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Conflict o f Laws

2.The Common Law Regime

13.42Under the common law rules, the jurisdiction of the English court in actions in personam is founded on service of process on the defendant, except where the defendant has submitted to the English court’s jurisdiction. The defendant may be served with process either within the jurisdiction, without the permission of the court, or outside the jurisdiction, with the permission of the court.

A. Service within the jurisdiction

(i)Service o fprocess

13.43Process may be served on the defendant even if he is present in the jurisdiction only for a fleeting moment.79 Rules on the method of service of process within the jurisdiction are set out in Part 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR).80 Once jurisdiction has been assumed on the basis of service of process on the defendant it continues even if the defendant leaves the jurisdiction.81 Since jurisdiction based on service within the jurisdiction means that in cer­ tain cases the English court will have jurisdiction even though the case has little or no con­ nection with England, assumption of jurisdiction on this basis is subject to a discretionary power to stay English proceedings in cases where England is aforum non conveniens.82*

(ii)Forum non conveniens

13.44As Lord Golf explained in Spiliada Maritime Corp v. Cansulex Ltd,S3a stay will be granted on the ground o fforum non conveniens ‘where the court is satisfied that there is some other avail­ able forum, having jurisdiction, which is the appropriate forum for trial of the action, ie in which the case may be tried more suitably for the interests of all parties and the ends ofjustice’. Where the claimant has served process on the defendant within the jurisdiction, the burden is on the defendant who applies for a stay ofproceedings on the ground offorum non conveniens84 to show that there isan alternative available forum which is clearly or distinctly the appropriate forum for trial.85 However, the main criteria that govern the application of the forum conve­ niens doctrine, where the claimant wants to serve process abroad, are the same as those that govern application of theforum non conveniens doctrine, where the defendant wants to stay English proceedings.86 There are two main stages in the process of applying the doctrine.

13.45In the first stage the court considers whether England is the natural forum’ in the sense of the forum with which the action has its closest and most real connection. In doing so the court takes into account a wide range ofconnecting factors including: the nature of the dispute, the legal and practical issues involved, such as questions of local knowledge, the availability of witnesses and their evidence and expense,87 the connections between the parties and the cause

79HRH M aharanee Seethaderi GaekwarofBarodav. Wildenstein [1972] 2Q B 283; ColtIndustries Inc v. Sarlie

[1966] 1 A1IER 673.

80CPR Pt 6.3 to 6.19.

81Myerson v. M artin [1879] 1 WLR 1390.

82Spiliada M aritime Corp v. Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460; Conelly v. RTZ Corp Pic [1998] AC 854; Lubbe v. Cape Pic [2000] 1 WLR 1545.

33 [1987] AC 460 at 476.

84'Ihe application is made under CPR Pt 11.

85e.g. Bank o fCreditand Commerce Hong Kong Ltd (in liquidation) v. Sonali Bank [1995] 1 Lloyds Rep. 227.

86Spiliada M aritime Corp v. Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460.

87Amin Rasheed Corp v. Kuwait Insurance Co [1984] AC 50 at 12, per Lord Wilberforce.

314

II. jurisdiction

 

of action and the alternative forum,88 and the law governing the contract.89 If at the end of

 

this stage the court concludes that the alternative forum is the natural forum a stay will nor­

 

mally be granted.90 However, the court will proceed to the second stage where it is alleged that

 

there are circumstances by which justice requires that the trial should take place in England.

 

In this second stage the court considers the question whether justice will be done in the

13.46

foreign courts. There is no fixed list of factors to be taken into account at this stage but they

 

include: whether the claimant will get a fair trial in the foreign court,91 whether there will be

 

a lengthy delay in trial abroad,92 whether the limit on the amount of damages recoverable in

 

the foreign court is too low,93 whether the foreign court will award costs to a successful

 

claimant,94 and whether the court fees abroad are too high.95 Where there is cogent evidence

 

that for political or other reasons the claimant will not get justice in the foreign court, which

 

is the natural forum, a stay of English proceedings will be refused or, in the case of an applica­

