Time Span

Is the negotiation concerned with multifaceted objectives likely to require years and successive sets of negotiators to reconcile? Or is the likely time period short and limited by external factors? A recent example in which time fatally limited both the duration and scope of negotiations occurred in the aftermath of the Argentinian occupation of the Falkland Islands in 1982. Because of the imminence of winter storms in the South Atlantic, the British were forced to end negotiations and move to military action. This constraint also created great inequality in the bargaining power of the antagonists. The British had to act (or abandon the option of military action at least for a year and possibly forever); Argentina could afford to go on talking indefinitely, and even to offer to withdraw, because its military bases were only forty minutes by plane from the islands. Another, less dramatic example is the pressure to renegotiate the status of Hong Kong, which is created by the expiration in 1997 of the 1898 Convention of Peking, under which more than 90 percent of the land area of Hong Kong was leased to Great Britain.

The case for an analytical framework

Much that is written about negotiations is simply descriptive of actual cases. Such description usually reflects the particular area of concern of authors. It does not follow any particular model, and the range in emphasis is great. Similarly, efforts to uncover universal patterns or to construct models for looking at negotiations vary greatly in terms of focus. To generalize about negotiation and its place in foreign policy, a tightly constructed analytical framework is needed. Such a framework would serve three distinct purposes.

First, it could offer a means for describing a negotiation across a number of dimensions. The negotiation could be placed in its broad environmental setting. This would mean considering its relation to the major foreign policy aims and objectives of the participants, its place in their strategies and tactics, the capabilities of the participants, and the sanctions available to them. The framework would also take account of efforts to achieve convergence around a formula. This should include a survey of preferences of the actors for various formulae, the efforts made by each to settle on a favored formula, and the obstacles each faced. Then, there should be a focus on the critical moment in the negotiating process that led to a formula around which there could be general convergence.⁷ The emphasis here should be on power and perceptions because these two components are always central to explaining the reason the critical moment appeared when it did. Finally, the formula itself should be described both formally and in terms of the implicit conditions that made its acceptance possible.

Second, a framework could serve an evaluative purpose. It could provide a means for evaluating either the literature concerning a negotiation or negotiations in general or the negotiation itself from the point of view of one or more of the concerned parties. One outcome might be the identification of areas that are emphasized and areas that are neglected. For example, was the general environment ignored? How well was the capability factor dealt with and in what ways is it conceptualized?

Moreover, the framework could be used to construct an ideal typical negotiation, and this ideal could be compared with the actual negotiations. This ideal would be useful for evaluating the performance of any single participant. It could also provide the means for evaluating the effectiveness of leverage, the success of negotiators in keeping

UNDERSTANDING NEGOTIATION: THE ACADEMIC CONTRIBUTION

overall objectives in mind, and the degree of control exercised by negotiators over the negotiating process itself.

Third, the framework could be adapted for prescriptive purposes. Because it is inherently systematic, it would provide a general standard by which to judge and improve negotiating performance. In particular, it would expose, and correct, the common tendency to ignore the general environment and to conceptualize the bargaining milieu systematically. In short, a framework used for prescriptive purposes would be a device to avoid the common tendency of dealing with negotiations on an ad hoc and incremental basis.

SUGGESTED FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

Situational Definition: Basic Aims and Objectives Relevant to the Negotiations

People will, of course, disagree about the basic objectives of any government. Because these objectives are the consequence of a foreign policy decision-making process that does not lend itself easily to empirical analysis, objectives can only be inferred, and the rationale for inference will vary considerably. Analysts like to think their conclusions are derived directly from their observation, rather than being filtered through their own assumptions about the way policy is made. In fact, however, such assumptions lend influence, and because observers’ assumptions differ, they are unlikely to agree on a government’s policy objectives. The moral here is that observers should explicitly state their assumptions about objectives, as well as their conclusions. Both statements are necessary to evaluate their analysis of the negotiation.

