- •Network Intrusion Detection, Third Edition
- •Table of Contents
- •Copyright
- •About the Authors
- •About the Technical Reviewers
- •Acknowledgments
- •Tell Us What You Think
- •Introduction
- •Chapter 1. IP Concepts
- •Layers
- •Data Flow
- •Packaging (Beyond Paper or Plastic)
- •Bits, Bytes, and Packets
- •Encapsulation Revisited
- •Interpretation of the Layers
- •Addresses
- •Physical Addresses, Media Access Controller Addresses
- •Logical Addresses, IP Addresses
- •Subnet Masks
- •Service Ports
- •IP Protocols
- •Domain Name System
- •Routing: How You Get There from Here
- •Summary
- •Chapter 2. Introduction to TCPdump and TCP
- •TCPdump
- •TCPdump Behavior
- •Filters
- •Binary Collection
- •TCPdump Output
- •Absolute and Relative Sequence Numbers
- •Dumping in Hexadecimal
- •Introduction to TCP
- •Establishing a TCP Connection
- •Server and Client Ports
- •Connection Termination
- •The Graceful Method
- •The Abrupt Method
- •Data Transfer
- •What's the Bottom Line?
- •TCP Gone Awry
- •An ACK Scan
- •A Telnet Scan?
- •TCP Session Hijacking
- •Summary
- •Chapter 3. Fragmentation
- •Theory of Fragmentation
- •All Aboard the Fragment Train
- •The Fragment Dining Car
- •The Fragment Caboose
- •Viewing Fragmentation Using TCPdump
- •Fragmentation and Packet-Filtering Devices
- •The Don't Fragment Flag
- •Malicious Fragmentation
- •TCP Header Fragments
- •Teardrop
- •Summary
- •Chapter 4. ICMP
- •ICMP Theory
- •Why Do You Need ICMP?
- •Where Does ICMP Fit In?
- •Understanding ICMP
- •Summary of ICMP Theory
- •Mapping Techniques
- •Tireless Mapper
- •Efficient Mapper
- •Clever Mapper
- •Cerebral Mapper
- •Summary of Mapping
- •Normal ICMP Activity
- •Host Unreachable
- •Port Unreachable
- •Admin Prohibited
- •Need to Frag
- •Time Exceeded In-Transit
- •Embedded Information in ICMP Error Messages
- •Summary of Normal ICMP
- •Malicious ICMP Activity
- •Smurf Attack
- •Tribe Flood Network
- •WinFreeze
- •Loki
- •Unsolicited ICMP Echo Replies
- •Theory 1: Spoofing
- •Theory 2: TFN
- •Theory 3: Loki
- •Summary of Malicious ICMP Traffic
- •To Block or Not to Block
- •Unrequited ICMP Echo Requests
- •Kiss traceroute Goodbye
- •Silence of the LANs
- •Broken Path MTU Discovery
- •Summary
- •Chapter 5. Stimulus and Response
- •The Expected
- •Request for Comments
- •TCP Stimulus-Response
- •Destination Host Listens on Requested Port
- •Destination Host Not Listening on Requested Port
- •Destination Host Doesn't Exist
- •Destination Port Blocked
- •Destination Port Blocked, Router Doesn't Respond
- •UDP Stimulus-Response
- •Destination Host Listening on Requested Port
- •Destination Host Not Listening on Requested Port
- •Windows tracert
- •TCPdump of tracert
- •Protocol Benders
- •Active FTP
- •Passive FTP
- •UNIX Traceroute
- •Summary of Expected Behavior and Protocol Benders
- •Abnormal Stimuli
- •Evasion Stimulus, Lack of Response
- •Evil Stimulus, Fatal Response
- •No Stimulus, All Response
- •Unconventional Stimulus, Operating System Identifying Response
- •Bogus "Reserved" TCP Flags
- •Anomalous TCP Flag Combinations
- •No TCP Flags
- •Summary of Abnormal Stimuli
- •Summary
- •Chapter 6. DNS
- •Back to Basics: DNS Theory
- •The Structure of DNS
- •Steppin' Out on the Internet
- •DNS Resolution Process
- •TCPdump Output of Resolution
- •Strange TCPdump Notation
- •Caching: Been There, Done That
- •Reverse Lookups
- •Master and Slave Name Servers
- •Zone Transfers
- •Summary of DNS Theory
- •Using DNS for Reconnaissance
- •The nslookup Command
- •Name That Name Server
- •HINFO: Snooping for Details
- •List Zone Map Information
- •Tainting DNS Responses
- •A Weak Link
- •Cache Poisoning
- •Summary
- •Part II: Traffic Analysis
- •Chapter 7. Packet Dissection Using TCPdump
- •Why Learn to Do Packet Dissection?
