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obligation on the state under article 46 to introduce general and/or individual measures in the domestic legal system in order to end the violations and provide redress.105 However, they do not go so far as issuing binding obligations in the operative provisions, and so for that reason, they do not have the same importance or priority status as pilot judgments (as is illustrated by the discussion above about the Court’s treatment of cases revealing unfair domestic proceedings).106

There is already an abundance of such judgments, encompassing a very broad range of systemic Convention issues, some of which are certainly endemic across a number of Convention states, such as the excessive length of pre-trial detention,107 prison conditions,108 the practice of holding trials in absentia,109 and the inadequacy of compensation for expropriated property.110 Article 46 judgments have also been issued

105It has not, of course, been unknown for the Court to highlight systemic issues arising from legislative deficiencies and to identify practices considered to be incompatible with the Convention (see, e.g., ECtHR, Messina v. Italy (No. 2) (Appl. No. 25498/94), Judgment (Second Section), 28 August 2000, Reports 2000-X (monitoring of prisoners’ correspondence) and ECtHR, Bottazzi v. Italy (Appl. No. 34884/97), Judgment (Grand Chamber), 28 July 1999, Reports 1999-V (length of proceedings cases)). However, it is the sheer scale of ‘article 46 judgments’ and the breadth of the range of their subject matter that is unprecedented.

106Very exceptionally, an article 46 judgment will also prescribe general measures in the operative part of the judgment (e.g. ECtHR, Lukenda v. Slovenia (Appl. No. 23032/02), Judgment (Third Section), 6 October 2005, Reports 2005-X; and ECtHR, Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (Appl. No. 46347/99), Judgment (Third Section), 22 December 2005, not reported). Some commentators have described these decisions as ‘pilot judgments’, although the Court did not state expressly that it was applying the pilot judgment

procedure. The Court’s practice in that respect has not always been clear or consistent. For example, the judgment in ECtHR, Doğan and Others v. Turkey (Appl. Nos. 8803– 8811, 8813 and 8815–8819/02), Judgment (Third Section), 29 June 2004, Reports 2004-

VI (concerning the applicants’ forced evictions from their homes) was not defined by the Court as a pilot judgment, but in the later admissibility decision in ECtHR, İçyer v.

Turkey (Appl. No. 18888/02), Admissibility Decision (Third Section), 12 January 2006, Reports 2006-I, the Court referred to Doğan as a ‘pilot judgment’ (paras. 73 and 94).

107See, e.g., ECtHR, Kauczor v. Poland (Appl. No. 45219/06), Judgment (Fourth Section), 3 February 2009, not reported; ECtHR, Cahit Demirel v. Turkey (Appl. No. 18623/03), Judgment (Second Section), 7 July 2009, not reported.

108See, e.g., ECtHR, Orchowski v. Poland (Appl. No. 17885/04), Judgment (Fourth Section), 22 October 2009, not reported; and ECtHR, Norbert Sikorski v. Poland (Appl. No. 17599/05), Judgment (Fourth Section), 22 October 2009, not reported.

109ECtHR, Sejdovic v. Italy (Appl. No. 56581/00), Judgment (Chamber), 10 November 2004 and Judgment (Grand Chamber), 1 March 2006, Reports 2006-II; ECtHR, RR v. Italy (Appl. No. 42191/02), Judgment (Third Section), 9 June 2005, not reported.

110ECtHR, Scordino v. Italy (No. 1) (Appl. No. 36813/97), Judgment (First Section), 29 July 2004 and Judgment (Grand Chamber), 29 March 2006, Reports 2006-V; ECtHR,

in respect of problems which certainly seem to be less widespread, but which nevertheless have systemic origins, such as the right to parental leave for male military personnel,111 the right to a hearing for prisoners charged with disciplinary measures,112 restrictions on the rights of allotment-holders,113 and laws regulating leadership conflicts in religious communities.114

