- •ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
- •INTRODUCTION
- •1. The evolution of money laundering and AML/CFT measures
- •1.1. A brief history of money laundering
- •1.2. The first stage of ML evolution: Al Capone tax evasion charges
- •1.3. The subsequent stages of ML evolution: better hiding techniques
- •1.4. The appearance of “money laundering” expression in the legal context
- •1.5. Further development of the international AML/CFT standards
- •2. An overview of money laundering and AML regime goals
- •2.1. Basic concept of money laundering
- •2.2. Predicate offences: the scope and methods of AML/CFT description
- •2.3. Definition of money laundering in the narrow sense
- •2.4. Definition of money laundering in the broad sense
- •2.5. Anti-money laundering measures of combating organized crime
- •2.6. The process of money laundering and modeling of its phases
- •3. Applying a risk-based approach to a model AML/CFT regime
- •3.1. Key institutions of a national AML/CFT regime
- •3.2. Methodology bases of a risk-based approach and national AML/CFT coordination
- •3.3. Financial institutions: definition for AML/CFT purposes through activities and operations related to managing clients’ assets
- •3.4. Definition of financial institutions for AML/CFT purposes through activities and operations other then managing clients’ assets
- •3.5. AML/CFT definition of designated non-financial businesses and professions
- •3.6. AML/CFT risk-assessment obligations and decisions for countries
- •4. Legal requirements for a national AML/CFT regime
- •4.1. An extension of liability for money laundering to the predicate offence perpetrator: the adverse implications for the economy
- •4.2. Dual criminality for money laundering offences committed internationally
- •4.3. “State of mind” connected with a money laundering offence
- •4.4. Confiscation and provisional measures related to AML/CFT
- •4.5. Non-conviction based confiscation and corporate liability for money laundering
- •5. Explanations of terrorism and the financing of terrorism
- •5.1. Social and economic origins of terrorism
- •5.2. Basic concept of terrorist financing
- •5.3. Legal definition of terrorism and terrorist financing
- •5.4. Characteristics of the terrorist financing offence and legal capacity to prosecute persons that finance terrorism
- •5.5. Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism, terrorist financing and proliferation
- •6. Institutional bases of the international AML/CFT framework
- •6.1. The United Nations bodies of the international AML/CFT framework
- •6.2. The United Nations organizations of the international AML/CFT framework
- •6.3. Main functions of the Financial Action Taskforce
- •6.4. The Financial Action Task Force associate members and observers
- •6.5. The Egmont Group of financial intelligence units and international AML/CFT standard setters in banking, securities and insurance sectors
- •6.6. The Wolfsberg Group of banks and its AML/CFT documents
- •7. Customer due diligence measures undertaken by financial institutions
- •7.1. General requirements for AML/CFT programs of financial institutions and groups of financial institutions
- •7.2. Methodology approach to customer due diligence
- •7.3. Additional features of customer due diligence
- •7.4. Customer due diligence measures for legal persons and their arrangements
- •7.5. Actions of financial institutions in case of inability to comply with customer due diligence requirements
- •7.6. AML/CFT-related record-keeping requirements for financial institutions
- •8. Risk-based approach pursued by financial institutions in customer due diligence
- •8.1. Reliance on customer due diligence information received from third parties
- •8.2. Potentially higher-risk situations for enhanced customer due diligence measures
- •8.3. Lower-risk situations for simplified customer due diligence measures
- •8.4. Enhanced customer due diligence measures
- •8.5. Simplified customer due diligence measures
- •9. Additional AML/CFT measures for specific activities of financial institutions
- •9.1. AML/CFT requirements for cross-border correspondent banking relationships
- •9.2. Definition of wire transfers and activities of involved parties
- •9.3. The scope of applying AML/CFT measures to wire transfers
- •9.4. AML/CFT measures of information gathering related to wire transfers
- •9.6. AML/CFT obligations for persons that provide money or value transfer services
- •10. Additional AML/CFT measures for specific customers, entities and professions
- •10.1. Definition of politically exposed persons and the scope of applying AML/CFT measures
- •10.2. Additional AML/CFT measures for politically exposed persons
- •10.3. AML/CFT requirements for financial institutions with foreign operations
- •10.4. Customer due diligence and record-keeping requirements for designated non-financial businesses and professions
- •10.5. Other AML/CFT requirements for designated non-financial businesses and professions
- •11. Competent authorities of a national AML/CFT system
- •11.1. General requirements for government agencies with an AML/CFT function
- •11.2. Approaches to AML/CFT-related regulation and supervision
- •11.3. Financial intelligence unit and its core functions
- •11.4. AML/CFT responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative authorities
- •11.5. Detecting and countering activities of cash couriers for the AML/CFT purposes
- •12. Additional requirements for a national AML/CFT regime and issues of international cooperation
- •12.1. Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons and their arrangements
- •12.2. Prevention of using non-profit organizations for the purpose of terrorist financing
- •12.3. General principles of AML/CFT mutual legal assistance
- •12.4. Mutual legal assistance: freezing and confiscation of assets related to money laundering and terrorist financing
- •12.5. Extradition in relation to money laundering and terrorist financing
- •12.6. International exchange of information between government agencies with an AML/CFT function
12.3. General principles of AML/CFT mutual legal assistance
Countries should rapidly, constructively and effectively provide the widest possible range of mutual legal assistance in relation to money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing investigations, prosecutions, and related proceedings (R. 37), in particular
Not to restrict the provision of mutual legal assistance
