es6

journal of

Research article

RESEARC

II

JournalofPeace Research

Economic

sanctions and the duration

or

47(2) 129-141 2010

?71,6and

Aud;or<s)

Reprints

permission:

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? I ? sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav

connictsdol 10.1177/0022343309356489

Abstract

This article studies the impact of economic

sanctions on the duration and outcome of intrastate conflicts. Sanctions are argued to

fosterthe convergence of beliefsover parties' capacity, to reduce theutilityof victoryand to increase the costs of continuing

fightingUsing. a sample of 87 wars and new data on

sanctions and sanction types,the author shows that sanctions and their

durations

are

statistically

associated

with shorter

intrastate

conflicts.

It is also

shown

that

total economic

embargoes

are

the most

effective

type

of coercive

measure

in these cases

and

that

sanctions

imposed

either

by

international

organizations

or

by other

and

I demonstrate

that

sanctions imposed by

international

institutions

increase

the

likelihood

of

conflict

resolution,

whereas

those sanctionsnot

imposed by

such institutionstend to increasethe

probability

of a

Moreover, ifthe

targeted

state

is a member

military victory.

of the

international

institution

imposing

the sanctions,

the effect of

such coercion

is even

greater.

Economic

embargoes are also proven to increase the likelihoodsof amilitary and a negotiated end,whereas

internationalarms embargoes

reduce the likelihood of a

military victory.

ing contemporaneous

of each

typeof external intervention.

Finally,

scholars

have

also

sought

tomeasure

and

explain

coer

the number ofmonths

Their

results,

a

sample

of 55 wars between 1960 and

cion effectivenessfrom theperspectiveof the typeofmeasures

using

applied

or according

to the

senders'

characteristics.

One

part

2000,

show

that

economic

interventions

have

a

effect

positive

of thedebate revolvesaroundwhether unilateralormultilateral

onwar

but are

and that

are more

length

wholly insignificant,

onlymilitary

sanctions

effective

(Bapat

&

Morgan,

2007; Drezner,

interventionson thesideof therebelsresultin shortercivilwars.

1999;

Hufbauer,

Schott & Elliott,

1990; Kaempfer &

The

studyof the likelihood ofwar

endmay

overlook the

Lowenberg, 1999), aswell

as around the role of international

alternative

ways

in which

a

conflict

can

actually

terminate.

organizations

(Drezner,

2000)

and

the

involvement of

Consequently, simple durationmodels

have

thedisadvantage

that

they

do

not

differentiatethe differenteffectsof a

given

war

1

covariate

on

the alternative

outcomes,

because

the

reports the same rateof success, about one

The updated version of thebook

an

coefficientswould

be

average

effectofhow factors

third. See Hufbauer

et al. (2007).

reflecting

motivations

for

such

measures

are

intrastate

conflicts,

human

Following thissimple scheme, sanctionsmay operate in the

rights

violations

and

political

violence.

Therefore,

an

appropri

ate way

to

assess

their

success

is to

analyze

whether

sanctions

contextof civilwar (i) by alteringtheparties' beliefsabout the

have been of any help

wars

(and fostering

relativedistribution of

power

(which affect the combatants'

in shorteningcivil

conflict

resolution).

However,

the

studies

of

external

interven

estimations of theprobability of victory,pe),

(ii) by affecting

tions

reviewed

above

have

not

considered

sanctions

separately;

the structure of

the

incentives of the contending parties

rather,

they

consider

only

'economic

interventions',

which

(so reducing theexpected payofffromvictoryand thebenefits

may

include

aid,

grants,

loans

and

restrictions.

Thus,

we

know

of

Uy),

or (iii)

by reducing

theamount of

-

-

continuing fighting,

littleabout

the

if

of economic sanctions

financial

resources

and

arms

necessary

to

sustain

warfare,

specificimpact

any

thereby increasing

the costs of

ECp.

in

the

specific

context

of

civil

war.

So

far, sanctions,

inter

fighting,

in thecontextof

preted as a

typeof costly signal from an externalactor, have

On

theone hand, sanctions can be placed

been shown to exertno

significantimpacton

theprobability

the general uncertainty thatwars

involve,which

affects the

of civilwar onset (Thyne, 2006), while

concerningwar dura

estimated

probability

of

victory,

pe.

