If tlie agency is to endure for an indefinite period, or is an

agency at will, the agent has not only the power but the ri<jht

to renounce at any time.^ But in case there is an express or

Implied agreement that the agency is to endure for a definite

period, a renunciation is a breach of contract and subjects the

agent to liability for the damages resulting to the principal.^

There is an exception to this rule, of course, when the prin-

cipal, by his own breach, justifies the renunciation. If an

agent renounces the employment he cannot generally recover

compensation for services rendered, but some jurisdictions

allow a recovery on quantum meruit}

3. By Operation of Law.

В§ 70. Change affecting subject-matter.

Contracts may be discharged without the consent of the

parties, or irrespective of their consent. Such are the cases

where the law creates a discharge on grounds of public policy,

convenience, or necessity. Discharge by operation of law is

a topic of the general law of contract, and need not be spe-

cially treated here.^ So far as contracts of personal service

Cunn. 197; Tier v. Lampson, 35 Vt. 179; Lamothe i'. St. Louis, &c. Co.,

17 iMo. 204.

1 Stoddart v. Key, 62 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 137.

2 Capen v. Pac. &c. Ins. Co., 1 Dutcher (N. J. L.), 07.

8 Banow.s v. Cushway, 37 Mich. 181.

* Post В§81.

6 Iluft'cut's Anson on Cont. pp. 390-399; Leake on Cont. (3d ed.)

590 el se(^.

BY OPERATION OF LAW. 83

arc concerned the subject involves, (1) a change in the law

itself, (2) a change affecting the subject-matter or circum-

stances of the contract, (3) a change affecting the parties to

the contract. These changes are generally in the nature of

what is termed a subsequent impossibility.

(1) A change in the law itself which renders the continu-

ance of the contract impossible, because illegal, would operate

to discharge the contract.^

(2) A change affecting the subject-matter or circumstances

of the contract may operate to discharge the contract if the con-

tract was made in contemplation of the continued existence of

the subject-matter or circumstances as it or they were at the

time of the formation of the contract. Thus if the agency be

created for the sale of a specific article and the article should

perish, without fault, the agency would be terminated.^ So if

the agency contemplated the continued existence of a particu-

lar state of things, and, without fault, this condition should

cease to exist, the agency would be terminated.^ But " the

parties must have contemplated the continuing of that state

of things as the foundation of what was to be done ; " other-

wise a change in conditions, however seriously it may inter-

rupt the agency, will not discharge the contract.* Whether

the danger arising from the prevalence of a contagious disease

at the place where the service is to be rendered will discharge

the contract, is a disputed question.^

(3) A change affecting the parties to the contract may be

caused by death, insanity, illness, marriage, constraint of law,

bankruptcy, and war. These are treated in the succeeding

section.

1 Cordes v. Miller, 39 Mich. 581.

2 Dexter v. Norton, 47 N. Y. G2.

8 Stewart v. Stone, 127 N. Y. 500.

* Turner i'. Goldsmith, 1891, 1 Q. B. 514, where the destruction of the

principal's manufactory was held not to discharge an agency for the sale

of the goods manufactured; so also Madden v. Jacobs, 52 La. Ann.

2107.

5 Lakeman v. Pollard, 43 Me. 463; Dewey v. Union School Dist., 43

Mich. 480.

84 te[;mixation of agency

В§ 71. Change in condition of parties.

(1) Death. The death of either i>arty to the contract ter-

minates tlie agency. It is no longer binding on the survivor

nor on tlic estate of the deceased. ^ The death of the principal

revokes the anthority of the agent, and any contracts made

uith him afterwards are a millity, even though no notice of

the revocation of authority is given.^ The death of one of

two joint principals has the like effect.^ l>ut if the agent's

authority be coupled with an interest, the death of the i>rinci-

pal does not revoke the authority.* So also, the death of the

agent terminates his authority, and it cannot ))e exercised by

his administrator.^

(2) Inmnity. The after-occurring insanity of the principal

or agent, like his death, terminates the agency.^ And if his