- •Sidestep DNS Queries
- •Normal Query
- •Evasive Query
- •Introduction to Packet Dissection Using TCPdump
- •Where Does the IP Stop and the Embedded Protocol Begin?
- •Other Length Fields
- •The IP Datagram Length
- •Increasing the Snaplen
- •Dissecting the Whole Packet
- •Freeware Tools for Packet Dissection
- •Ethereal
- •tcpshow
- •Summary
- •Chapter 8. Examining IP Header Fields
- •Insertion and Evasion Attacks
- •Insertion Attacks
- •Evasion Attacks
- •IP Header Fields
- •IP Version Number
- •Protocol Number
- •The Don't Fragment (DF) Flag
- •The More Fragments (MF) Flag
- •Mapping Using Incomplete Fragments
- •IP Numbers
- •IP Identification Number
- •Time to Live (TTL)
- •Looking at the IP ID and TTL Values Together to Discover Spoofing
- •IP Checksums
- •Summary
- •Chapter 9. Examining Embedded Protocol Header Fields
- •Ports
- •TCP Checksums
- •TCP Sequence Numbers
- •Acknowledgement Numbers
- •TCP Flags
- •TCP Corruption
- •ECN Flag Bits
- •Operating System Fingerprinting
- •Retransmissions
- •Using Retransmissions Against a Hostile Host—LaBrea Tarpit Version 1
- •TCP Window Size
- •LaBrea Version 2
- •Ports
- •UDP Port Scanning
- •UDP Length Field
- •ICMP
- •Type and Code
- •Identification and Sequence Numbers
- •Misuse of ICMP Identification and Sequence Numbers
- •Summary
- •Chapter 10. Real-World Analysis
- •You've Been Hacked!
- •Netbus Scan
- •How Slow Can you Go?
- •RingZero Worm
- •Summary
- •Chapter 11. Mystery Traffic
- •The Event in a Nutshell
- •The Traffic
- •DDoS or Scan
- •Source Hosts
- •Destination Hosts
- •Scanning Rates
- •Fingerprinting Participant Hosts
- •Arriving TTL Values
- •TCP Window Size
- •TCP Options
- •TCP Retries
- •Summary
- •Part III: Filters/Rules for Network Monitoring
- •Chapter 12. Writing TCPdump Filters
- •The Mechanics of Writing TCPdump Filters
- •Bit Masking
- •Preserving and Discarding Individual Bits
- •Creating the Mask
- •Putting It All Together
- •TCPdump IP Filters
- •Detecting Traffic to the Broadcast Addresses
- •Detecting Fragmentation
- •TCPdump UDP Filters
- •TCPdump TCP Filters
- •Filters for Examining TCP Flags
- •Detecting Data on SYN Connections
- •Summary
- •Chapter 13. Introduction to Snort and Snort Rules
- •An Overview of Running Snort
- •Snort Rules
- •Snort Rule Anatomy
- •Rule Header Fields
- •The Action Field
- •The Protocol Field
- •The Source and Destination IP Address Fields
- •The Source and Destination Port Field
- •Direction Indicator
- •Summary
- •Chapter 14. Snort Rules - Part II
- •Format of Snort Options
- •Rule Options
- •Msg Option
- •Logto Option
- •Ttl Option
- •Id Option
- •Dsize Option
- •Sequence Option
- •Acknowledgement Option
- •Itype and Icode Options
- •Flags Option
- •Content Option
- •Offset Option
- •Depth Option
- •Nocase Option
- •Regex Option
- •Session Option
- •Resp Option
- •Tag Option
- •Putting It All Together
- •Summary
- •Part IV: Intrusion Infrastructure
- •Chapter 15. Mitnick Attack
- •Exploiting TCP
- •IP Weaknesses
- •SYN Flooding
- •Covering His Tracks
- •Identifying Trust Relationships
- •Examining Network Traces
- •Setting Up the System Compromise?
