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Mankiw Principles of Microeconomics (4th ed)

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210 Externalities

218 PART FOUR THE ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR

TRADABLE POLLUTION PERMITS

Returning to our example of the paper mill and the steel mill, let us suppose that, despite the advice of its economists, the EPA adopts the regulation and requires each factory to reduce its pollution to 300 tons of glop per year. Then one day, after the regulation is in place and both mills have complied, the two firms go to the EPA with a proposal. The steel mill wants to increase its emission of glop by 100 tons. The paper mill has agreed to reduce its emission by the same amount if the steel mill pays it $5 million. Should the EPA allow the two factories to make this deal?

From the standpoint of economic efficiency, allowing the deal is good policy. The deal must make the owners of the two factories better off, because they are voluntarily agreeing to it. Moreover, the deal does not have any external effects because the total amount of pollution remains the same. Thus, social welfare is enhanced by allowing the paper mill to sell its right to pollute to the steel mill.

The same logic applies to any voluntary transfer of the right to pollute from one firm to another. If the EPA allows firms to make these deals, it will, in essence, have created a new scarce resource: pollution permits. A market to trade these permits will eventually develop, and that market will be governed by the forces of supply and demand. The invisible hand will ensure that this new market efficiently allocates the right to pollute. The firms that can reduce pollution only at high cost will be willing to pay the most for the pollution permits. The firms that can reduce pollution at low cost will prefer to sell whatever permits they have.

One advantage of allowing a market for pollution permits is that the initial allocation of pollution permits among firms does not matter from the standpoint of economic efficiency. The logic behind this conclusion is similar to that behind the Coase theorem. Those firms that can reduce pollution most easily would be willing to sell whatever permits they get, and those firms that can reduce pollution only at high cost would be willing to buy whatever permits they need. As long as there is a free market for the pollution rights, the final allocation will be efficient whatever the initial allocation.

Although reducing pollution using pollution permits may seem quite different from using Pigovian taxes, in fact the two policies have much in common. In both cases, firms pay for their pollution. With Pigovian taxes, polluting firms must pay a tax to the government. With pollution permits, polluting firms must pay to buy the permit. (Even firms that already own permits must pay to pollute: The opportunity cost of polluting is what they could have received by selling their permits on the open market.) Both Pigovian taxes and pollution permits internalize the externality of pollution by making it costly for firms to pollute.

The similarity of the two policies can be seen by considering the market for pollution. Both panels in Figure 10-5 show the demand curve for the right to pollute. This curve shows that the lower the price of polluting, the more firms will choose to pollute. In panel (a), the EPA uses a Pigovian tax to set a price for pollution. In this case, the supply curve for pollution rights is perfectly elastic (because firms can pollute as much as they want by paying the tax), and the position of the demand curve determines the quantity of pollution. In panel (b), the EPA sets a quantity of pollution by issuing pollution permits. In this case, the supply curve for pollution rights is perfectly inelastic (because the quantity of pollution is fixed by the number of permits), and the position of the demand curve determines the price of pollution. Hence, for any given demand curve for pollution, the EPA can

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Externalities 211

CHAPTER 10 EXTERNALITIES

219

(a) Pigovian Tax

Price of

Pollution

P

1. A Pigovian tax sets the price of pollution . . .

0

Q

2. . . . which, together with the demand curve, determines the quantity of pollution.

Pigovian

tax

Demand for pollution rights

Quantity of

Pollution

 

(b) Pollution Permits

Price of

Supply of

Pollution

pollution permits

 

P

 

 

Demand for

 

 

pollution rights

0

Q

 

Quantity of

 

 

 

 

Pollution

2. . . . which, together

 

1. Pollution

 

 

 

 

with the demand curve,

 

permits set

 

 

determines the price

 

the quantity

 

 

of pollution.

 

of pollution . . .

 

 

 

 

 

 

THE EQUIVALENCE OF PIGOVIAN TAXES AND POLLUTION PERMITS. In panel (a), the EPA

sets a price on pollution by levying a Pigovian tax, and the demand curve determines the quantity of pollution. In panel (b), the EPA limits the quantity of pollution by limiting the number of pollution permits, and the demand curve determines the price of pollution. The price and quantity of pollution are the same in the two cases.

