) it does not lead to reproduction. There are a variety of concrete human goods that can be realized in sexual activity even between partners who cannot have children or choose not to do so. The Glenn and Stacy story (under the heterosexual assumption, at least) strikes a familiar chord precisely because these goods are so evident.

The analogy between the assumed-heterosex- ual Glenn and Stacy and the actual homosexual Glenn and Stacy suggests a prima facie argument in favor of homosexuality. To put it simply, homosexual activity can realize all of the concrete goods that non-procreative heterosexual activity does. It can be an avenue of intimacy, of pleasure, and of lasting interpersonal fulfillment. Over the long haul, it can play a role in building relationships that can be important sources of growth. Anyone who has been in a long-term relationship will understand how physical intimacy not only expresses but also facilitates deep emotional bonds. These bonds enrich human life and can make us better people - happier, more secure, more sensitive and more generous. They are the kinds of things that make us want to shout, "Life is good!"

Thus, even at first blush, there is more to be said in Glenn's and Stacy's favor than "if it feels good, do it." Yes, their romantic connection feels good, but it also has a much larger role to play in their lives. Of course, not every homosexual encounter will realize the various goods mentioned. Recall, for example, the story of Charles, whose experiences left him feeling empty and degraded. I do not wish to be dismissive of his experience, but instead to criticize the way in which he generalizes from that experience to make a claim about all homosexual experience. Just as it would be wrong for Glenn to claim, on the basis of his experience with Stacy, that all homosexual experience is deep and meaningful, it is wrong for Charles to claim, on the basis of his encounters at the rest

stop, that none is. Sex is powerful, and like most other powerful things, it can have good and bad effects. This is as true for homosexual experience as for heterosexual experience. Analogously, it would be wrong to draw a blanket conclusion about heterosexuality from observations about the heterosexual couples portrayed on the Jerry Springer show, for example - though many people make precisely this sort of mistake with respect to homosexuality.

My point is that testimony like Glenn's demonstrates that homosexual experience can sometimes realize the very same concrete goods sometimes realized by non-procreative heterosexual experience. This evidence is especially powerful when it includes the testimony of homosexual people who have experienced long-term romantic relationships and the goods associated with them. Through our own experience with such goods we recognize them as valuable, and thus we would need a very strong reason to deny them to others or to judge others wrong for pursuing them. Yet moral opponents of homosexuality do precisely that. They are not simply making some theoretical claim about some abstract construct: they are claiming that actual persons (like Glenn and Stacy) are wrong to engage in concrete actions (like "making out" on the bridge). Given the prima facie argument just sketched, the burden of proof is on such opponents to explain some relevant difference between the case of the as- sumed-heterosexual Glenn and Stacy and that of the actual homosexual Glenn and Stacy. Why, despite the apparently identical concrete goods realized in each case, is the one morally right and the other morally wrong?

Before proceeding, I should acknowledge a certain vagueness in my remarks thus far. I described Glenn and Stacy as "making out," which can comprise a rather wide variety of activities, depending on whom one asks. Opponents of homosexuality might suggest that whether the activity should be evaluated differently in the homosexual and heterosexual cases depends on what "making out" means. For instance, they might claim that if Glenn and his boyfriend were merely kissing, the activity was permissible, but if they were doing something "more than" that, it was not. I find this

Sexuality

suggestion rather strange, but it is worth considering, if only briefly. When people condemn homosexuality, what activities are they condemning? Presumably, there are a wide variety of activities and choices that make up Glenn's romantic life. Some of these may be sexual, but most, presumably, are not. Indeed, Glenn's taking Stacy out for a romantic birthday dinner in some sense manifests Glenn's homosexuality, yet few would be prepared to condemn that.

Rather than settle this issue here, let me state my thesis as follows: whatever sort of activity is permissible for heterosexuals is permissible for homosexuals. Thus, if heterosexual kissing is permissible, then (all else being equal) homosexual kissing is permissible. If heterosexual oral sex is permissible, then homosexual oral sex is permissible - and so on. The reason is that the very same goods can be realized in the homosexual case as in the (non-procreative) heterosexual case. The burden of proof is on opponents to indicate some morally relevant difference between the two cases.