 

tion for permission to serve process abroad, permission will be granted.96

 

B. Service out of the jurisdiction

 

The court has power under CPR 6.36 and 6.37 to assume jurisdiction over a defendant who

13.47

is not present in England, by permitting service of a claim form on the defendant out of the

 

jurisdiction.97 However, for the court to exercise this exorbitant’989or ‘long arm’ jurisdiction,

 

at least three key conditions must be satisfied: (i) the claim must fall within one of the juris­

 

dictional grounds now set out in CPR 6BPD 3 .1 ," (ii) it must be shown that there is a seri­

 

ous issue to be tried, and (iii) the court must be satisfied that England is the appropriate place

 

for trial of the action.100

 

(i) Jurisdictionalgrounds

 

Service of process out of the jurisdiction will only be permitted where there is a sufficient

13.48

connection with England, for example, the contract sued on was concluded in England or

 

88Spiliaela M aritime Corp v. Consulex Ltd [1987] AC 460.

89Bank ofBaroda v. Vysya Bank Ltd [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 87 at 96.

90In the case of an application for permission to serve process out of the jurisdiction, permission will nor­ mally be refused.

91Deripaska v. Cherney [2009] EWCA Civ 849, risk of interference by the State of Russia in the judicial process.

92 Marconi v. P T Pan Indonesia Bank Ltd TBK [2004] 1 Lloyds Rep. 594, a ffd [2005] EWCA Civ 422 at [77].

93Lise ViskvaAbba [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 312.

94Ronehigh Ltd v. MIL Exports Inc [1989] 1 WLR619.

95H abib Bank Ltd v. CentralBank o fSudan [2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 412 at [45].

96Oppenheimer v. Louis Rosenthaland Co AG [1937] 1 A11ER23.

97Permission of the court is not required to serve a claim form on a defendant within the United Kingdom (Scotland and Northern Ireland) where the claim is in respect of a matter over which the English court has jurisdiction under the Modified Brussels I Regulation: CPR Pt 6.32). Permission is also not required for service of a claim form out of the United Kingdom where the claim is in respect of a matter over which the English courts have jurisdiction under the European regime: CPR Pt 6.33.

98Spiliada M aritime Corp v. Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460 at 481.

99These grounds were previously in the CPR 6.20 of the old rules. The CPR rules on service of process out of the jurisdiction replace the old rules under RSC Ord 11, r 1(1).

100 CPR 6.37(1) and (3). And see Seaconsar Far Eastern Ltd v. Bank M arkaziJomhouri Islami Iran [1994] 1 AC 438. Where the claimant has served a person within the jurisdiction and the claimantwants to serve another person out of the jurisdiction as a necessary and proper party, there is an additional condition that the claimant should show that there is between the claimant and the defendant (who has been served in England) a real issue which it is reasonable for the court to try: CPR 6.37(2).

315

Conflict o f Laws

the breach was committed in England. Instances where there is such a connection with England are contained in the jurisdictional grounds listed in CPR 6BPD 3.1. In the case of a claim arising from a letter of credit or performance transaction a number of the jurisdic­ tional grounds in CPR 6BPD 3.1 are likely to be relevant. This will be the case where the claim is for a remedy against any party to the transaction domiciled in England101 (whether this is the bank, the beneficiary, or the account party), or, if the party is not domiciled in England, a claim for an injunction ordering that party to do or refrain from doing something within the jurisdiction102 (such as an injunction ordering the beneficiary not to demand payment from the bank in England), or on the ground that the claim is made in respect of'a contract where the contract was made in England, or was made by or through an agent trading and residing in England, or is governed by English law103 or contained a clause conferring jurisdiction on the English courts,104 or the claim is made in respect of a breach of contract committed within the jurisdiction.10516In some cases a claim may fall under more than one of thegrounds in CPR6BPD 3.1. In PTPan Indonesia BankLtdTBKv. Marconi Communications International Lad,106 a letter of credit was issued by a foreign bank and confirmed by another foreign bank and advised to the beneficiary in England by a bank in England. The credit was available by negotiation of drafts drawn on the confirming bank. The confirming bank refused to pay and the beneficiary commenced proceedings in England against the bank for damages for breach of contract by refusing to pay. The Court of Appeal gave permission for process to be served on the bank abroad, holding that the claim fell within four of the juris­ dictional grounds107 in that the contract between the beneficiary and the confirming bank was: (a) made within the jurisdiction, (b) made by the advising bank in London as agent for the confirming bank, (c) governed by English law, and (d) the refusal to pay constituted a breach of contract committed within the jurisdiction.