For example, take three individual analysts. “A” “B”, and “C”, each of whom is looking at U.S.-Soviet negotiations on arms control and on the issue of the seabed. “A” sees as the primary determinant of U.S. objectives an intensely perceived threat from a Soviet Union seeking to expand its global influence. “A” sees Soviet objectives as determined by a messianic drive to spread communism throughout the world. “B” agrees with “A” regarding the determinant of U.S. objectives, that is, an intensely perceived threat from the Soviet Union. But “B” sees Soviet objectives as determined by an intensely perceived threat from the United States, based on a perceived U.S. policy of overturning Marxism wherever it exists. “C” in contrast, believes U.S. policy to be a product of capitalistic forces that are inducing a policy that favors the advancement of capitalism. “C” sees Soviet objectives

as does “B” as reflecting a view of a U.S. policy of eradicating Marxist forces wherever they exist. The divergence of views among the three will clearly affect the ways in which the analysts interpret and evaluate the negotiations that are scrutinized.

Basic Aims and Objectives. First, one should ask, what are the basic aims to which the negotiations in question most clearly relate? Then, what are some of the subsidiary aims to which the negotiations relate? As the forgoing suggests, the analysts will disagree here as well. “A” and “B”, in the arms control example, will view the most basic and relevant U.S. objective as that of containing and deterring the Soviet Union. The primary subsidiary objective will be that of denying the Soviet Union strategic superiority in nuclear weapons. For "C," in contrast, the objective will be that of advancing the interests of world capitalism. The primary subsidiary objective would be to achieve a base of nuclear superiority that would advance the U.S. bargaining position vis--vis the communist bloc. “A” would see the basic objective of the Soviet Union relating to the negotiations as that of advancing the interests of international communism as directed by Moscow. The subsidiary objective would be that of gaining nuclear superiority over the Western bloc for bargaining purposes. “B” and “C” would see the objective as one of containing and deterring the United States. The subsidiary objective served, it follows, would be that of denying the United States strategic superiority in nuclear weapons.

With regard to negotiations over the seabed, however, the picture would be somewhat different. “A” who sees a highly aggressive Soviet Union bent on world domination, is likely to see negotiations regarding the seabed as most closely related to the U.S. aim of deterring the Soviet Union. The subsidiary objective would be to prevent additional Soviet strategic access to marine areas. “B”, in contrast, sees U.S.-Soviet relations as based on mutual misperceptions of threat. “B” may see the U.S. aim—to which the seabed negotiations relate—as that of improving world economic relations. The view of “B” appears to have been the position that prevailed in the Carter administration. When the Reagan administration took power, however, the view of “A” suddenly prevailed, and the progress that had been made toward a treaty dealing with the seabed was lost. “C” whose view represents a much smaller constituency than either “A” or “B” would likely see the basic objective of the U.S. aim regarding the seabed negotiations as advancing the interests of world capitalism, with the subsidiary objective of opening the seabed worldwide to capitalistic entrepreneurship. For

UNDERSTANDING NEGOTIATION: THE ACADEMIC CONTRIBUTION

Richard Cottam

“A” and “C”, therefore, the seabed negotiations would relate to the most basic aim of U.S. policy. For “B,” the aim served would be a secondary one in the aims hierarchy.

Relative Importance of the Aims and Objectives. Second, one should ask, how important the aims pursued in the negotiations are to the overall objectives of the governments concerned? How important is foreign policy relative to domestic policy goals? The assumption here is that the greater the intensity of a government's concern about foreign or defense policies, the more hierarchically ordered will be the foreign policy objectives.

In the arms control example, the negotiations concern central objectives and the milieu is one of an intensely perceived threat or opportunity. If “A”, “B”, and “C” represent significant sections of the population, disagreement about the negotiations will certainly be very great. However, because few individuals think in terms of basic assumptions, the disagreements are likely to be expressed in terms of tactical differences, with no real understanding that the differences are, in fact, far more fundamental. The advantage of using the suggested framework is that in applying the framework, the analyst will begin to understand the level at which disagreement is most clearly rooted.