Figure 10-5

achieve any point on the demand curve either by setting a price with a Pigovian tax or by setting a quantity with pollution permits.

In some circumstances, however, selling pollution permits may be better than levying a Pigovian tax. Suppose the EPA wants no more than 600 tons of glop to be dumped into the river. But, because the EPA does not know the demand curve for pollution, it is not sure what size tax would achieve that goal. In this case, it can simply auction off 600 pollution permits. The auction price would yield the appropriate size of the Pigovian tax.

The idea of the government auctioning off the right to pollute may at first sound like a creature of some economist’s imagination. And, in fact, that is how the idea began. But increasingly the EPA has used the system as a way to control pollution. Pollution permits, like Pigovian taxes, are now widely viewed as a costeffective way to keep the environment clean.

OBJECTIONS TO THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF POLLUTION

“We cannot give anyone the option of polluting for a fee.” This comment by former Senator Edmund Muskie reflects the view of some environmentalists. Clean air and clean water, they argue, are fundamental human rights that should not be debased by considering them in economic terms. How can you put a price on clean air and clean water? The environment is so important, they claim, that we should protect it as much as possible, regardless of the cost.

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212 Externalities

220 PART FOUR THE ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Economists have little sympathy with this type of argument. To economists, good environmental policy begins by acknowledging the first of the Ten Principles of Economics in Chapter 1: People face tradeoffs. Certainly, clean air and clean water have value. But their value must be compared to their opportunity cost—that is, to what one must give up to obtain them. Eliminating all pollution is impossible. Trying to eliminate all pollution would reverse many of the technological advances that allow us to enjoy a high standard of living. Few people would be willing to accept poor nutrition, inadequate medical care, or shoddy housing to make the environment as clean as possible.

Economists argue that some environmental activists hurt their own cause by not thinking in economic terms. A clean environment is a good like other goods. Like all normal goods, it has a positive income elasticity: Rich countries can afford a cleaner environment than poor ones and, therefore, usually have more rigorous environmental protection. In addition, like most other goods, clean air and water obey the law of demand: The lower the price of environmental protection, the more the public will want. The economic approach of using pollution permits and Pigovian taxes reduces the cost of environmental protection and should, therefore, increase the public’s demand for a clean environment.

QUICK QUIZ: A glue factory and a steel mill emit smoke containing a chemical that is harmful if inhaled in large amounts. Describe three ways the town government might respond to this externality. What are the pros and cons of each of your solutions?

CONCLUSION

The invisible hand is powerful but not omnipotent. A market’s equilibrium maximizes the sum of producer and consumer surplus. When the buyers and sellers in the market are the only interested parties, this outcome is efficient from the standpoint of society as a whole. But when there are external effects, such as pollution, evaluating a market outcome requires taking into account the well-being of third parties as well. In this case, the invisible hand of the marketplace may fail to allocate resources efficiently.

In some cases, people can solve the problem of externalities on their own. The Coase theorem suggests that the interested parties can bargain among themselves and agree on an efficient solution. Sometimes, however, an efficient outcome cannot be reached, perhaps because the large number of interested parties makes bargaining difficult.

When people cannot solve the problem of externalities privately, the government often steps in. Yet, even now, society should not abandon market forces entirely. Rather, the government can address the problem by requiring decisionmakers to bear the full costs of their actions. Pigovian taxes on emissions and pollution permits, for instance, are designed to internalize the externality of pollution. More and more, they are the policy of choice for those interested in protecting the environment. Market forces, properly redirected, are often the best remedy for market failure.

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IN THE NEWS

Children as Externalities

THIS TONGUE-IN-CHEEK EDITORIAL FROM

THE Economist, an international newsmagazine, calls attention to a common externality that is not fully appreciated.

M u m ’s t h e W o r d :

W h e n C h i l d r e n S h o u l d B e S c r e e n e d a n d N o t H e a r d

We live in increasingly intolerant times. Signs proliferate demanding no smoking, no spitting, no parking, even no walking.