Typically, article 46 judgments identify a flaw in domestic legislation and recommend that the domestic law should be brought into compliance with the Convention. One of the earliest such cases was Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey, which exposed the fact that religious teaching within the Turkish educational system failed to respect the parental convictions of adherents to Alevism, in violation of article 2 of Protocol No. 1.115 As a result, the Court noted that ‘bringing the Turkish educational system and domestic legislation into conformity with the … Convention would represent an appropriate form of compensation which would make it possible to end the violation found’,116 although in its operative provisions it held simply that the finding of a Convention breach constituted sufficient just satisfaction (the applicants not having claimed any pecuniary or non-pecuniary damages). Another example is the important judgment in Manole and Others v. Moldova,117 which concerned governmental interference in the domestic law regulating broadcasting, in violation of article 10. Although nothing was said about

Scordino v. Italy (No. 3) (Appl. No. 43662/98), Judgments (Fourth Section), 17 May 2005 and 6 March 2007, not reported; ECtHR, Guiso-Gallisay v. Italy (Appl. No. 58858/00), Judgment (Second Section), 21 October 2008, not reported; ECtHR, Driza v. Albania (Appl. No. 33771/02), Judgment (Fourth Section), 13 November 2007, Reports 2007-V (extracts); ECtHR, Ramadhi and 5 Others v. Albania (Appl. No. 38222/02), Judgment (Fourth Section), 13 November 2007, not reported.

111ECtHR, Konstantin Markin v. Russia (Appl. No. 30078/06), Judgment (First Section), 7 October 2010, not reported. Note, however that this decision was superseded by a Grand Chamber Judgment of 22 March 2012, Reports 2012.

112ECtHR, Gülmez v. Turkey (Appl. No. 16330/02), Judgment (Second Section), 20 May 2008, not reported.

113ECtHR, Urbárska obec Trenčianske Biskupice v. Slovakia (Appl. No. 74258/01), Judgment (Fourth Section), 27 November 2007, not reported.

114ECtHR, Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Inokentiy) and Others v. Bulgaria (Appl. Nos. 412/03 and 35677/04), Judgment (Fifth Section), 22 January 2009, not reported.

115ECtHR, Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey (Appl. No. 1448/04), Judgment (Second Section), 9 October 2007, not reported.

116Ibid., para. 84.

117ECtHR, Manole and Others v. Moldova (Appl. No. 13936/02), Judgment (Fourth Section), 17 September 2009, Reports 2009 (extracts).

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reforms in the operative provisions of that judgment, this passage clearly indicates the Court’s view of the mandatory nature of the obligation which thereby arose:

… the respondent State is under a legal obligation under Article 46 to take general measures at the earliest opportunity to remedy the situation which gave rise to the violation of Article 10. In the light of the deficiencies found by the Court, these general measures should include legislative reform, to ensure that the legal framework complies with the requirements of Article 10…118

In addition to such cases where the state is required, in general terms, to amend its laws, the Court may issue more specific directions, as to the nature of the general or individual measures required. Some of these cases have related to ‘staple’ Convention subjects such as the unfairness of land-expropriation procedures. Thus, in Yetiş and Others v. Turkey,119 for example, the Court specifically called for the creation of a mechanism which would take account of depreciation in the value of compensation for expropriation resulting from the length of proceedings or inflation. Other article 46 decisions demonstrate a definite tendency to broaden and deepen the Court’s reach. One example is the case of Kurić and Others v. Slovenia,120 which concerned the situation of the ‘erased’ – former Yugoslav citizens whose names had been taken off the register of permanent residents and who became de facto stateless after Slovenian independence. As well as urging legislative reform, the Court also called on the Slovenian authorities to issue the applicants retroactively with permanent residence permits. This stipulation mirrored earlier rulings of the Slovenian Constitutional Court which had not been respected. Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. UK121 concerned the applicants’ detention by the British armed forces in Southern Iraq in 2003, and their subsequent transfer to the Iraqi authorities. The Court found that article 3 had been breached because the applicants had been subjected to inhuman mental suffering caused by a fear of execution. This meant a requirement for the UK to take all possible steps to obtain an assurance from the Iraqi

118Ibid., para. 117.

119ECtHR, Yetiş and Others v. Turkey (Appl. No. 40349/05), Judgment (Second Section), 6 July 2010, not reported.

120ECtHR, Kurić and Others v. Slovenia (Appl. No. 26828/06), Judgment (Third Section), 13 July 2010, not reported.