Reconciliation Problems. Third, one should ask, how the negotiations are likely to affect the realization of basic objectives not directly related to the purpose of the negotiations? Assume, for example, that if a particular arms reduction proposal is accepted, the United States will be required to remove some weaponry from a friendly Third World state. The presence of the weaponry in that Third World state, however, is meant to signal to an aggressive neighbor of the state the commitment of the United States to the defense of its friend. Thus, removal of the weaponry might very well be perceived as a withdrawal of that commitment. In this case, the U.S. government must engage in a strategy beforehand of signaling by some other device its continued concern for the security of its friend. This can be thought of as a strategy to reconcile two important interests. In most cases, policymakers will have considered the major complications that could follow an agreement in the negotiation process. Far too often, however, involvement in the intricacies of a particular negotiation will be so all-consuming that important implications will be overlooked. Systematizing the process, as through the application

of a framework, should reduce these occurrences.

Situational Definition: Operating Strategy and Rele­vance of Negotiations. Having related the negotiations to basic and subsidiary aims and objectives of participating governments, the next task is to determine the operating strategy designed to achieve those aims and objectives. The use of the term "designed" may in fact be seriously misleading. Just as basic aims are the consequence of a highly elaborate and little understood decisional process—and not the product of the thinking and planning of single authorities—so, too, is strategy only rarely the outcome of the thinking of an individual or a set of individuals. Rather, "strategy," if thought of as the overall plan for achieving basic aims and directions, tends to emerge over a period of time. It can be thought of as the summation of a large number of incremental decisions that in toto gives the appearance of a conscious attempt to achieve a desired future.

But if it is not conscious, neither is it random. The summation of incremental decisions reflects a reconciliation of the disparate objectives of a large number of forces acting on the decision process. This phenomenon can be conceptualized as system determination. It reflects a judgment that high-level strategy is the product of a number of basic foreign policy determinants, the competing demands of which are incrementally reconciled by decision makers who are not conscious of their role in strategy formulation. The academic analyst, separated from the day-to-day demands of decision making, is in a position to infer and describe the process at work. This is, in fact, exactly the level at which the academic analyst has a contribution to make to an understanding of negotiation.

Public opinion provides an example of the forces at work in this process, and one that, in spite of its extraordinary importance, is little understood as a determinant of foreign policy. The U.S. public, for example, appears to agree strongly with the view of U.S. and Soviet objectives identified by analyst “A”. At least, the evidence suggests that U.S. policymakers believe this to be the case. Therefore, even if a great many, well-placed decision makers agree essentially with the views of analyst “B”, they understand that they cannot act on that view and still continue to be constructing a policy acceptable to the U.S. public. Thus, actual policies are likely to stay reasonably close to the perceived view of the modal American's assessment. The operating strategy, therefore, will be essentially a Cold War strategy, even though a

number of individual decisions (likely to have been made by technicians dealing with problems that were not visible to the public) are premised on very different assumptions.

A better understood example is that of a major economic pressure group. U.S. industry, to take a real example, may be doing well in gaining a wide variety of contracts granted by the Saudi Arabian government. However, the Saudi government feels seriously threatened by the Islamic movement both at home and emanating from Iran. The Saudi government wants support from the United States in the form of weaponry and technical aid but understands that, because of the susceptibility of Saudi Arabia to the Islamic movement, such support must be unobtrusive. Therefore, it asks Americans doing business in Saudi Arabia to apply subtle pressure on the U.S. government to gain the kind of military and technical support it feels is needed. This requires a willingness to oppose pro-Israeli pressure groups. In the equation of elements producing U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia, this pressure is almost certain to be both critical and barely visible. Because concern for Israeli security is also central to U.S. aims in the Middle East, the negotiations with Saudi Arabia about the sale of arms must involve a compromise between the objective of helping Saudi Arabia oppose Islamic forces and that of avoiding creating a security problem for Israel.