- •Detecting the Mitnick Attack
- •Trust Relationship
- •Port Scan
- •Host Scan
- •Connections to Dangerous Ports
- •TCP Wrappers
- •Tripwire
- •Preventing the Mitnick Attack
- •Summary
- •Chapter 16. Architectural Issues
- •Events of Interest
- •Limits to Observation
- •Human Factors Limit Detects
- •Limitations Caused by the Analyst
- •Limitations Caused by the CIRTs
- •Severity
- •Criticality
- •Lethality
- •Countermeasures
- •Calculating Severity
- •Scanning for Trojans
- •Analysis
- •Severity
- •Host Scan Against FTP
- •Analysis
- •Severity
- •Sensor Placement
- •Outside Firewall
- •Sensors Inside Firewall
- •Both Inside and Outside Firewall
- •Analyst Console
- •Faster Console
- •False Positive Management
- •Display Filters
- •Mark as Analyzed
- •Drill Down
- •Correlation
- •Better Reporting
- •Event-Detection Reports
- •Weekly/Monthly Summary Reports
- •Summary
- •Chapter 17. Organizational Issues
- •Organizational Security Model
- •Security Policy
- •Industry Practice for Due Care
- •Security Infrastructure
- •Implementing Priority Countermeasures
- •Periodic Reviews
- •Implementing Incident Handling
- •Defining Risk
- •Risk
- •Accepting the Risk
- •Trojan Version
- •Malicious Connections
- •Mitigating or Reducing the Risk
- •Network Attack
- •Snatch and Run
- •Transferring the Risk
- •Defining the Threat
- •Recognition of Uncertainty
- •Risk Management Is Dollar Driven
- •How Risky Is a Risk?
- •Quantitative Risk Assessment
- •Qualitative Risk Assessments
- •Why They Don't Work
- •Summary
- •Chapter 18. Automated and Manual Response
- •Automated Response
- •Architectural Issues
- •Response at the Internet Connection
- •Internal Firewalls
- •Host-Based Defenses
- •Throttling
- •Drop Connection
- •Shun
- •Proactive Shunning
- •Islanding
- •Reset
- •Honeypot
- •Proxy System
- •Empty System
- •Honeypot Summary
- •Manual Response
- •Containment
- •Freeze the Scene
- •Sample Fax Form
- •On-Site Containment
- •Site Survey
- •System Containment
- •Hot Search
- •Eradication
- •Recovery
- •Lessons Learned
- •Summary
- •Chapter 19. Business Case for Intrusion Detection
- •Part One: Management Issues
- •Bang for the Buck
- •The Expenditure Is Finite
- •Technology Used to Destabilize
- •Network Impacts
- •IDS Behavioral Modification
- •The Policy
- •Part of a Larger Strategy
- •Part Two: Threats and Vulnerabilities
- •Threat Assessment and Analysis
- •Threat Vectors
- •Threat Determination
- •Asset Identification
- •Valuation
- •Vulnerability Analysis
- •Risk Evaluation
- •Part Three: Tradeoffs and Recommended Solution
- •Identify What Is in Place
- •Identify Your Recommendations
- •Identify Options for Countermeasures
- •Cost-Benefit Analysis
- •Follow-On Steps
- •Repeat the Executive Summary
- •Summary
- •Chapter 20. Future Directions
- •Increasing Threat
- •Improved Targeting
- •How the Threat Will Be Manifested
- •Defending Against the Threat
- •Skills Versus Tools
- •Analysts Skill Set
- •Improved Tools
- •Defense in Depth
- •Emerging Techniques
- •Virus Industry Revisited
- •Smart Auditors
- •Summary
- •Part V: Appendixes
- •Appendix A. Exploits and Scans to Apply Exploits
- •False Positives
- •All Response, No Stimulus
- •Scan or Response?