121ECtHR, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. UK (Appl. No. 61498/08), Judgment (Fourth Section), 2 March 2010, Reports 2010 (extracts).

authorities that the applicants would not be subjected to the death penalty. In cases highlighting the very poor state of health of detainees, the Court has invoked article 46 in order to ensure that the applicants received adequate medical and psychiatric treatment.122

Another case resulting in a direction to make legislative changes is L v. Lithuania,123 although the case is something of an anomaly, as no reference was made to article 46. The applicant was a pre-operative transsexual who successfully complained to the Court about the absence of any domestic law regulating full gender reassignment surgery. The applicant’s just satisfaction claim included a request for the future costs of surgery. However, the Court’s response was to direct the state (using its operative provisions) to enact subsidiary legislation to plug the gap, but if that were to prove impossible, then a sum of €40,000 would have to be paid to the applicant (in order to pay for surgery abroad). Judge FuraSandström was concerned that in doing so, the Second Section had acted ultra vires. He sought to distinguish the case from pilot judgments like Broniowski and Hutten-Czapska by suggesting that the Court in L v. Lithuania had prescribed general measure to redress an individual complaint. The point he seemed to be making was one of scale – that there were not thousands of similarly-situated individuals. Nevertheless, in identifying a legislative gap, the problem was a systemic one, and around 50 people in Lithuania were believed to have been affected by it.

The explicit identification by the Court of violations of the Convention arising from systemic causes, together with the additional focus and priority that the Court is placing on such cases, are welcome, and indeed necessary, measures. As the further reform of the Court continues to be debated, it is important that the experiences gleaned from pilot judgments and article 46 cases should be built upon, in particular, by closely monitoring the extent to which there is effective compliance with, and implementation of, such cases. Again, the subsidiarity principle is not being ignored – as Sitaropoulos has argued:

All these jurisprudential techniques [pilot judgments and article 46 judgments] are actually based on the fundamental principle of subsidiarity …

122See, e.g., ECtHR, Dybeku v. Albania (Appl. No. 41153/06), Judgment (Fourth Section), 18 December 2007, not reported; ECtHR, Sławomir Musiał v. Poland (Appl. No. 28300/06), Judgment (Fourth Section), 20 January 2009, not reported; ECtHR, Poghosyan v. Georgia (Appl. No. 9870/07), Judgment (Second Section), 24 February 2009, not reported.

123ECtHR, L v. Lithuania (Appl. No. 27527/03), Judgment (Second Section), 11 September 2007, Reports 2007-IV.

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By these methods the Court provides guidance to states in order to overcome long-standing dysfunctions in their law and practice affecting Convention rights and freedoms.124

4.Gross and systematic human rights violations

A significant influence on the Court in recent years has undoubtedly been the increasing rate of occurrence of extremely serious, systematic breaches of the Convention. Cases such as Assanidze and Ilascu (discussed above) are representative of situations of manifestly unlawful detention in parts of Europe under the de facto control of separatist power blocs. The Kurdish cases (brought against Turkey) first introduced the phenomenon of the ‘enforced disappearance’ into European human rights jurisprudence in the 1990s, and also led to a series of findings of violations by the Turkish security forces, constituting the large-scale destruction of homes, torture and extra-judicial executions. The security forces in Russia, operating in Chechnya and other republics in the North Caucasus since 1999, have been responsible for a comparable catalogue of egregious breaches of the Convention since 2005. Such cases are undoubtedly significant, but their influence on the Court’s approach to redress has not been as marked as might have been expected. Situations entailing gross and systematic human rights violations arguably justify a significant step-up in terms of the remedial response by an international court. The very nature and scale of the violations are likely to require a radical re-think about the suitability of reparations. For example, what constitutes appropriate redress where an applicant’s relative has ‘been disappeared’, no body has been found, and where similar cases are common? There is an extra dimension to be taken into account here – the moral adequacy of redress. As Shelton has argued, remedies also serve moral goals.125 Moreover, these cases are not just about individual justice; much broader questions arise about wider societal healing and the relevance of principles of restorative justice, such as reintegration and rehabilitation.

The only other international court which has had to adjudicate on a comparable body of egregious, systematic human rights violations is the

124N. Sitaropoulos, ‘Implementation of the European Court of Human Rights’ Judgments concerning National Minorities or Why Declaratory Adjudication Does Not Help’,

European Society of International Law Conference Paper Series 4 (2011), at 28.

