- •Table of Contents
- •Foreword
- •OECD Journal on Budgeting
- •Board of Advisors
- •Preface
- •Executive Summary
- •Sharp differences exist in the legal framework for budget systems
- •Public finance and legal theories do not explain inter-country differences in budget system laws
- •Political variables and legal culture help explain the inter-country differences
- •Norms for budget systems have been issued and many should be in budget system laws
- •Budget system laws are adopted to strengthen the powers of the legislature or the executive
- •Country studies reveal a multiplicity of reasons for adopting budget-related laws
- •Conclusions
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Budget processes
- •2.1. Budgeting: a five-stage process
- •Figure I.1. The roles of Parliament and the executive in the budget cycle
- •2.2. How are the different legal frameworks for budget systems organised?
- •Figure I.2. Different models for organising the legal framework of budget systems
- •3. Can economic theory explain the differences?
- •3.1. New institutional economics
- •3.2. Law, economics and public choice theory
- •3.3. Constitutional political economy: budgetary rules and budgetary outcomes
- •3.4. Can game theory help?
- •4. Can comparative law explain the differences?
- •4.1. Families of legal systems and the importance of the constitution
- •Box I.2. Purposes of constitutions and characteristics of statutes
- •4.2. Absence of norms for constitutions partly explains differences in budget system laws
- •4.3. Hierarchy within primary law also partly explains differences in budget-related laws
- •Box I.3. Hierarchy of laws: The example of Spain
- •4.4. Not all countries complete all steps of formal law-making processes
- •Box I.4. Steps in making law
- •4.5. Greater use is made of secondary law in some countries
- •Table I.1. Delegated legislation and separation of powers
- •4.6. Decisions and regulations of the legislature are particularly important in some countries
- •4.8. Are laws “green lights” or “red lights”?
- •5. Forms of government and budget system laws
- •5.1. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchies
- •5.2. Presidential and semi-presidential governments
- •5.3. Parliamentary republics
- •5.4. Relationship between forms of government and budget system law
- •Table I.2. Differences in selected budgetary powers of the executive and the legislature
- •Figure I.3. Separation of powers and the need to adopt budget-related laws
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Introduction
- •Figure II.1. Density of legal framework for budget systems in 25 OECD countries
- •Table II.1. Legal frameworks for budget systems: 13 OECD countries
- •2. Different purposes of the legal frameworks for budget systems
- •Box II.1. Purposes of budget system laws
- •2.1. Legal necessity?
- •Figure II.2. Budget reforms and changes in budget laws
- •2.2. Budget reform: when is law required?
- •2.3. Elaborating on the budget powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive
- •3. Differences in the legal framework for the main actors in budget systems
- •3.1. Legislatures
- •3.2. Executives
- •Box II.2. New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988
- •3.3. Judiciary
- •3.4. External audit offices
- •Table II.3. External audit legal frameworks: Selected differences
- •3.5. Sub-national governments
- •3.6. Supra-national bodies and international organisations
- •4. Differences in the legal framework for budget processes
- •4.1. Budget preparation by the executive
- •Table II.4. Legal requirements for the date of submission of the budget to the legislature
- •Box II.3. France: Legal requirements for budget information
- •4.2. Parliamentary approval of the budget
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting systems
- •Box II.4. Finland: Legal requirements for annual report and annual accounts
- •Table II.5. Legal requirements for submission of annual report to the legislature: Selected countries
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Have standards for the legal framework of budget systems been drawn up?
- •1.1. Normative and positive approaches to budget law
- •1.2. Limited guidance from normative constitutional economics
- •2. Who should set and monitor legally binding standards?