Some Counterarguments

I turn now to some attempts to indicate such a difference. For initial appearances may be misleading, and what seem at first glance to be similar cases may in fact be quite different. Perhaps the opponent of homosexuality is correct in claiming that (the actual homosexual) Glenn and Stacy are simply deceived about the goods they're realizing.

Emotional risks and Levin sargument

In what ways might Glenn and Stacy be deceived? One possible answer is that although their activity seems good now, it will be regretted later. Here one might point to Charles's experience and claim that Glenn and Stacy will be left feeling similarly empty and alone over time. The problem with this claim is that the evidence suggests otherwise. While some gays and lesbians - just like some heterosexuals - experience their sex lives as largely negative, many do not. Indeed, one noteworthy result of the increasing number of "out" gays and les-

bians is that it has provided mounting public evidence that homosexual relationships can be just as fulfilling as heterosexual ones. One might be tempted to dismiss such evidence as "mere testimony," but that dismissal applies equally to the case of Charles. If we are to take people's experiences seriously, we must conclude that some people are happy engaging in homosexual activity even while others are miserable doing so.

Of course, if most people who engage in homosexual activity turn out to be miserable as a result, then there might be good reasons for society to discourage homosexuality (even if we do not conclude that it is immoral, strictly speaking). If nine out of ten friends report that Woody Allen's most recent film is wretched, their testimony might provide sufficient reason for declining to watch it (and for recommending that others not watch it) even if the tenth friend positively raves about it. Analogously, ifthe vast majority of people who engage in homosexual activity tell stories similar to Charles's, then one might have a good prudential reason, and perhaps even a good moral reason, to refrain from homosexual behavior and to encourage others to do the same. In a well-known article reprinted in this volume, Michael Levin offers a complex version of this kind of prudential argument. I Levin contends that homosexuality is likely to lead to unhappiness because it is "abnormal"; thus, it should be avoided and discouraged. Since Levin's argument includes the most rigorous attempt to date to articulate the view that homosexuality is a kind of "biological error," it merits some discussion.

In calling homosexuality "abnormal," Levin does not simply mean it is uncommon or rare. Being a philosophy professor is uncommon (in the sense that only a small minority of people do it), but it is not "abnormal" in Levin's sense. For Levin, an activity is abnormal in the relevant sense whenever it involves using an organ for purposes for which it was not intended. Levin argues that penises are for inserting into vaginas, not for inserting into mouths or other orifices; vaginas are for receiving penises, not for rubbing up against other vaginas.

One fortunate feature of Levin's claim about the purpose of genitalia is that it does not

depend upon any controversial claims about divine intentions. (That matter is best left for theologians to debate, and in any case would take us too far afield here?) Rather, he bases his argument on evolutionary theory. For Levin, an organ is for some function if and only if that function explains its existence through evolution. Our teeth are for chewing: we have teeth because our ancestors who used their teeth for chewing tended to survive and reproduce, creating progeny who also had teeth and used them for chewing. In a later article Levin illustrates further:

Shark teeth are for tearing flesh, since primeval sharks with sharp teeth devoured prey more efficiently than less well-endowed competitors, and were thereby fitter. Thus, their ability to tear flesh explains why there are shark teeth. Shark teeth also impress aquarium visitors, but that is not what shark teeth are for because impressing aquarium visitors is not why today's sharks have sharp teeth. 3

In a similar fashion, Levin argues that human beings have penises and vaginas because our ancestors who put their penises into vaginas (or put their vaginas around penises) tended to reproduce, passing along the tendency to have penises and vaginas and to use them in this way. That is what genitalia are .for. Any other uses (such as homosexual acts) are abnormal.

Levin connects normality and happiness in the following way. Evolution tends to make us enjoy normal behaviors because in doing so it reinforces them:

Evolution makes us like what makes us fit; it makes organisms not only seek food, but enjoy it, for organisms reinforced by eating are more apt to eat than competitors who are not, and therefore more apt to reproduce. 4

Our ancestors who enjoyed using their teeth for chewing tended to use their teeth this way and thus lived longer and created more offspring, who in turn enjoyed using their teeth in this way. In a sense, we are "programmed" through evolution to enjoy using our organs in

evolutionarily adaptive (i.e. normal) ways. Correspondingly, we are likely to be unhappy when we use them in abnormal ways. Levin uses the peculiar example of Mr. Jones, who removes all his teeth and wears them as a necklace. Because of the evolutionary processes of which he is a product, Jones is likely eventually to feel dissatisfaction at his inability to chew. For similar reasons, those who use their genitalia in abnormal ways are likely eventually to feel dissatisfied. We should thus not be surprised by testimony like that of Charles, who claimed that "the homosexual lifestyle" made him miserable. Evolutionary theory gives us reason to expect that abnormal behaviors will lead to unhappiness.