125Shelton, Remedies, 1–2.

Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which has often had to deal with such situations since it published its first judgments (relating to enforced disappearances) in the late 1980s. In the ensuing 20 or so years, it has developed a rich and progressive jurisprudence on reparations in cases of egregious violations.126 For example, the Inter-American Court may order the state to make a public apology to victims, acknowledging its responsibility,127 or require that a person be reinstated to their former employment.128 It has acted innovatively by introducing the concept of damages to the victim’s ‘life plan’ (‘proyecto de vida’), which reflects their circumstances, ambitions and potential.129 In adjudicating on disappearances and extra-judicial executions, the Inter-American Court has upheld the right of relatives (and of wider society) to be informed about what happened,130 and has ordered respondent states to locate the remains of victims and provide them to the next-of-kin.131 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has explicitly held that the nature and gravity of cases of gross violations of human rights may require rather more than a declaratory response:

… while a condemnatory judgment may in itself constitute a form of reparation and moral satisfaction, whether or not there has been recognition on the part of the State, it would not suffice in the instant case, given the extreme gravity of the violation of the right to life and of the moral suffering inflicted on the victims and their next of kin, who should be compensated on an equitable basis.132

126See further, D. Cassel, ‘The Expanding Scope and Impact of Reparations Awarded by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, in K. De Feyter et al. (eds.), Out of the Ashes: Reparation for Victims of Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2005); C. Sandoval and M. Duttwiler, ‘Redressing Non-pecuniary Damages of Torture Survivors – The Practice of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, in G. Gilbert, F. Hampson and C. Sandoval, The Delivery of Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Professor Sir Nigel Rodley (London and New York: Routledge, 2011) 114–36.

127See, e.g., IACtHR, Cantoral Benavides v. Peru (Reparations), Judgment, 3 December 2001, Ser. C, No. 88, operative para. 7.

128IACtHR, Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama, Judgment, 2 February 2001, Ser. C, No. 61, operative para. 7. The ECtHR made a reinstatement order for the first time in ECtHR Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine (Appl. No. 21722/11), judgment (former Fifth Section), 9 January 2013, not reported.

129See, e.g., IACtHR, Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Judgment, 27 November 1998, Ser. C, No. 42, paras. 144–54.

130See, e.g., IACtHR, Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala, Judgment, 25 November 2003, Ser. C, No. 101, para. 274.

131See, e.g., IACtHR, Bamaca Velasquez v. Guatemala (Reparations), Judgment, 22 February 2002, Ser. C, No. 91, para. 79.

132IACtHR, El Amparo v. Venezuela, Judgment, 14 September 1996, Ser. C, No. 28, para. 35.

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As yet, the ECtHR has not generally been willing to follow the example set by the Inter-American Court as regards its more progressive, nuanced approach toward reparations. There are recent signs, however, of movement by the ECtHR on the question of the need for an investigation into human rights abuses. It has been the common practice of the InterAmerican Court to order the respondent state to investigate, prosecute and punish the perpetrators of human rights violations.133 In doing so, the Inter-American Court has also explicitly recognised that the failure to investigate will lead to situations of ‘grave impunity’ and thereby foster chronic recidivism.134

Similar orders have been sought by applicants to the ECtHR, which have not been successful, although they have found support from judges in the minority.135 In his Partly Dissenting Opinion in the case Medova v. Russia,136 a case of enforced disappearance from Ingushetia for which the authorities were held to be directly responsible, Judge Spielmann argued that the respondent state should have been ordered to carry out an investigation. It was clearly important to him that in spite of the shortcomings in the investigation identified by the Court, he considered that they could be overcome, even though several years had passed.137 Explicitly relying on the principle of restitutio in integrum, Judge Spielmann expressed similar views about the obligation to investigate in his Concurring Opinion (joined by Judges Ziemele and Kalaydjieva) in Varnava

133See, e.g., ibid., operative para. 4; IACtHR, Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina (Reparations), Judgment, 27 August 1998, Ser. C, No. 39, operative para. 4; IACtHR, Paniagua Morales et al. v. Guatemala (Reparations), Judgment, 25 May 2001, Ser. C, No. 7, operative para. 2. There is, of course, a quite separate question about the implementation of such measures. In practice, compliance with these orders is rare. Aside from political will, the conduct of investigations is hampered, for example, by amnesty laws, statutes of limitation and the double jeopardy principle.