Hence,

one

set

of

argu

tion, the existing evidence is only partial and

based

on an

ments

contends that theparties in a conflictwill continue to

extremelylimitednumber of cases

(Strandow,2006).

fight if they are uncertain about

the actual distribution of

The

potential

impact of sanctions on war

length can be

power,which makes

thedemands of theother side generally

simplyapproached from the existing third-partyintervention

unacceptable

(Filson& Werner,

2002).

In otherwords, war

perspective.

Sanctions

can

be

thought

of

as

constituting

one

duration

can

be

understood

as

the

result of

forecast

error

-

-

-

-

on

the

part of

one

of

the

actors

or

particular

form

economic

of

external

intervention

into a

usually

over-optimistic

the

associatedwith

both (Elbadawi&

Sambanis, 2000). This

view coincideswith

civil conflict

thus, involving

problems

and,

the rebellion-as-mistake

which

stresses

the

role

of

such

interventions.

Accordingly,

external

interventions

may

approach,

make

itdifficultto reach an agreement or a military victory

misperceptions about themilitary capabilityand, hence, about

by entailing the involvement in the conflict of a new veto

theprobabilityofvictory (pe)as a key determinantofwar per

which

might

reduce the

of

acceptable agreements

sistence (Hirshleifer,2001;

Collier, Hoeffier &

S?derbom,

player,

range

Gleditsch &

(Cunningham, 2006),

by reducing thecosts of rebellioncoor

2004).

Indeed, Cunningham,

Salehyan

(2005)

dination (Elbadawi&

Sambanis, 2000),

or by shiftingthebal

show thatcivilwars

tend to last longerwhen

rebelgroups are

ance

of parties'

capabilities

toward parity

(Regan,

2002).

weaker

vis-?-vis the

government.

Under

such

conditions,

a

Consequently,

and according

to

the

existing

evidence

on

exter

settlement is

clearly

implausible. All

in all,

as

Strandow

nal

interventions

reviewed

in

the

previous

section,

economic

(2006)

claims, conflict resolution is the resultof convergence

sanctionswould

tend to lengthen theduration of civilwars,

of the parties' beliefs

over

their relativepower distribution,

as indeed suggestedbymany

of the empirical findings, such

which

sanctions can help

to promote by influencingprivate

as

Regan's

(2002)

which

shows thateconomic

interven

information,

thereby

making

the each

side's

estimated

prob

study,

tions

tend

to prolong

civil

wars.

abilityofwinning,pe, progressivelyapproach therealprobabil

In

contrast,

sanctions

can

be

argued

to

decrease

civil war

ityof victory,pe

?

pr. This

makes possible thatone

side's

duration

through

various,

more

specific, mechanisms.

In

simple

formal

and somewhat

Mason,

&

2

terms,

Weingarten

following

According

toMason,

Weingarten

&

Fett

(1999: 242),

these costs

'must be

Fett's (1999)

setting,each party'sexpected utilityof continued

summed

from the present until that point

in time in the future,when

the

fightingat a given timecan be expressedas follows:

party in question

estimates

that

itwill

be

able

to achieve

victory',

so

they

132

journal of "PeaceResearch

47(2)

demands

can be accepted by theother as they reflectits real

the

government.

As

for

the

rebel

side,

sanctions

are usually

power.

For

instance,

sanctions

are

argued

to have

been

success

aimed at limitingthefunding thatsome of thesegroups obtain

ful in stabilizing the Liberian

conflict.The

arms embargo

through

contraband.

For

example,

it is argued

that

the Lancas

(imposed

in

1992)

made

the

acquisition

and

delivery

of

terHouse

agreement (1979)

that

an

end to theconflict in

weap

put

sanc

onsmore difficultand less

predictable (Wallensteen,

Eriksson

Rhodesia was

in

made

possible by

theextensiveUN

we

are

part

&

Strandow, 2006).

