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TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

 

7 A Contextual Analysis of the System Justification Motive and Its Societal Consequences / 158

Aaron C. Kay and Mark P. Zanna

IV. EPISTEMIC AND EXISTENTIAL MOTIVES

8The Social Psychology of Uncertainty Management and System Justification / 185

Kees van den Bos

9Political Ideology in the 21st Century: A Terror Management Perspective on Maintenance

and Change of the Status Quo / 210

Jacqueline Anson, Tom Pyszczynski, Sheldon Solomon, and Jeff Greenberg

10No Atheists in Foxholes: Motivated Reasoning and Religious Belief / 241

Robb Willer

V. PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

11Motivated Social Cognition and Ideology: Is Attention to Elite Discourse a Prerequisite for Epistemically

Motivated Political Affinities? / 267

Christopher M. Federico and Paul Goren

12A Dual Process Motivational Model of Ideological Attitudes and System Justification / 292

John Duckitt and Chris G. Sibley

13Statewide Differences in Personality Predict Voting

Patterns in 1996–2004 U.S. Presidential Elections / 314

Peter J. Rentfrow, John T. Jost, Samuel D. Gosling, and Jeffrey Potter

VI. PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE AND MORALITY

14Procedural Justice and System-Justifying Motivations / 351

Irina Feygina and Tom R. Tyler

Table of Contents xi

15

Planet of the Durkheimians, Where Community, Authority,

 

and Sacredness Are Foundations of Morality

/ 371

 

Jonathan Haidt and Jesse Graham

 

16

Ideology of the Good Old Days: Exaggerated Perceptions

 

of Moral Decline and Conservative Politics /

402

Richard P. Eibach and Lisa K. Libby

VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR SELF, GROUP, AND SOCIETY

17Group Status and Feelings of Personal Entitlement: The Roles of Social Comparison and System-Justifying Beliefs / 427

Laurie T. O’Brien and Brenda Major

18Ambivalent Sexism at Home and at Work: How Attitudes Toward Women in Relationships Foster Exclusion in the Public Sphere / 444

Mina Cikara, Tiane L. Lee, Susan T. Fiske, and Peter Glick

19 Acknowledging and Redressing Historical Injustices / 463

Katherine B. Starzyk, Craig W. Blatz, and Michael Ross

20 The Politics of Intergroup Attitudes / 480

Brian A. Nosek, Mahzarin R. Banaji, and John T. Jost

Name Index / 507

Subject Index / 513

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FOREWORD

Why Political Psychology Is Important

The knowledge of our own minds can be put to no better use than in understanding our social and political lives. That is why political psychology matters. Political psychology applies an important branch of the cognitive and brain sciences—experimental psychology, including social and cognitive psychology—to politics. Although the methodologies may be limited to the techniques of one or more subfields, the results nonetheless contribute substantially to the overall picture: Political thought is not what it appears to be. It is much deeper, as we strive to show in Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification.

Over the past three decades, the cognitive and brain sciences have utterly changed our understanding of the mind and how it works. The results are startling to most people, including academics in most fields and political professionals. Perhaps most startling is the concept that ideas are not abstract; they are physical structures in the brain—and once there, they don’t change easily. A widely accepted view of the mind assumes that reason is conscious, literal (it can directly fit the world), logical, dispassionate, universal, disembodied (independent of perception and bodily movement), and serving of self-interest, so much so that it is seen to be irrational to act against one’s own interests.

We now know from scientific studies of the brain and mind that all of these commonplace views of reason are false. Reason is mostly unconscious, automatic, and effortless. We make inevitable use of conceptual framing and metaphor to understand and reason about reality. Thus reason does not fit the world directly—in most politically important cases, it’s not even close. Our “logic” is frameand metaphor-based; it is not the logic of logicians and mathematicians. Reason is anything but dispassionate. The reverse is true. If brain damage (say from a stroke or an accident) has eliminated your emotional capacities, you would not know what to want or how anyone else would want you to act: loss of emotion makes the use of reason virtually impossible.

Reason is anything but universal: even conservatives and progressives in the same country do not use the same forms of thought. Since you think with your brains, and since concepts arise from the body, reason is anything but disembodied. Moreover, mirror neuron studies indicate that we are born

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FOREWORD

 

 

with a natural capacity for empathy and cooperation, and do not use reason simply in the service of self-interest.

Viewed through the lens of my field, cognitive linguistics, the political environment is not what the TV pundits tell you. Conservatives and progressives don’t just have different beliefs; they have different views of the world and different modes of reasoning—mostly unconscious. The central difference arises from a commonplace metaphorical understanding of the nation as family, with conflicting ideas of what an ideal family should be, either strict or nurturant. Many Americans are biconceptual; they have both worldviews and modes of thought, but apply them in different arenas of life—say, conservative on foreign policy and progressive on domestic matters, or the reverse. Foundational concepts, like freedom, fairness, equality, and democracy don’t have just one meaning. They are essentially contested; they will inevitably have multiple incompatible meanings, reflecting the multiple differences in worldview. Most people will be unaware of all this because thought is mostly unconscious. Similarly, they will be unaware that we all normally think in terms of conceptual frames and metaphors.