134See, e.g., Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala, para. 272.

135As to the range of international law standards concerning the duty to investigate, see, e.g., P. Leach, ‘Quelles sont les réparations adéquates dans les affaires de ‘disparitions’? Leçons issues des affaires sur la Tchétchénie’, E. Lambert-Abdelgawad and K MartinChenut (eds.), Réparer les violations graves et massives des droits de l’homme: La Cour InterAméricaine, pionnière et modèle?, Collection de L’UMR De Droit Comparé de Paris (Université de Paris1/CNRS UMR 8103), Vol. XX (Paris: Société de Législation Comparée, 2010).

136ECtHR, Medova v. Russia (Appl. No. 25385/04), Judgment (First Section), 15 January 2009.

137See also his similar Dissenting Opinion in ECtHR, Umayeva v. Russia (Appl. No. 1200/03), Judgment (First Section), 4 December 2008, not reported, concerning the wounding of the applicant in an artillery attack by Russian armed forces on Grozny in January 2000.

and Others v. Turkey,138 which concerned the disappearance of nine men in northern Cyprus, following the Turkish occupation of Cyprus in 1974. The 2010 judgment in Abuyeva and Others v. Russia139 laid down another important marker. That case concerned a series of fatalities caused by the shelling of the village of Katr-Yurt in Chechnya in 2000 by the Russian armed forces. The decision followed the Isayeva judgment in 2005 relating to the same incident.140 The Court in Abuyeva noted ‘with great dismay’ that an effective investigation had still not been carried out into the attack. It found that the government had ‘manifestly disregarded the specific findings of a binding judgment concerning the ineffectiveness of the investigation’ and the Court also concluded that an effective investigation into the case was still possible. Therefore, although the state’s compliance with the judgment was to be assessed by the Committee of Ministers, the Court considered it ‘inevitable that a new, independent, investigation should take place’.141

One issue that has been a significant feature of the gross violation cases from both Turkey and Chechnya has been the significant non-disclosure of the investigation files by the respondent governments.142 This is not just a technical, legal issue; nor are its consequences insignificant. While the Court may, in a disappearance case, find a substantive violation of article 2, because it concludes that state agents were directly responsible for an abduction (and presumed death), many of the vital facts are often left unresolved. Thus, it may not be established how or when the victim was killed, nor who was responsible (nor even which state entity was involved, let alone identifiable individuals). This is an unacceptable lacuna and is one that needs to be tackled. One way to do so would be to acknowledge, in this particular context, the right to know the truth as an integral part of reparations. This is an area where the ECtHR could justifiably draw on the Inter-American jurisprudence. The

138ECtHR, Varnava and Others v. Turkey (Appl. Nos. 16064, 16065, 16066, 16068, 16069, 16070, 16071, 16072 and 16073/90), Judgment (Grand Chamber), 18 September 2009, Reports 2009.

139ECtHR, Abuyeva and Others v. Russia (Appl. No. 27065/05), Judgment (First Section), 2 December 2010, not reported.

140ECtHR, Isayeva v. Russia (Appl. No. 57950/00), Judgment (First Section), 24 February 2005, not reported.

141Abuyeva and Others v. Russia, para. 243.

142See as regards the Chechen cases, P. Leach, ‘The Chechen Conflict: Analysing the Oversight of the European Court of Human Rights’, European Human Rights Law Review 6 (2008) 732–61.