- •SYN Floods
- •Valid SYN Flood
- •False Positive SYN Flood
- •Back Orifice?
- •IMAP Exploits
- •10143 Signature Source Port IMAP
- •111 Signature IMAP
- •Source Port 0, SYN and FIN Set
- •Source Port 65535 and SYN FIN Set
- •DNS Zone Followed by 0, SYN FIN Targeting NFS
- •Scans to Apply Exploits
- •mscan
- •Son of mscan
- •Access Builder?
- •Single Exploit, Portmap
- •rexec
- •Targeting SGI Systems?
- •Discard
- •Weird Web Scans
- •IP-Proto-191
- •Summary
- •Appendix B. Denial of Service
- •Brute-Force Denial-of-Service Traces
- •Smurf
- •Directed Broadcast
- •Echo-Chargen
- •Elegant Kills
- •Teardrop
- •Land Attack
- •We're Doomed
- •nmap
- •Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks
- •Intro to DDoS
- •DDoS Software
- •Trinoo
- •Stacheldraht
- •Summary
- •Appendix C. Detection of Intelligence Gathering
- •Network and Host Mapping
- •Host Scan Using UDP Echo Requests
- •Netmask-Based Broadcasts
- •Port Scan
- •Scanning for a Particular Port
- •Complex Script, Possible Compromise
- •"Random" Port Scan
- •Database Correlation Report
- •SNMP/ICMP
- •FTP Bounce
- •NetBIOS-Specific Traces
- •A Visit from a Web Server
- •Null Session
- •Stealth Attacks
- •Explicit Stealth Mapping Techniques
- •FIN Scan
- •Inverse Mapping
- •Answers to Domain Queries
- •Answers to Domain Queries, Part 2
- •Fragments, Just Fragments
- •Measuring Response Time
- •Echo Requests
- •Actual DNS Queries
- •Probe on UDP Port 33434
- •3DNS to TCP Port 53
- •Worms as Information Gatherers
- •Pretty Park Worm
- •RingZero
- •Summary
always true.
nmap –sU sparky –p 32771-34000
WARNING: -sU is now UDP scan -- for TCP FIN scan use -sF
Starting nmap V. 2.12 by Fyodor (fyodor@dhp.com, www.insecure.org/nmap/) Interesting ports on sparky (1.1.1.100):
Port |
State |
Protocol |
Service |
32771 |
open |
udp |
unknown |
32772 |
open |
udp |
unknown |
32773 |
open |
udp |
unknown |
32774 |
open |
udp |
unknown |
32782 |
open |
udp |
unknown |
32783 |
open |
udp |
unknown |
32784 |
open |
udp |
unknown |
32785 |
open |
udp |
unknown |
32786 |
open |
udp |
unknown |
32797 |
open |
udp |
unknown |
The following TCPdump output shows a sample from UDP port scanning. Any port in the scanned range that sparky does not generate an ICMP "port unreachable" message for is
assumed to be listening:
07:09:08.286810 verbo.62865 > sparky.32787: udp 07:09:08.286847 verbo.62865 > sparky.32775: udp 07:09:08.286878 verbo.62865 > sparky.32788: udp 07:09:08.286924 verbo.62865 > sparky.32789: udp 07:09:08.286969 verbo.62865 > sparky.32791: udp 07:09:08.287046 verbo.62865 > sparky.32774: udp 07:09:08.287094 verbo.62865 > sparky.32781: udp 07:09:08.287162 verbo.62865 > sparky.32772: udp 07:09:08.287229 verbo.62865 > sparky.32789: udp
07:09:08.287793 sparky > verbo: icmp: sparky udp port 32788 unreachable (DF) 07:09:08.977544 sparky > verbo: icmp: sparky udp port 32791 unreachable (DF) 07:09:09.657361 sparky > verbo: icmp: sparky udp port 32781 unreachable (DF) 07:09:10.157301 sparky > verbo: icmp: sparky udp port 32787 unreachable (DF) 07:09:10.817315 sparky > verbo: icmp: sparky udp port 32789 unreachable (DF)
UDP Length Field
The UDP length is the number of bytes found in the UDP header plus the number of bytes found in the UDP payload. The UDP header is 8 bytes so the minimum length for the UDP length is 8 bytes. The maximum theoretical byte length of an IP datagram is 65535. Given this, and that the IP header is a minimum of 20 bytes long, the theoretical maximum UDP length value is 65515.