. . . Posh clubs and restaurants have long had “no jeans” rules, but these days you can be too smart. Some London hostelries have “no suits” policies, for fear that boisterous city traders in suits might spoil the atmosphere. Environmentalists have long demanded all sorts of bans on cars. Mobile telephones are the latest target: some trains, airline lounges, restaurants, and even golf courses are being designated “no phone” areas.

If intolerance really has to be the spirit of this age, The Economist would like to suggest restrictions on another source of noise pollution: children. Lest you dismiss this as mere prejudice, we can even produce a good economic argument for it. Smoking, driving, and mobile phones all cause what economists call “negative externalities.” That is, the costs of these activities to other people tend to exceed the costs to the individuals

A NEGATIVE EXTERNALITY

of their proclivities. The invisible hand of the market fumbles, leading resources astray. Thus, because a driver’s private motoring costs do not reflect the costs he imposes on others in the form of pollution and congestion, he uses the car more than is socially desirable. Likewise, it is argued, smokers take too little care to ensure that their acrid fumes do not damage other people around them.

Governments typically respond to such market failures in two ways. One is higher taxes, to make polluters pay the full cost of their anti-social behavior. The other is regulation, such as emission standards or bans on smoking in public places. Both approaches might work for children.

For children, just like cigarettes or mobile phones, clearly impose a negative externality on people who are near them. Anybody who has suffered a 12hour flight with a bawling baby in the row immediately ahead, or a bored youngster viciously kicking their seat from behind, will grasp this as quickly as they would love to grasp the youngster’s neck. Here is a clear case of market failure: parents

do not bear the full costs (indeed young babies travel free), so they are too ready to take their noisy brats with them. Where is the invisible hand when it is needed to administer a good smack?

The solution is obvious. All airlines, trains, and restaurants should create child-free zones. Put all those children at the back of the plane and parents might make more effort to minimize their noise pollution. And instead of letting children pay less and babies go free, they should be charged (or taxed) more than adults, with the revenues used to subsidize seats immediately in front of the war-zone.

Passengers could then request a no-children seat, just as they now ask for a no-smoking one. As more women choose not to have children and the number of older people without young children increases, the demand for childfree travel will expand. Well, yes, it is a bit intolerant—but why shouldn’t parents be treated as badly as smokers? And at least there is an obvious airline to pioneer the scheme: Virgin.

SOURCE: The Economist, December 5, 1998, p. 20.

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222 PART FOUR THE ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Summar y

When a transaction between a buyer and seller directly affects a third party, the effect is called an externality. Negative externalities, such as pollution, cause the socially optimal quantity in a market to be less than the equilibrium quantity. Positive externalities, such as technology spillovers, cause the socially optimal quantity to be greater than the equilibrium quantity.

Those affected by externalities can sometimes solve the problem privately. For instance, when one business confers an externality on another business, the two businesses can internalize the externality by merging. Alternatively, the interested parties can solve the problem by negotiating a contract. According to the Coase theorem, if people can bargain without cost, then

they can always reach an agreement in which resources are allocated efficiently. In many cases, however, reaching a bargain among the many interested parties is difficult, so the Coase theorem does not apply.

When private parties cannot adequately deal with external effects, such as pollution, the government often steps in. Sometimes the government prevents socially inefficient activity by regulating behavior. Other times it internalizes an externality using Pigovian taxes. Another way to protect the environment is for the government to issue a limited number of pollution permits. The end result of this policy is largely the same as imposing Pigovian taxes on polluters.

Key Concepts

externality, p. 206

Coase theorem, p. 213

Pigovian tax, p. 216

internalizing an externality, p. 209

transaction costs, p. 214

 

Questions for Review

1.Give an example of a negative externality and an example of a positive externality.

2.Use a supply-and-demand diagram to explain the effect of a negative externality in production.

3.In what way does the patent system help society solve an externality problem?

4.List some of the ways that the problems caused by externalities can be solved without government intervention.

