Public Administration in Southeast Asia: An Overview 9

It is tempting for some scholars and many practitioners to want to put aside the past of culture and legacy. It is said that, “these are modern times, circumstances are now different, we need to move on, and not dwell on the past.” These are true sentiments, but ignoring the past makes people blind to the larger forces of norms and practices that often continue today. The past is prologue—no more, but also no less. Without these, it is sometimes hard to understand why some things endure.

1.4 Decentralization

Decentralization has developed in the last 20 years as a major force for development. The development of effective regional and local governments allows for increased services and initiatives that can spur and support new economic activity. Yet, all three countries (Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines) have a strong tradition of centralization, which often led in past development efforts. Decentralization involves a loss of control by the central government, which has an obvious political element.

Bidhya notes that Thailand has had a long and strong tradition of authoritative rule, centralization, and big government. Achakorn and Chandra explain that, “the extremely tight traditional central-provincial-local relations were patterned on British colonial administrative regimes. This strong central state was designed to secure control over outlying rural areas… Only since the 1990s, and despite strong opposition from the Ministry of Interior, have Thai governments consistently supported decentralization.” Possibly, this reflects in some measure a growing influence of politicians elected from rural areas. Likewise, Brillantes and Ilago note that, “a leading argument on why decentralization was pursued in the Philippines was to correct the inherent centralism of the administrative system. The Local Government Code of 1991 is a landmark piece of decentralization legislation because of its unprecedented transfer of powers, functions and resources of the central government to the historically weak or politically insignificant local government units.”

Of concern has been the relatively weak competency of many local governments, of course. “Most local governments in Thailand feature weak financial management, insufficient resources, inefficient planning and service delivery, and deficient public infrastructure. These major problems, in turn, result from inadequate revenue resources, poor mobilization of existing revenues, lack of technical capabilities and personnel, and unclear responsibilities.” Still, progress is being made and Brillantes and Ilago state that “the relatively small size of municipalities make it more difficult to deliver extension services or to hire the needed expertise… In spite of these constraints, devolution has yielded some positive results such as the increasing cooperation between local government units and the private sector and NGOs in agricultural extension, an increased focus on training and extension for farm systems rather than on a single commodity, and local government focus on training and entrepreneurship for agricultural development.”

Some innovation is also present. According to Achakorn and Chandra, “critics of decentralization in Thailand have worried… that local power brokers would boost their influence. In 1988, the Ministry of Interior issued an order to all local governments to encourage, organize, recognize, and support Cooperative Community Groups (CCGs) in local areas. CCGs are local groups of residents formally recognized by the local government as representatives of their communities. CCGs can be organized at local governments’ behest or at the request of the groups themselves. (An approximate number of members is from 200 to 2000). The main objective of the CCG is to encourage community groups to be strong and depend on themselves as much as they possibly can in solving their own problems.”

© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC

10 Public Administration in Southeast Asia

Brillantes and Sonco describe how the Philippines has made earnest headway in decentralization. In 1991, the Local Government Code was enacted, which is considered “a landmark, far-reaching and the most radical piece of legislation in the history of Philippine politicoadministrative system. It devolved significant functions, powers, and responsibilities to the thousands of local governments in the country that have long been operating under a highly centralized regime.” They describe the development of new initiatives and increased responsiveness as a result of decentralization. Its implementation has shown progress and desirable results, but they also note that, “strong familial ties and strong political clans of the Filipinos threaten the degree of democratization, electoral participation, and political accountability at the local government level.” They also note that capacity building for local governance is much needed. For example, “professionalizing the local bureaucracy requires establishing the competency needs of civil servants at the local level, their career path and development in the local bureaucracy.” They call for a comprehensive capacity-building program.

Centralization is also strong in Malaysia, but the demand for local governance has been weak, coupled with a perceived need to maintain a strong central structure. Phang states: “The theory and practice of development administration in Malaysia has thus far been based upon the premise that ‘effective governance’ should have priority over ‘good governance’ as the intensity of plural and communal politics may get in the way of national development. The key to Malaysia’s economic development and growth propensity is very much dependent upon racial harmony and the government will not be willing to compromise this.” Thus, maintaining racial harmony (or, peace) is the order of the day. Moreover, the capacity of local government has long been limited. Local governments must seek state approval over most matters in finance, appointment of its councilors and staffing, and local elections were abolished in the 1970s. The local government governance capacity is very weak.

The cases of Macao and Hong Kong are unique and a matter of decentralization only in the sense of Mainland China providing far-reaching autonomy to these former colonies and now special regions. Both Hong Kong and Macao are under the direct authority of the central government of China, and the highest level of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), namely, the central leadership under Hu Jintao, decides on the policy toward Hong Kong. The top central body that takes charge is the Hong Kong and Macao Work Coordination Group of the CCP. Under the One Country Two Systems (OCTS) policy, Mainland China agrees to give substantial autonomy, though it appoints and removes the chief executive (who is chosen to be a political ally of Beijing), and China has responsibility for diplomacy and defense. A key to OCTS is the agreement that no offices or local authorities of the Mainland may interfere in the affairs of Hong Kong or Macao SAR. Peter Cheung writes that, “the OCTS policy reveals that the relationship between the central government and the SAR is hardly smooth. While most observers would agree that the first decade of OCTS has been largely successful, Hong Kong’s enjoyment of a ‘high degree of autonomy’ is first and foremost dependent upon Beijing’s restraint.” Similarly, Choi writes, “Macao is repeatedly reminded that autonomy is based on a grant from the centre, and that it is not an inherent right, suggesting that deliverance from central involvement is tenuous.”

Cheung writes that demonstrations in Hong Kong against the Tung administration on July 1, 2003, shocked the Chinese leadership, and caused it to become more active in shaping Hong Kong politics. China revamped its agencies and policy coordination group responsible for Hong Kong affairs, stepped up the monitoring of Hong Kong political developments, intensified its work with political, business, and community leaders, and offered economic policy support measures to boost the Hong Kong economy. Similarly, Choi notes that by supporting pro-China social groups in Macao, China maintains its unchallenged control on Macao politics, “the local elite, no matter old or new rich, sing in unison of the caring and kindness of the motherland.” Popular concern in

© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC