of the System-Cube. Some limited property rights restrict the right of ownership more than others. One could visualise this by taking away more minor cubes from the depth of the SystemCube. If a particular property right only relates to corporeals or incorporeals, this can be visualised by taking away minor cubes from the width of the System-Cube. The minor cubes representing the corporeals could be subdivided in movables and immovables, should one wish to do so.9 The third dimension, of time, is represented by the height of the System-Cube. If a property right is limited in time, or if an object is limited in time (e.g. emission rights), the height of the System-Cube is reduced by taking away minor cubes.

The number of minor cubes, making up the System-Cube, with which one starts, is irrelevant; the principle idea always remains the same. I chose to work with a System-Cube of 3x3x3 minor cubes, because in my opinion this provides the most clarity. Taking the cube as shown above in Figure 1 as a starting point, specific property rights in specific countries would have the following composition of minor cubes.

A) A right of usufruct

A right of usufruct can in Germany and the Netherlands be created both in respect to corporeal and in respect to incorporeal objects. It therefore does not limit the width of the System-Cube. It does, however, limit the depth of the System-Cube, since it is a less extensive right than the right of ownership. It also limits the height of the cube, because both under German and under Dutch law, the usufruct is limited in time in the sense that it ends upon the death of the usufructuary.10

However, the object as such is in principle not limited in time, so no time-cubes are taken away there. As a result the System-Cube would get the following shape:

Fig. 3: A right of usufruct in Germany and the Netherlands.

9 I have chosen to do so myself, for the purpose of clarity, but the movables and immovables could just as well be merged into one cube ‘corporeals’, thereby reducing the width of the System-Cube by one minor cube.

10 Artt. 1030, 1063 and 1068 German BGB; Art. 3:203 Dutch BW.

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B) A non-possessory right of pledge

A non-possessory pledge created in respect to a claim, as is possible under Dutch law, would affect all three dimensions of the System-Cube. The width is reduced because the object is incorporeal and not corporeal (movable or immovable); the depth is reduced because a right of pledge is less extensive than the right of ownership; and the height is reduced because the right of pledge only exists during the time in which the loan, that the right of pledge is meant to secure, is not yet repaid and the claim still exists. As a result the System-Cube would be shaped like this:

Fig. 4: A non-possessory right of pledge in respect to a claim.

C) Security rights in respect to corporeal objects

A security right created in respect to a corporeal object reduces the width of the System-Cube, because incorporeals are left out; it reduces the depth of the cube because a security right is less extensive than the right of ownership; and the height above the rights-cubes is reduced, because security rights only exist for the duration of the claim that they are meant to secure. A security right in respect to a corporeal object is therefore visualised by the System-Cube in the following way:

Fig. 5: A security right in respect to a corporeal object.

D) Right of ownership of emission rights

The right of ownership of emission rights gives yet another shape to the System-Cube. The width is reduced, because emission rights constitute an incorporeal object. The depth is not reduced, because it is the right of ownership, the most extensive property right, which is being visualised.

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The height is reduced, but not above the rights-cubes as in the previous examples, because the right of ownership is in principle unlimited in time. The height is reduced above the object-cube, since emission rights are inherently limited in time. They are depleted, used up. This provides the following image:

Fig. 6: Right of ownership of emission rights, in France and Germany respectively.

Since it is not technically possible in systems such as Germany to be owner of an incorporeal object, the objects-cubes in the example of Figure 5 are coloured orange instead of red. However, since a right-holder in Germany has powers functionally equivalent to those of an owner, the shape of the rights-cubes as such does not have to be altered.11

4. The System-Cube fit to English law

The English system of property law is different from the European continental systems, because England is a Common law jurisdiction, whereas the European continental countries are predominantly civil law jurisdictions.12 Nevertheless, as I argued before, the System-Cube fits within any property law system, as long as its components are properly allocated. It therefore also fits the English system of property rights. English law does not know an absolute, unitary right of ownership like the European continental systems do, but it does also use a ‘most extensive’ property right. ‘Most extensive’ here means that this right grants the holder of it powers in respect to an object, which holders of other – lesser – property rights do not have. The most extensive property right that features in English law is the fee simple with regard to land and title with regard to personal property. These could be seen as the functional equivalents to the civil law right of ownership.13 They can be visualised in the System-Cube in the same way in which the German and Dutch-type ‘right-holder’ is visualised: simply by using a different colour. Furthermore, the objects of property rights are classified somewhat differently than in the

11See above, at fn. 9.

12‘Common law’ is hereafter used in the meaning ‘as opposed to civil law’, not ‘as opposed to Equity’, with the exception of section 4.2.

13J. Gordley, Foundations of Private Law – Property, Tort, Contract, Unjust Enrichment (Oxford: OUP, 2006), p. 50.

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previous models.14 Taking all of this into account, the system of property rights in England could then be visualised with the System-Cube in the following manner:

Fig. 7: The system of property rights in English law.

4.1. Limited property rights in English law and their visualisation through the System-Cube

One could argue in two directions when describing what limited property rights are in English property law, as opposed to the more extensive fee simple and title. If one takes Hohfeld’s bundle of rights theory as a starting point,15 limited property rights are an assembly of some of the rights taken out of the original bundle. This seems to come quite close to the French notion of démembrement and could therefore lead to a similar visualisation through the System-Cube as seen above in Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5. The other possibility is to see limited property rights not so much as a decrease of the powers of the holder of the fee simple or the person who had title, but as a limitation of those powers. Such a limitation entails that those powers that accumulate in the limited property right are not taken away from the person with the more extensive entitlement, but that this person can, temporarily, simply not make use of those powers. This could be visualised through the System-Cube in two steps: first, rather than taking minor cubes out of the System-Cube, a clone of the System-Cube is made, which has similar characteristics as the original, but is merely a bit smaller. The clone as a whole is smaller than its original, the System-Cube, to indicate that it represents a limited property right that is derived from a more extensive right. Second, the rights-cubes in the original System-Cube are blackened out, without actually removing them. This indicates that those rights are not as such taken away from the person who has title, but that he can temporarily not make us of those rights himself.

14For more information on the classification of objects of property rights in English Common law, see Akkermans (2008), pp. 332-334.

15W.N. Hohfeld, 'Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning', YLJ, 26/8 (1916-1917).

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