5.Imagine that you are a nonsmoker sharing a room with a smoker. According to the Coase theorem, what determines whether your roommate smokes in the room? Is this outcome efficient? How do you and your roommate reach this solution?

6.What are Pigovian taxes? Why do economists prefer them over regulations as a way to protect the environment from pollution?

Problems and Applications

1.Do you agree with the following statements? Why or why not?

a.“The benefits of Pigovian taxes as a way to reduce pollution have to be weighed against the deadweight losses that these taxes cause.”

b.“A negative production externality calls for a Pigovian tax on producers, whereas a negative

consumption externality calls for a Pigovian tax on consumers.”

2.Consider the market for fire extinguishers.

a.Why might fire extinguishers exhibit positive externalities in consumption?

b.Draw a graph of the market for fire extinguishers, labeling the demand curve, the social-value

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curve, the supply curve, and the social-cost curve.

c.Indicate the market equilibrium level of output and the efficient level of output. Give an intuitive explanation for why these quantities differ.

d.If the external benefit is $10 per extinguisher, describe a government policy that would result in the efficient outcome.

3.Contributions to charitable organizations are deductible under the federal income tax. In what way does this government policy encourage private solutions to externalities?

4.Ringo loves playing rock and roll music at high volume. Luciano loves opera and hates rock and roll. Unfortunately, they are next-door neighbors in an apartment building with paper-thin walls.

a.What is the externality here?

b.What command-and-control policy might the landlord impose? Could such a policy lead to an inefficient outcome?

c.Suppose the landlord lets the tenants do whatever they want. According to the Coase theorem, how might Ringo and Luciano reach an efficient outcome on their own? What might prevent them from reaching an efficient outcome?

5.It is rumored that the Swiss government subsidizes cattle farming, and that the subsidy is larger in areas with more tourist attractions. Can you think of a reason why this policy might be efficient?

6.Greater consumption of alcohol leads to more motor vehicle accidents and, thus, imposes costs on people who do not drink and drive.

a.Illustrate the market for alcohol, labeling the demand curve, the social-value curve, the supply curve, the social-cost curve, the market equilibrium level of output, and the efficient level of output.

b.On your graph, shade the area corresponding to the deadweight loss of the market equilibrium. (Hint: The deadweight loss occurs because some units of alcohol are consumed for which the social cost exceeds the social value.) Explain.

7.Many observers believe that the levels of pollution in our economy are too high.

a.If society wishes to reduce overall pollution by a certain amount, why is it efficient to have different amounts of reduction at different firms?

b.Command-and-control approaches often rely on uniform reductions among firms. Why are these

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CHAPTER 10 EXTERNALITIES

223

approaches generally unable to target the firms that should undertake bigger reductions?

c.Economists argue that appropriate Pigovian taxes or tradable pollution rights will result in efficient pollution reduction. How do these approaches target the firms that should undertake bigger reductions?

8.The Pristine River has two polluting firms on its banks. Acme Industrial and Creative Chemicals each dump 100 tons of glop into the river each year. The cost of reducing glop emissions per ton equals $10 for Acme and $100 for Creative. The local government wants to reduce overall pollution from 200 tons to 50 tons.

a.If the government knew the cost of reduction for each firm, what reductions would it impose to reach its overall goal? What would be the cost to each firm and the total cost to the firms together?

b.In a more typical situation, the government would not know the cost of pollution reduction at each firm. If the government decided to reach its overall goal by imposing uniform reductions on the firms, calculate the reduction made by each firm, the cost to each firm, and the total cost to the firms together.

c.Compare the total cost of pollution reduction in parts (a) and (b). If the government does not know the cost of reduction for each firm, is there still some way for it to reduce pollution to 50 tons at the total cost you calculated in part (a)? Explain.

9.Figure 10-5 shows that for any given demand curve for the right to pollute, the government can achieve the same outcome either by setting a price with a Pigovian tax or by setting a quantity with pollution permits. Suppose there is a sharp improvement in the technology for controlling pollution.

a.Using graphs similar to those in Figure 10-5, illustrate the effect of this development on the demand for pollution rights.

b.What is the effect on the price and quantity of pollution under each regulatory system? Explain.