- •2.1. Role of politicians and bureaucrats
- •2.2. International transmission of budget system laws
- •2.3. International organisations as standard setters
- •Box III.1. The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- •Box III.2. Constitutional norms for external audit: Extracts from the INTOSAI “Lima Declaration”
- •2.4. Monitoring standards
- •3. Principles to support the legal framework of budget systems
- •Box III.3. Ten principles for a budget law
- •3.1. Authoritativeness
- •Table III.1. Stages of the budget cycle and legal instruments
- •3.2. Annual basis
- •3.3. Universality
- •3.4. Unity
- •3.5. Specificity
- •3.6. Balance
- •3.7. Accountability
- •Box III.4. Possible minimum legal norms for budget reporting
- •Box III.5. Ingredients of legal norms for external audit
- •3.8. Transparency
- •Box III.6. Ingredients of legal norms for government agencies
- •3.9. Stability or predictability
- •3.10. Performance (or efficiency, economy, and effectiveness)
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Canada: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Canada: Main provisions of the Spending Control Act 1992
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Canada: Major transfers from the federal to the provincial governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Canada: Key steps in the annual budgeting process
- •Box 5. Canada: Major contents of the main estimates
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. France: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Germany: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 2. Germany: Public agencies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 3. Germany: Budget processes in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit17
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Japan: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Japan: Main contents of the 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Act
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Japan: Grants from central government to local governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Japan: The timetable for the budget process
- •Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Korea: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Korea: Major acts governing the fiscal relationship across government levels
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Korea: Legal requirements for the timetable for budget preparation and deliberation
- •Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
- •Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
- •Box 4. New Zealand: Information required to support the first appropriation act
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Nordic Countries: The main budget system laws or near-laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The constitutions of the four countries
- •Table 1. Nordic countries: Age and size of constitutions
- •3.2. Legislatures
- •Table 2. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the legislatures
- •3.3. The political executive
- •Table 3. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the political executive
- •3.4. Ministries and executive agencies
- •3.5. Civil service
- •3.6. Sub-national governments
- •4. Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting
- •4.1. Authority of Parliament
- •Table 4. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the authority of Parliament
- •4.2. Timing of submission of the annual budget
- •4.3. Non-adoption of the annual budget before the year begins
- •4.4. Content of the budget and types of appropriations
- •4.5. Documents to accompany the draft budget law
- •4.6. Parliamentary committees and budget procedures in Parliament
- •4.7. Parliamentary amendment powers, coalition agreements, two-stage budgeting and fiscal rules
- •4.8. Supplementary budgets
- •4.10. Cancellation of appropriations and contingency funds
- •4.11. Government accounting
- •4.12. Other fiscal reporting and special reports
- •Table 5. Nordic countries: Constitutional requirements for external audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Spain: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
- •Box 3. Spain: The major content of medium-term budget plans
- •Box 4. Spain: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United Kingdom: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system law
- •Box 2. United Kingdom: Reforms of the budget system in the past 20 years
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 3. United Kingdom: Executive agencies and other bodies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 4. United Kingdom: Budget processes in Parliament
- •Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •Table 2. United Kingdom: Transfers of budgetary authority
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United States: Main federal budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. United States: Major transfers between different levels of government
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
- •Box 5. United States: Other information required by law
- •4.2. Budget process in the legislature
- •Box 6. United States: Legal and internal deadlines for congressional budget approval
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •5. Sanctions and non-compliance
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
IV. CANADA
4.2. Budget process in Parliament
The parliamentary budget process can be divided into two distinct stages: the pre-budget consultation process and the approval process. The pre-budget consultations were started during the fiscal crisis of the 1990s as a vehicle for promoting the government’s budget policy.7 Consultations begin in September or October when the government announces its budget policy themes and releases its Economic and Fiscal Update. The process ends in early December when the House of Commons Finance Committee presents its report on the pre-budget consultations.
4.2.1. The timetable for budget adoption and constraints on the budget debate in Parliament
There are no legal requirements regarding the timing of the submission of the budget by the government, nor on the adoption of the annual Appropriation Act. In practice, however, the budget is presented to Parliament about one month before the beginning of the fiscal year, several days prior to the introduction of the estimates. Following the tabling of the budget, there is a required four days of debate on the budget. After this debate, there is a confidence vote in the House of Commons on the government’s overall management of the economy.
Following the presentation by the Minister of Finance and the President of the Treasury Board, the House of Commons begins its deliberations, following procedures laid down in Standing Orders. The estimates are automatically referred to the standing committees of the House. Each standing committee examines those parts of the estimates that fall within its mandate. There is, however, no committee that co-ordinates the examination of the estimates or examines them on an aggregated level. The standing committees can call ministers, senior officials and other interested parties to appear. The committees report back to the House on the estimates before 31 May. If they have not reported, they are deemed to have reported (this was designed so that committees could not delay the parliamentary budget process).
The Standing Orders specify that 20 days be reserved for debate of the government’s expenditure proposals in full House session. Nineteen of these days are reserved for the Opposition. Although these days are fully used by the opposition, they are used not only for debate on the estimates, but also as an opportunity for general policy debate.
4.2.2. Provisional budgets
The fiscal year starts on 1st April but the main estimates are not traditionally approved until just before Parliament’s summer recess in late June. Parliament traditionally grants the government interim supply from the beginning of the
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Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
●Late September: House of Commons Finance Committee begins public hearings on budget policy. The pre-budget consultation process begins.
●Mid October: Minister of Finance announces the government’s broad budget policy themes to the Finance Committee and releases the government’s Economic and Fiscal Update.
●Early December: Finance Committee presents its report on pre-budget consultations.
●Late February: Minister of Finance introduces the budget and the President of the Treasury Board introduces the estimates. Standing committees begin their examination of the estimates.
●Late March: The President of the Treasury Board introduces a report on plans and priorities (RPP) for each department and agency. Parliament grants interim supply to end June.
●1st April: Start of fiscal year.
●Late May: Standing committees report on the estimates.