Charles Taylor

even declared

tions, imposed in 1966,

that forbade trade (the insuringof

hands-tied as a resultof thearms embargo' (cited inStrandow,

commodities or goods,

exports and

importsfromRhodesia)

2006:

11).A

comprehensive peace

agreementwas

reached in

aswell

as financial exchangewith

the targetcountry, and

so

August 2003. The

settlementprompted the resignationof for

weakened

Ian

Smith's

government

and

forces.

The

diamond

mer presidentCharles Taylor.

The National Transitional Gov

embargo recentlyimposed on IvoryCoast

(2005)

is intended

ernmentofLiberia

(NTGL)

- which

included both rebeland

to reduce the revenues raised fromexport and production by

government

groups

-

took

over

two months

later.

the

rebels of

the New

Forces

(Wallensteen, Eriksson &

On

theotherhand, sanctionsmay

shortenconflictthrough

Strandow,

2006).

Diamond

sanctions

have

been

imposed

their

impact

on

the

parties'

incentives

to

continue

the

fight,

againstUNITA

inAngola

(alongwith petroleum sanctions),

that is, the expected utilitya partywould

derive fromvictory

SierraLeone

and Liberia.

It is argued that the2001

diamond

(Uy) and

the utilityof sustained conflict. If some civilwars

sanctions

on

Liberia

were

effective

in reducing

government

effectivelycontain a greed component

(Collier &

Hoeffler,

revenues and, consequently shorteningthe conflict (Wallens

2004),

then,asCollier Hoeffler&

S?derbom

(2004: 254) pro

teen,Eriksson &

Strandow, 2006).

Ifproperly enforced, all

pose,

'a

key prediction

is that the

higher

the

payoff

fromvic

of themare

principallydesigned

to cut to some extent the flow

tory,

the

would

be

thewarranted

rebellion'.Rebellion

of monetary

and

military

resources

into

the

hands

of

the

con

longer

is

seen

as

an

investment

in

this case,

and

economic

sanctions,

tendingparties (especially the rebels).

by

restrictingthe expected benefits of resource control and

So

letus framethefollowingguiding hypotheses, relyingon

export,

may

alter

parties'

incentives

to

prolong

a conflict.

Like

both

the

arguments

against

the

usefulness

of sanctions

and

on

wise,

in

the

conceptualization

of

rebellion

as business,

groups

the

three basic

mechanisms

just mentioned

above

in

favour

of

have

an

incentive

to

continue

fighting when

the

general

state

sanctions'

role

in

shortening

conflicts:

of

lawlessnessmakes

contraband and

other

illegal activities

possible and highlyprofitable (Collier, 2000).

Indeed, Fearon

Hla:

Sanctions,

as

a sort of

external

intervention,

are

negatively

(2004)

shows that contraband by rebels increaseswar

dura

related

to

the probability

of war

end.

tion, especially given the presence of lootablegoods

likedia

lb: The

duration

of civil war

is decreased

by

the

imposition

of

monds

and

gemstones

(Buhaug, Gates

&

Lujala,

2002).

sanctions.

Perhaps theclearestexamples ofmeasures

seeking to limitsuch

over

sanctions

does

not

revolve

around

incentives

are

diamond

sanctions

and

other

export

restrictions.

The

debate

only

These

seek to control illicittradeand limitthe fundingof rebel

whether

they

are

effective

or

not.

The

apparent

reliance

for

groups and, thus,theexpected utilityof controlling theextrac

sanctions'

success

on

the

costs

they

impose

on

targets

com

tion

and

trade

of natural

resources

and

other

commodities.

For

pelled

governments

and

scholars

to discuss

and assess

the

type

example, the exportban and theoil embargo imposed by

the

of cost that should be

and on what

actor or

group

inflicted,

UN

against theKhmer Rouge

seriously limitedmany

gem

those costs

should

be

concentrated

in order

to

maximize

effec

mining

operations

around

Pailin

(Cambodia).

Then,

if

tiveness.

In

this

case,

comprehensive

sanctions

must

be

distin

S

stands

for

sanctions,

we

have

that

<

0.

So,

as

a

result,

guished

from

the

so-called