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Inter-American Commission of Human Rights has affirmed the right ‘to know the full, complete and public truth as to the events that transpired, their specific circumstances, and who participated in them’.143 In cases such as disappearances, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has reiterated both the specific right to know what happened, and the right to know which state agents were responsible.144 The extent of the right to know the truth was formulated in this way in the ‘Cotton Fields’ case:

The absence of a complete and effective investigation into the facts constitutes a source of additional suffering and anguish for the victims, who have the right to know the truth about what happened. This right to the truth requires the determination of the most complete historical truth possible, which includes determination of the collective patterns of action, and of all those who, in different ways, took part in said violations.145

The ECtHR’s more conservative approach to redress, in comparison with the position of the Inter-American Court, may reflect differences in the nature of the remedial provisions in their respective conventions. Article 63 of the American Convention on Human Rights expressly provides the power to order remedial measures other than compensation.146 The ECtHR’s tendency has been to interpret its power under article 41 of the ECHR to award ‘just satisfaction’ in a very limited way, although as Shelton has argued, that term in international practice has not been restricted to monetary compensation.147 The Inter-American Court may have deemed it necessary to develop a more prescriptive approach, not only because of the prevailing political context of egregious human rights violations being committed with apparent impunity, but also because of the absence of any separate body in the Inter-American

143See, e.g., IACHR, Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo Romero y Galdemez v. El Salvador, Report (2000), No. 37/00, Case 11.481, paras. 147–8.

144IACtHR, Bamaca-Velasquez v. Guatemala, para. 74.

145IACtHR, González et al. (Cotton Fields) v. Mexico, Judgment, 16 November 2009, Ser. C, No. 205, para. 454.

146Article 63(1) of the ACHR provides: ‘If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequence of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party.’

147Shelton, Remedies, at 280–1. See also Loucaides, ‘Reparations’, at 190 (‘…the language of Art. 41 is sufficiently wide to allow the possibility of a judgment indicating the specific measures for the execution of the obligation of restitutio in integrum resulting from the judgment itself ’).

system with the role of supervising the enforcement of judgments (comparable to the Committee of Ministers in the European system). Conversely, it has clearly been the case that the ECtHR has been concerned about over-stepping the mark as regards redress, and has been anxious not to tread on the toes of the Committee of Ministers, in the light of its duty of supervision, as stipulated in article 46 of the Convention. However, there need be no confusion in their respective roles, and there is no need for the Court to consider itself fettered by this on the question of redress (as opposed to the question of implementation). As Judge Malinverni has cogently argued:

… supervision of the execution of the Court’s judgments is the responsibility of the Committee of Ministers. That does not mean, however, that the Court should not play any part in the matter and should not take measures designed to facilitate the Committee of Ministers’ task in discharging these functions. To that end, it is essential that in its judgments the Court should not merely give as precise a description as possible of the nature of the Convention violation found but should also, in the operative provisions, indicate to the State concerned the measures it considers the most appropriate to redress the violation.148

The ECtHR has certainly become ever-more willing to refer to the InterAmerican jurisprudence as regards substantive questions of law,149 but not, as yet, to draw on its case law relating to redress. However, as has been discussed in this chapter, the Court has recently significantly changed its approach to redress, in making the kind of orders for nonmonetary relief which the Inter-American Court has consistently been making for years. Consequently, it makes every sense for the Court to place much greater reliance on the Inter-American case law in this area,

148Cudak v. Lithuania. Concurring Opinion of Judge Malinverni, joined by Judges Casadevall, Cabral Barreto, Zagrebelsky and Popović, para. 5.

149See, e.g., Varnava and Others v. Turkey (ratione temporis jurisdiction in disappearance cases); ECtHR, Al-Skeini v. UK (Appl. No. 55721/07), Judgment (Grand Chamber), 7 July 2011, not reported (the duty to investigate); ECtHR, Opuz v. Turkey (Appl. No. 33401/02), Judgment (Third Section), 9 June 2009, Reports 2009 (the imputability to the state of acts of private persons and discrimination in the context of domestic violence); ECtHR, Bayatyan v. Armenia (Appl. No. 23459/03), Judgment (Grand Chamber), 7 July 2011, not reported (conscientious objection); ECtHR, Palomo Sanchez and Others v. Spain (Appl. Nos. 28955, 28957, 28959 and 28964/06), Judgment (Grand Chamber), 12 September 2011, not reported (trade union rights); ECtHR, Gäfgen v. Germany (Appl. No. 22978/05), Judgment (Grand Chamber), 1 June 2010, Reports 2010 (the scope of the prohibition of torture); ECtHR, Zolotukhin v. Russia (Appl. No. 14939/03), Judgment (Grand Chamber), 10 February 2009 (the ‘double jeopardy’ principle).