Herein lies Levin's justification for treating the homosexual Glenn and Stacy differently from their heterosexual counterparts. Homosexuals, insofar as they are engaging in abnormal behavior, are likely to be less happy than heterosexuals. Society has an interest in maintaining and promoting the happiness of its members. Therefore, society is justified in using legal and social sanctions to discourage homosexuality. Notably, Levin does not claim to have established that homosexuality is immoral. Rather, he claims to have shown that homosexuality is intrinsically bad in a prudential sense, much like smoking, or (to repeat an example) watching movies that have been widely panned. (Of course, given certain versions of utilitarianism, Levin's argument might have moral implications as well.)

There is much to be said about Levin's argument, and particularly about his account of evolution, which is problematic on several counts. For brevity's sake, however, I shall limit my response to the portion of his argument most relevant to my thesis - namely, his contentions about the connection between abnormality and unhappiness. 5 There are several points to be made here. First, it seems implausible to claim that people tend to enjoy using their organs only for those purposes that explain the organs' existence. Human beings have ears because the ability to hear helped our ancestors to detect approaching predators (and thus to survive and reproduce), but it does not follow that it will make us unhappy to use them to sport earrings, to listen to

Sexuality

music, or to keep our eyeglasses from slipping off our noses. Indeed, although such uses are "abnormal" according to Levin's definition, they all seem to promote human happiness (and even, in the eyeglass case, survival) rather than to detract from it. Similarly, using the genital organs to express affection - even if that is not what they are for, in Levin's technical sense - seems clearly to promote happiness. Why else would people persist in doing it?

This brings me to a second important point. Levin's argument is a probabilistic one, in that it suggests that most of the time, we should expect that abnormal behaviors will correlate with unhappiness. But what should we do when our expectations are contradicted by the evidence - as in the case of Glenn and Stacy? Presumably, they engage in homosexual behavior precisely because such behavior makes them happy. Even if we don't expect or understand their preference, that is no reason to condemn it. Perhaps there is some complex evolutionary reason explaining why homosexuality (which admittedly seems to be a counterselective trait) continues to manifest itself across time and cultures. In any case, Levin's argument fails to explain the undeniable fact that some people - despite immense social pressure and even threat of prosecution - want to pursue homosexual relationships and enjoy doing so. As Andrew Koppelman writes, "People tend to want to do what will make them happy, and they don't need Levin to tell them not to pull out their teeth and wear them as necklaces. Whatever it is that makes homosexual sex gratifying to some people is missing from his model.,,6

Levin might respond by claiming that although some people find homosexual sex gratifying, most do not. This claim is doubtless correct, but it still doesn't explain why we should condemn or discourage those who do find it gratifying. Nor do Levin's statistics about homosexual unhappiness provide much help. For even if we grant that homosexuals are on average less happy than heterosexuals, and even if we grant - what seems exceedingly implausible - that this supposed disparity has nothing to do with society's treatment of the groups in question, Levin's conclusion about how society should treat homosexuals still doesn't follow. For if one is con-

cerned with promoting a happy society, the question to ask is not, "Who is happier - heterosexuals or homosexuals?" The question to ask is "Is society better off (i.e., happier overall) by supporting or discouraging homosexuality?"

Recall that we are talking about actual people here - people like Glenn and Stacy. There are at least three stances society could take toward them (if I may be permitted some oversimplification). First, it could condemn their relationships, perhaps encouraging them to seek heterosexual relationships instead. This approach does nothing for the general happiness; indeed, insofar as it interferes with these individuals' pursuit of happiness and perhaps even pressures them into relationships for which they are unsuited, it seems bound to promote misery.7 (Even proponents of so-called "reparative therapy" for homosexuals admit that it has scant success.s) Second, society could "tolerate" such relationships - a kind of "live and let live" attitude. Finally, it could encourage and support such relationships, much as it does with heterosexual relationships.