10.Suppose that the government decides to issue tradable permits for a certain form of pollution.

a.Does it matter for economic efficiency whether the government distributes or auctions the permits? Does it matter in any other ways?

b.If the government chooses to distribute the permits, does the allocation of permits among firms matter for efficiency? Does it matter in any other ways?

11.The primary cause of global warming is carbon dioxide, which enters the atmosphere in varying amounts from

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216 Externalities

224 PART FOUR THE ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR

different countries but is distributed equally around the globe within a year. In an article in The Boston Globe (July 3, 1990), Martin and Kathleen Feldstein argue that the correct approach to global warming is “not to ask individual countries to stabilize their emissions of carbon dioxide at current levels,” as some have suggested. Instead, they argue that “carbon dioxide emissions should be reduced in countries where the costs are least, and the countries that bear that burden should be compensated by the rest of the world.”

a.Why is international cooperation necessary to reach an efficient outcome?

b.Is it possible to devise a compensation scheme such that all countries would be better off than under a system of uniform emission reductions? Explain.

12.Some people object to market-based policies to reduce pollution, claiming that they place a dollar value on cleaning our air and water. Economists reply that society implicitly places a dollar value on environmental cleanup even under command-and-control policies. Discuss why this is true.

13.(This problem is challenging.) There are three industrial firms in Happy Valley.

 

INITIAL

COST OF REDUCING

FIRM

POLLUTION LEVEL

POLLUTION BY 1 UNIT

 

 

 

A

70 units

$20

B

80

25

C

50

10

The government wants to reduce pollution to 120 units, so it gives each firm 40 tradable pollution permits.

a.Who sells permits and how many do they sell? Who buys permits and how many do they buy? Briefly explain why the sellers and buyers are each willing to do so. What is the total cost of pollution reduction in this situation?

b.How much higher would the costs of pollution reduction be if the permits could not be traded?

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11

P U B L I C G O O D S A N D

C O M M O N R E S O U R C E S

An old song lyric maintains that “the best things in life are free.” A moment’s thought reveals a long list of goods that the songwriter could have had in mind. Nature provides some of them, such as rivers, mountains, beaches, lakes, and oceans. The government provides others, such as playgrounds, parks, and parades. In each case, people do not pay a fee when they choose to enjoy the benefit of the good.

Free goods provide a special challenge for economic analysis. Most goods in our economy are allocated in markets, where buyers pay for what they receive and sellers are paid for what they provide. For these goods, prices are the signals that guide the decisions of buyers and sellers. When goods are available free of charge, however, the market forces that normally allocate resources in our economy are absent.

In this chapter we examine the problems that arise for goods without market prices. Our analysis will shed light on one of the Ten Principles of Economics

225

IN THIS CHAPTER YOU WILL . . .

Learn the defining characteristics of public goods and common r esour ces

Examine why private markets fail to pr ovide public goods

Consider some of the impor tant public goods in our economy

See why the cost - benefit analysis of public goods is both necessar y and dif ficult

Examine why people tend to use common r esour ces too much

Consider some of the impor tant common r esour ces in our economy

217

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218 Public Goods and Common Resources

226

PART FOUR THE ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR

in Chapter 1: Governments can sometimes improve market outcomes. When a good does not have a price attached to it, private markets cannot ensure that the good is produced and consumed in the proper amounts. In such cases, government policy can potentially remedy the market failure and raise economic well-being.

THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF GOODS

excludability

the property of a good whereby a person can be prevented from using it

rivalr y

the property of a good whereby one person’s use diminishes other people’s use

private goods

goods that are both excludable and rival

public goods

goods that are neither excludable nor rival

common r esources goods that are rival but not excludable

How well do markets work in providing the goods that people want? The answer to this question depends on the good being considered. As we discussed in Chapter 7, we can rely on the market to provide the efficient number of ice-cream cones: The price of ice-cream cones adjusts to balance supply and demand, and this equilibrium maximizes the sum of producer and consumer surplus. Yet, as we discussed in Chapter 10, we cannot rely on the market to prevent aluminum manufacturers from polluting the air we breathe: Buyers and sellers in a market typically do not take account of the external effects of their decisions. Thus, markets work well when the good is ice cream, but they work badly when the good is clean air.