Why should we care that our main political modes of thought operate below the radar screen? Because conservatives, through their think tanks, have taken advantage of the situation, framing just about every issue in public discussion their way via conservative messages filling the airways. Our political discourse is disastrously out of balance. To remedy the situation, we need to understand more about how our minds are linked to our politics.

This book will take you on a grand tour of political psychology. What justifies systems of hierarchical power and vastly unequal wealth? Why does the status quo have an advantage over change? How do people manage uncertainty and terror, and what are the consequences? How do personality types line up with political ideologies? Why do so many people think the world is getting worse? Why do people tend to care more about injustices done to others by outsiders, than about injustices done to others by their own group members?

Read on.

George Lakoff

Berkeley, CA April 2008

CONTRIBUTORS

Jacqueline Anson

Doctoral Student

University of Rochester

Rochester, NY

Mahzarin R. Banaji

Professor of Psychology

Harvard University

Cambridge, MA

John A. Bargh

Professor of Psychology

Yale University

New Haven, CT

Craig W. Blatz

SSHRC Post-Doctoral Fellow

Simon Fraser University

Vancouver, BC

Canada

Travis J. Carter

Doctoral Student

Cornell University

Ithaca, NY

Becky L. Choma

Post-Doctoral Fellow

York University

Toronto, ON

Canada

Mina Cikara

Doctoral Student

Princeton University

Princeton, NJ

Chris Crandall

Professor of Psychology

University of Kansas

Lawrence, KS

John Duckitt

Professor of Psychology

The University

of Auckland

Auckland, NZ

Richard P. Eibach

Assistant Professor

Yale University

New Haven, CT

Scott Eidelman

Assistant Professor

University of Arkansas

Fayetteville, AR

Christopher M. Federico

Associate Professor

University of

Minnesota

Minneapolis, MN

Melissa J. Ferguson

Associate Professor

Cornell University

Ithaca, NY

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CONTRIBUTORS

 

 

Irina Feygina

Doctoral Student

New York University

New York, NY

Susan T. Fiske

Professor of Psychology

Princeton University

Princeton, NJ

Paul Goren

Associate Professor

University of Minnesota

Minneapolis, MN

Sam Gosling

Associate Professor

University of Texas, Austin

Austin, TX

Jesse Graham

Doctoral Student

University of Virginia

Charlottesville, VA

Jeff Greenberg

Professor of Psychology

University of Arizona

Tucson, AZ

Carolyn L. Hafer

Professor of Psychology

Brock University

St. Catharines, ON

Canada

Jonathan Haidt

Associate Professor

University of Virginia

Charlottesville, VA

Ran R. Hassin

Professor of Psychology

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Jerusalem, Israel

John T. Jost

Professor of Psychology

New York University

New York, NY

Aaron C. Kay

Assistant Professor

University of Waterloo

Waterloo, ON

Canada

George Lakoff

Professor of Linguistics and

Cognitive Science

University of California

Berkeley, CA

Tiane L. Lee

Doctoral Student

Princeton University

Princeton, NJ

Lisa K. Libby

Assistant Professor

Ohio State University

Columbus, OH

Brenda Major

Professor of Psychology

University of California

Santa Barbara, CA

Gregory Mitchell

Professor of Law

University of Virginia

Charlottesville, VA

Contributors

xvii

 

 

Brian Nosek

Associate Professor

University of Virginia

Charlottesville, VA

Laurie T. O’Brien

Assistant Professor

Tulane University

New Orleans, LA

T. Andrew Poehlman

Assistant Professor

Southern Methodist University

Dallas, TX

Tom Pyszczynski

Professor of Psychology

University of Colorado,

Colorado Springs

Colorado Springs, CO

Peter J. Rentfrow

Lecturer

University of Cambridge

Cambridge, UK

Mike Ross

Professor of Psychology

University of Waterloo

Waterloo, ON

Canada

Chris G. Sibley

Lecturer

The University of Auckland

Auckland, NZ

Sheldon Solomon

Professor of Psychology

Skidmore College

Saratoga Springs, NY

Katherine B. Starzyk

Assistant Professor

University of Manitoba

Winnipeg, MB

Canada

Philip E. Tetlock

Professor of Organizational

Behavior

University of California, Berkeley

Berkeley, CA

Hulda Thorisdottir

Postdoctoral Fellow

Princeton University

Princeton, NJ

Tom R. Tyler

Professor of Psychology

New York University

New York, NY

Eric Luis Uhlmann

Postdoctoral Fellow

Northwestern University

Evanston, IL

Kees van den Bos

Professor of Psychology

Utrecht University

The Netherlands

Robb Willer

Assistant Professor of Sociology

University of California, Berkeley

Berkeley, CA

Mark Zanna

Professor of Psychology

University of Waterloo

Waterloo, ON

Canada

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P A R T I

Introduction