- •Додаткова
- •Інформаційні ресурси
- •Us army intelligence analisis
- •1 July 2009 tc 2-33.4 2-5
- •Intellectual Humility
- •Intellectual Courage
- •1 July 2009 tc 2-33.4 2-7
- •Intellectual Empathy
- •Intellectual Integrity
- •Intellectual Perseverance
- •Intellectual Autonomy
- •Inductive reasoning
- •1 July 2009 tc 2-33.4 2-9
- •1 July 2009 tc 2-33.4 2-11
- •1 July 2009 tc 2-33.4 2-13
- •1 July 2009 tc 2-33.4 2-13
- •1 July 2009 tc 2-33.4 2-17
- •1 July 2009 tc 2-33.4 2-19
- •1 July 2009 tc 2-33.4 2-21
1 July 2009 tc 2-33.4 2-17
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Correspondence Test of Truth
2-80. While studying a response to the commander’s PIR, an analyst notices that all presented information
is the result of firsthand observation. Knowing the source to be reliable, the analyst assumes that every
statement in the response corresponds to reality. The correspondence test of truth is the theory in which the
truth is a statement that corresponds to reality.
Example
• Pilots returning from a close air support mission reported destruction of three
enemy tanks. The debriefing officer debriefed each pilot separately, and all pilots
gave essentially the same report.
• Despite the fact that all pilots of one flight reported destruction of three tanks, the
brigade commander wanted more supporting evidence. To gain supporting
evidence, the brigade S-2 requested a post-strike unmanned aircraft system
(UAS) imagery mission through the division ISR manager. The ISR manager
granted the request and ordered the mission. Both the brigade S-2 and the
commander placed more credibility in the photographic evidence because they
believe that it is more objective, and less prone to human error. As such, the S-2
felt that it would eliminate the chance of human error.
• The S-2, believing that video and photography eliminated any possibility of
subjectivity, failed to consider that photographs require interpretation and this
interpretation involves a degree of subjectivity.
• Post-strike results: The UAS mission revealed three badly damaged tanks in hulldefilade
positions. The intelligence analyst considered the imagery reports, along
with the pilot debriefs. Based upon this information, the analyst reported three
tanks confirmed damaged, but cannot confirm they were destroyed.
2-81. In the example above, the statements or other evidence corresponded to reality. To test the degree of
correspondence, observations are required. The chief criterion in observations is objectivity. Using a mix
of ISR assets can attain greater objectivity during collection operations.
2-82. Analysts naturally place more confidence in data collected from multiple sources than data collected
from a single source. In the case of the unmanned aircraft system (UAS) mission report, versus the pilots’
reports, the analyst had more confidence in the UAS’s ability to observe the target from multiple angles.
The UAS-derived information had more credibility than the pilots’ report because the pilots may only have
a fleeting glimpse of the target while attempting to egress. When a variety of collectors corroborate with
each other, confidence in the conclusions increases. If there are conflicts between reports from multiple
sources, analysts tend to rely on the least subjective source.
2-83. The correspondence test of truth requires observations to test whether or not, and to what extent,
statements correspond to reality. One problem with this theory is that the enemy seldom permits direct
observations, and often goes to great lengths to prevent direct observations or to deceive those observing.
Coherence Test of Truth
2-84. This test of truth uses consistency with ideas or facts to validate statements. Where direct access to
the threat is denied, the coherence test of truth becomes necessary. The coherence theory refers to how
consistent different pieces of information are in relation to each other. An analyst considering a new piece
of information that corroborates known information would place more credibility in the new information
and the conclusions drawn from it.
Chapter 2
2-18 TC 2-33.4 1 July 2009
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Example
In the latter part of September, theater level staff intelligence officers considered the
following information:
• The Southern League (Parma, Corinth, Lythia, and Samar) normally concludes
their training cycles with a large-scale, combined exercise (historical record).
• Visitors to Parma reported being denied access to certain areas in the vicinity of
Ides, in the western Daematia Province (confirmed report).
• Reports indicate certain infantry, armor, and engineer units from all four League
member nations have moved from their garrison locations (unconfirmed report).
• All commercial air traffic to Thesulis will be restricted for a period of two weeks,
starting 1 October (confirmed report).
The intelligence staff concluded that this year’s League exercise will take place in, or
near Thesulis, bordering Parma’s Daematia province, during the period 1 to 14
October. Although no one piece of information pointed directly to this conclusion, all
pieces of information seemed consistent with each other as well as with the
conclusion.
2-85. In the realm of theory, intelligence usually works with some factual basis for most inferences or
conclusions. The coherence test of truth supplements the correspondence test of truth.
Pragmatic Test of Truth
2-86. The pragmatic test of truth proposes that a statement is true if it works in practice. Although a
practical tool, the pragmatic test of truth has some weaknesses. First, the results may only appear to justify
the means used to achieve them. Second, a successful outcome may be attributed to other factors that could
have produced the same outcome in a different situation.
Example
Before the Battle of Cape Esperance in World War II, U.S. Navy Admiral Norman
Scott organized a task force into a long, single column. He believed this line-ahead
formation would be effective against the Japanese units’ night tactics. In the ensuing
battle, Admiral Scott sank two Japanese destroyers and severely damaged two
cruisers. After the battle, Admiral Scott concluded that the line-ahead formation
theory was indeed effective. By combining radar-controlled fire control systems with
the line-ahead formation, Admiral Scott believed he could master any night battle
situation.
2-87. In the above example, the use of radar-controlled fire control systems may have produced the same
result no matter what formation was used. Lastly, an unsuccessful outcome does not necessarily imply that
the means used were unsound; again, other unknown factors may have contributed to the unsuccessful
outcome.
SITUATIONAL LOGIC
2-88. The most common method of intelligence analysis is “situational logic,” sometimes called the “area
studies” approach. This involves generating different hypotheses on the basis of considering concrete
elements of the current situation. Broad, global generalizations are avoided. Even though most analysts
know this to be untrue, every situation is treated as one-of-a-kind, to be understood in terms of its own
unique logic. A single country is looked at, although on multiple interrelated issues.
Analytical Processes, Methodologies, and Terms