●Late June: Approval of the estimates.
fiscal year until the end of June. Interim supply allows the government to spend the funds necessary for its ongoing operations during this period. This procedure is inherited from the United Kingdom and has no legal basis.
4.2.3. Powers of amendment
Amendment powers, which are not specified in law, are very limited. By convention, the government has exclusive power to initiate expenditure proposals. Parliament can only approve the government’s proposals, either in full or at a reduced level of funding, or reject them altogether. Parliament is prohibited from proposing new expenditure programmes or increasing the proposed level of funding.8 The role of Parliament is further limited by the “confidence” convention: a vote on any “money bill” is considered a vote of confidence in the government. This is not enshrined in any legislation but is rather a tradition enforced through party discipline. The confidence convention is interpreted strictly, meaning that any vote on a “money bill” is a vote of confidence in the government.9
4.2.4. Approval of resources
The Constitution Act 1867 clearly states that Parliament has an exclusive legislative power on matters relating to the raising of money by any mode or system of taxation. It is therefore illegal for the executive to raise a tax or levy
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IV. CANADA
without having legislative authority from Parliament. At the federal level, all tax liabilities, credits, deductions, and exemptions are embodied in statutes (for instance, the Income Tax Act, the Customs Act, and the Excise Act). All revenues including taxes, tariffs and other money received by the federal government must be credited to the Consolidated Revenue Fund and be properly accounted for.
4.2.5. The nature, structure and duration of appropriations
The estimates aim at presenting to Parliament information in support of budgetary and non-budgetary spending authorities that will be sought through appropriation bills. These authorities are divided into two categories: voted and statutory. Voted authorities are those for which the government must seek Parliament’s approval annually through an Appropriation Act. The authority attributable to each vote appears in a schedule attached to the Appropriation Act. Once approved, the vote wording and approved amounts become the governing conditions under which specific expenditures may be made. When approved by Parliament, the relevant estimates form the basis for the annual Appropriation Act for that year, which is adopted like any other piece of legislation.
There is no statutory provision for the appropriations structure and detailed budget classification. Traditionally the main estimates are first classified according to section, which represents around 20 broad functional categories of public expenditures. For instance, sections include agriculture and agri-food, environment, finance, health, industry, national defence, transport, Canadian heritage and foreign affairs and international trade. Within sections, the estimates are further classified according to department or agency, within which various votes are included. To determine and report more accurately the impact of government revenues and expenditures on the economy, the main estimates are also classified according to 12 standard objects of expenditure, including personnel, transportation and communications, information, professional and special services, rentals, purchased repair and maintenance, acquisition of land, buildings and works, transfer payments, and public debt charges.
4.2.6. Carryover of appropriations and borrowing of future appropriations
In principle, the balance of unexpended appropriations lapses at the end of a fiscal year (FAA, Art. 37). However, the government permits the carryover of unused appropriations up to 5% for operating costs. There is also a system for carryover of unspent capital appropriations – these are approved on a case- by-case basis. The Department of Finance and the Treasury Board Secretariat add amounts equal to the carryovers to the requested funding levels from
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Parliament in the subsequent year. Annual appropriations for the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency and the Canada Parks Agency do not lapse until two years following the start of the fiscal year in which the appropriation was granted.
4.2.7. Public debt approval
Confronted with high indebtedness in the 1990s, Canada has very strict legal control over debt issuance. Part IV of the FAA is devoted exclusively to public debt. Article 43 states that no money shall be borrowed by the government except as provided by or under the FAA or any other Act of Parliament that expressly authorises the borrowing of money. In addition, no securities shall be issued by the government without the authority of Parliament. Once Parliament has provided legal authority, the FAA provides for the Governor in Council to authorise the Minister of Finance to borrow money by any means that the Minister considers appropriate (Art. 44). The Minister is thereby authorised, for example, to make portfolio shifts between different debt instruments.
4.2.8. Promulgation, veto and publication of the adopted budget
There is a legal requirement to publish all statutes, including the Appropriations Act, under the Revised Publication of Statutes Act 1985. The documents for the budget and updates are available on the Internet site of the Department of Finance.
4.2.9. Supplementary budgets (rectifying laws)
The main estimates provide funding only for programmes and activities for which there is existing parliamentary authority. Parliament may be asked in supplementary estimates, tabled later in the year, for funding for new initiatives. The supplementary estimates may contain funding for unforeseen contingencies if the budget’s reserve for funding new initiatives and contingencies is completely exhausted.
4.2.10. Budgetary implications of other bills
There is no legal provision which requires any bill having budgetary implications to be reviewed by the Cabinet or a parliamentary committee before it is approved by Parliament. It should be noted that statutory authority which Parliament has approved through other legislation does not have to be approved annually as long as the enabling legislation is effective. The enabling laws set out both the purpose of the expenditure and the terms and conditions under which it may be made. Statutory spending is included in the estimates for information only, and accounts for around 70% of the total estimates.
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