Without entering the thorny debate over gay marriage, I suggest that this third option - active support - is the one most likely to achieve Levin's expressed aim of promoting happiness. After all, it is widely recognized that romantic relationships, which are conducive to many important goods, require considerable effort to sustain. The support of friends, family, and society is invaluable in this regard. That the relationships in which Glenn and Stacy find fulfillment are homosexual is no reason to deny them such support. Indeed, insofar as these relationships make them not merely happier but also more stable, sensitive, and productive members of society, societal support of their relationship is not merely in their interest but in society's interest as well.

I conclude that Levin's argument gives us no reason to treat homosexuals any differently from non-procreating heterosexuals: the unhappiness that Levin alleges in connection with homosexuality is either non-existent or irrelevant. However, many people condemn homosexuality not because of its alleged emotional risks but instead because of its alleged physical risks - in particular, its connection with diseases

like AIDS. I turn now to such arguments. (For simplicity's sake I will use the example of AIDS throughout, though the points made will apply, mutatis mutandis, to other diseases as well.)

Physical risks

Recall that the activity I initially described was Glenn's and Stacy's "making out" in the car - an activity that carries relatively little risk of disease and is probably safer than driving. 9 But what about oral and anal intercourse? These do in fact pose some risk of disease, and no amount of personal testimony from Glenn and Stacy can change this fact. I have two responses. First, it is important to remember that these activities pose a risk of disease only insofar as one's partner carries the disease. While this seems patently obvious, opponents of homosexuality often speak as if (male) homosexual sex causes AIDS in the same way that sparks cause fires. This view is simply naIve. AIDS is caused by the HIV-virus and cannot develop without it. If Glenn and Stacy are both virus-free, they can have intercourse with each other for days on end and not worry for a moment about contracting AIDS. (Fatigue, yes; AIDS, no.) It would be a different matter if Glenn were having sex with people whose HIV status he didn't know, but this brings me to my second point. Insofar as oral and anal sex transmit bodily fluids, they are risky regardless of the gender of the participants. Prudence dictates that Glenn protect himself against AIDS whether Stacy is an unfamiliar man or an unfamiliar woman; sex with either could pose an AIDS risk.

Now it may be the case that in a given population a homosexual male is statistically more likely to carry the virus than a heterosexual female, and thus, that male homosexual sex in that population is statistically riskier than heterosexual sex. But what is the moral force of that? Under such circumstances, homosexual sex would be riskier for men than heterosexual sex in the same way that, in our own society, heterosexual sex is riskier for women than homosexual sex. (Lesbians have a remarkably low incidence of AIDS, not to mention cervical cancer.) Yet no one infers from these facts that

the Surgeon General should recommend lesbianism, or that we should condemn women who decline to pursue it. It remains unclear how one justifies the move from claiming that an activity is risky to claiming that it is immoral. Being a coal miner is riskier than being a college professor, yet the latter profession carries no moral superiority as a result.

We can summarize the problems with the physical-risk argument as follows. The argument seems to be something like the following:

Homosexual activity is risky.

Risky activity is immoral.

Therefore, homosexual activity is immoral.

Both premises are false, or at least ambiguous, as written. Some homosexual activity is risky, as is some heterosexual activity, not to mention some activities that are not sexual at all. Some risky activities may be immoral - particularly, if they put non-consenting parties at risk - but many are not. Moreover, even if risky activities were essentially immoral, they would be equally immoral for heterosexuals and homosexuals. The argument gives us no reason to distinguish morally between the as- sumed-heterosexual Glenn and Stacy and the actual homosexual ones.

Finnis and the PIB argument

At this point opponents of homosexuality might try a different tack. Thus far I have argued that homosexual behavior can realize the same goods as (non-procreative) heterosexual behavior. In doing so, I have focused on the effects of such behavior - in particular, its contribution to a happy and fulfilling life. But perhaps I have been missing something. Maybe there are certain other, less obvious goods which are realized by heterosexual activity - including non-procre- ative heterosexual activity - but not by homosexual activity. Such goods might constitute a relevant difference between the cases of the assumed-heterosexual Glenn and Stacy and the actual homosexual Glenn and Stacy.

John Finnis argues along such lines. \0 Understanding Finnis's argument requires understanding his natural law theory. As one of the