In thinking about the various goods in the economy, it is useful to group them according to two characteristics:

Is the good excludable? Can people be prevented from using the good?

Is the good rival? Does one person’s use of the good diminish another person’s enjoyment of it?

Using these two characteristics, Figure 11-1 divides goods into four categories:

1.Private goods are both excludable and rival. Consider an ice-cream cone, for example. An ice-cream cone is excludable because it is possible to prevent someone from eating an ice-cream cone—you just don’t give it to him. An ice-cream cone is rival because if one person eats an ice-cream cone, another person cannot eat the same cone. Most goods in the economy are private goods like ice-cream cones. When we analyzed supply and demand in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 and the efficiency of markets in Chapters 7, 8, and 9, we implicitly assumed that goods were both excludable and rival.

2.Public goods are neither excludable nor rival. That is, people cannot be prevented from using a public good, and one person’s enjoyment of a public good does not reduce another person’s enjoyment of it. For example, national defense is a public good. Once the country is defended from foreign aggressors, it is impossible to prevent any single person from enjoying the benefit of this defense. Moreover, when one person enjoys the benefit of national defense, he does not reduce the benefit to anyone else.

3.Common resources are rival but not excludable. For example, fish in the ocean are a rival good: When one person catches fish, there are fewer fish for the next person to catch. Yet these fish are not an excludable good because it is difficult to charge fishermen for the fish that they catch.

4.When a good is excludable but not rival, it is an example of a natural monopoly. For instance, consider fire protection in a small town. It is easy to

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CHAPTER 11 PUBLIC GOODS AND COMMON RESOURCES

227

 

 

Rival?

 

Yes

 

No

 

Private Goods

 

Natural Monopolies

Yes

• Ice-cream cones

 

• Fire protection

• Clothing

 

• Cable TV

 

 

 

• Congested toll roads

 

• Uncongested toll roads

Excludable?

 

 

 

Common Resources

 

Public Goods

 

 

No

• Fish in the ocean

 

• National defense

• The environment

 

• Knowledge

 

 

 

• Congested nontoll roads

 

• Uncongested nontoll roads

 

 

 

 

Figur e 11-1

FOUR TYPES OF GOODS.

Goods can be grouped into four categories according to two questions: (1) Is the good excludable? That is, can people be prevented from using it? (2) Is the good rival? That is, does one person’s use of the good diminish other people’s use of it? This table gives examples of goods in each of the four categories.

exclude people from enjoying this good: The fire department can just let their house burn down. Yet fire protection is not rival. Firefighters spend much of their time waiting for a fire, so protecting an extra house is unlikely to reduce the protection available to others. In other words, once a town has paid for the fire department, the additional cost of protecting one more house is small. In Chapter 15 we give a more complete definition of natural monopolies and study them in some detail.

In this chapter we examine goods that are not excludable and, therefore, are available to everyone free of charge: public goods and common resources. As we will see, this topic is closely related to the study of externalities. For both public goods and common resources, externalities arise because something of value has no price attached to it. If one person were to provide a public good, such as national defense, other people would be better off, and yet they could not be charged for this benefit. Similarly, when one person uses a common resource, such as the fish in the ocean, other people are worse off, and yet they are not compensated for this loss. Because of these external effects, private decisions about consumption and production can lead to an inefficient allocation of resources, and government intervention can potentially raise economic well-being.

QUICK QUIZ: Define public goods and common resources, and give an example of each.

PUBLIC GOODS

To understand how public goods differ from other goods and what problems they present for society, let’s consider an example: a fireworks display. This good is not excludable because it is impossible to prevent someone from seeing fireworks, and it is not rival because one person’s enjoyment of fireworks does not reduce anyone else’s enjoyment of them.

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