Not refuse to execute a request for mutual legal assistance on the sole ground that the offence is also considered to involve fiscal matters
Not refuse to execute a request for mutual legal assistance on the grounds that laws require financial institutions to maintain secrecy or confidentiality
Ensure that they have clear processes for the timely prioritization, transmission, execution and monitoring of mutual legal assistance requests; a case management system should be maintained
Maintain the confidentiality of mutual legal assistance requests they receive and the information contained in them
Render mutual legal assistance, notwithstanding the absence of dual criminality
Should ensure that documents or evidence (including financial records) from financial institutions or other persons, the taking of
witness statements, and information related to the production, search and seizure are available for use to foreign counterparts in response to
direct requests
To avoid conflicts of jurisdiction, consideration should be given to devising and applying mechanisms for determining the best venue for prosecution of defendants in the interests of justice in cases that are subject to prosecution in more than one country
Should, when making mutual legal assistance requests, make best efforts to provide complete factual and legal information
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12.4. Mutual legal assistance: freezing and confiscation of assets related to money laundering and terrorist financing
Countries should ensure that they have the authority to take expeditious action in response to requests by foreign countries to identify, freeze, seize and confiscate the following (R. 38)
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This authority should include the ability to respond to requests made on the basis of non-conviction-based confiscation proceedings and related provisional measures, unless this is inconsistent with fundamental principles of their domestic law
With regard to requests for cooperation made on the basis of nonconviction based confiscation proceedings, countries need not have the authority to act on the basis of all such requests, but should be able to do so, at a minimum in circumstances when a perpetrator is unavailable by reason of death, flight, absence, or the perpetrator is unknown
There should be effective mechanisms for managing such property, instrumentalities or property of corresponding value, and arrangements for coordinating seizure and confiscation proceedings, which should include the sharing of confiscated assets
Countries should consider establishing an asset forfeiture fund into which all, or a portion of, confiscated property will be deposited for law enforcement, health, education, or other appropriate purposes
It should be made possible to share confiscated property between countries, in particular, when confiscation is directly or indirectly a result of coordinated law enforcement actions
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12.5. Extradition in relation to money laundering and terrorist financing
Countries should constructively and effectively execute extradition requests in relation to ML/TF, without undue delay and take all possible measures to ensure that they do not provide safe havens for individuals charged with the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorist organizations (R. 38), in particular
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Or at the request of the country seeking extradition, submit the case, without undue delay, to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution of the offences set forth in the request (where a country does not extradite persons solely on the grounds of nationality)
Where dual criminality is required for extradition, that requirement should be deemed to be satisfied regardless of whether both countries place the offence within the same category of offence, or denominate the offence by the same terminology, provided that both countries criminalize the conduct underlying the offence
Those authorities should take their decision and conduct their proceedings in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a serious nature under the domestic law of that country
Consistent with fundamental principles of domestic law, countries should have simplified extradition mechanisms, such as allowing direct transmission of requests for provisional arrests between appropriate authorities, extraditing persons based only on warrants of arrests or judgments, or introducing a simplified extradition of consenting persons who waive formal extradition proceedings
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12.6. International exchange of information between government agencies with an AML/CFT function
Countries should ensure that their competent authorities can rapidly, constructively and effectively provide the widest range of international cooperation in relation to ML, associated predicate offences and TF (R. 40)
Should a competent authority need bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements, such as a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), these should be negotiated and signed in a timely way with the widest range of foreign counterparts
Clear channels or mechanisms should assure the effective transmission and execution of requests for information or other types of assistance
Competent authorities should have clear and efficient processes for the prioritization and timely execution of requests, and for safeguarding the information received
When making a request for cooperation, FIUs should make their best efforts to provide complete factual, and, as appropriate, legal information, including the description of the case being analyzed and the potential link to the requested country
Upon request and whenever possible, FIUs should provide feedback to their foreign counterparts on the use of the information provided, as well as on the outcome of the analysis conducted, based on the information provided
FIUs should exchange information with foreign FIUs, regardless of their respective status, and should have an adequate legal basis for providing cooperation on money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing (R. 40, IN)
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Сапунцов Андрей Леонидович
The International AML/CFT Framework: Challenges for Financial Transnational Corporations from Developing Countries
Корректор М.В. Макарова
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