Many UDP applications limit the length of the UDP datagram to 8192 bytes, although we saw where DNS limited the DNS payload to 512 bytes. Also, the TCP/IP stack of a given operating system as implemented in the kernel might limit the length of the UDP datagram.
ICMP
ICMP is another protocol that is fairly simple as far as the fields found in the header. Like UDP, ICMP does not guarantee delivery of the message, so its structure and fields are
straightforward. ICMP fields will be examined in terms of normal and malicious use.
Type and Code
Remember that ICMP has no ports. There must be a method indicating what type of ICMP message is being sent or received. The first two bytes of the ICMP message are the ICMP message type and code, respectively. The message code is a subcategory under the message type.
For instance, there are two possible message codes for a message type of 11, which represents the time exceeded category. If the message code is 0, it is a "time exceeded in-transit" message. If the message code is 1, it is an IP "reassembly time exceeded" message.Valid
values of ICMP message types and codes are found at www.iana.org/assignments/icmp-parameters.
Identification and Sequence Numbers
If you examine some ICMP requests such as the echo request, you'll find some additional fields in the ICMP header. These are the ICMP identifier found in bytes 4 and 5 offset of the ICMP header and the ICMP sequence number found in bytes 6 and 7 offset of the ICMP header. These fields are used in an echo request/echo reply pair to uniquely identify requests and match them with responses. For UNIX hosts, the ICMP ID is typically the process ID of the ping that generated the traffic. There can be several simultaneous ping commands so the identifier in both the echo request and echo reply informs the pinging host what reply is connected with what request. Each ping can generate several echo requests and the sequence number is the manner in which they are tracked in order to see if there are missing packets. Here is the
output from a ping request that demonstrates the change in ICMP sequence numbers.
PING sparky (1.1.1.100) from 1.1.1.5 : 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 1.1.1.100: icmp_seq=0 ttl=255 time=0.8 ms 64 bytes from 1.1.1.100: icmp_seq=1 ttl=255 time=0.9 ms 64 bytes from 1.1.1.100: icmp_seq=2 ttl=255 time=7.3 ms
16:33:07.400700 verbo > sparky: icmp: echo request
4500 0054 038d 0000 4001 bed1 0101 0105
0101 0164 0800 9e12 c402 0000 0391 8439 1d1d 0600 0809 0a0b 0c0d 0e0f 1011 1213
1415 1617 181916:33:07.401479 sparky > verbo: icmp: echo reply (DF)
4500 0054 7146 4000 ff01 5217 010018f64
010018f05 0000 a612 c402 0000 0391 8439 1d1d 0600 0809 0a0b 0c0d 0e0f 1011 1213 1415 1617 1819
Let's examine the ICMP identifier and sequence numbers in the context of the previous output's ping. We ping host sparky from verbo and see from the output that the sequence number begins at 0 and increments for each new echo request sent out. In this case, the ping process was aborted after the third echo request.
If you examine the hex dump, you'll see that the identifier is a hex c402 or decimal 50178. Because the pinging host is a Linux host, we assume this is the process ID of the ping. This value will remain static for all echo requests and replies associated with this ping. The sequence number, on the other hand, will increase by 1 for each new echo request sent and will be cloned in the associated echo reply. Had all the echo requests and replies associated with this ping process been displayed, we'd see four additional records, two echo requests, and two echo replies. The identifier would be the same for all, but the sequence number would be 1 for the second set of echo requests and replies, and it would be 2 for the third set.
Misuse of ICMP Identification and Sequence Numbers
Because the ICMP identifier and sequence number fields were not likely to receive careful