13.49An application for permission to serve out of the jurisdiction must set out which of the jurisdictional grounds of CPR 6BPD 3.1 is relied on.108 However, the claimant will need to provide the court with the necessary evidence to enable the court to determine whether on the facts the jurisdiction of the court has been established on the ground relied on. The stan­

dard to be applied in this regard is that of a good arguable case.1091In considering whether there is a good arguable case the court takes into account all the admissible material, not just the claimant’s case. The performance bond case oiAttock Cement Co Ltd v. Romanian Bank for Foreign Trade110 illustrates this point. The underlying contract was for the construction of a cement plant in Pakistan for the claimant, a Cayman Island company. Tire contract, which by its terms was governed by English law, required the Romanian contractor to provide a performance bond. The bond was issued by the defendant, a Romanian bank. There was no express provision in the terms of the performance bond as to jurisdiction or

101CPR 6BPD.3.1(1).

102Ibid., at (2).

103Ibid., at (6)(c).

104Ibid., at (6)(d). See, e.g. H abib Bank Ltd v. Central Bank o fSudan [2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 415.

105CPR6BPD 3.1(7).

106[2005] EWCA Civ 422.

107Under what was then CPR 6.20.

108CPR6.37(l)(a).

109Sharabv. HRH PrinceAtWaitedBin TalalBin Abdal-AzizAl-Saud[lQQ9\ EWCACiv353; The Republic o fPakistan v. Zardari [2006] EWHC 2411 (Comm) at [137], following бедсталг?-Far East Ltd v. Bank M arkazi Jonhouri Islami Iran [1994] 1 AC 438.

110[1989] 1 WLR 1147.

316

II. Jurisdiction

the governing law. Construction failed to proceed as planned and the claimant made a demand under the bond but the defendants failed to honour the demand, 'fhe claimant brought proceedings against the defendants in England and applied for leave to serve the defendants outside the jurisdiction on the ground that the performance bond was governed by English law. The claimant contended that the performance was governed by English law on the bases that there was a collateral oral agreement to that effect or by implication from the proper law of the construction contract. After assessing the strength of the cases of both parties it was held that the claimant had failed to show a good arguable case that there had been an oral agreement concerning the governing law or that the performance bond was impliedly governed by English law (since the bond was intended to be separate and indepen­ dent of the underlying contract). In the result, the Court of Appeal refused the claimant permission to serve process abroad.

(ii) A reasonableprospect o fsuccess

It is not enough for the claimant to establish a good arguable case that his claim falls within 13.50 one of the jurisdictional grounds. An application for permission to serve out of the jurisdic­

tion must also set out that the claimant believes that the claim has ‘a reasonable prospect of success’.111 This does not mean that a mere statement by the claimant that he believes the claim has a reasonable prospect of success will be sufficient.112 The claimant’s application must show evidence that on the merits the claim has a reasonable prospect of success. This is the same as the test o f‘real prospect of success’ under CPR 3.2 and 24.113 The threshold of this test is lower than that of a good arguable case.114 It is the same as the test o f‘a real issue to be tried’11516which was applied in Seaconsar Far East Ltd v. Bank MarkaziJomhouri Islami 1гапш under the old RSC Order 11, rule 1 (1) in a claim concerned with a letter of credit. The claimant, a Hong Kong company, agreed to sell a large quantity of artillery shells to the Iranian Ministry of Defence. Payment was to be by letter of credit. The defendant, an Iranian bank, issued the letter of credit in favour of the claimant. The credit was unconfirmed and, as amended, was payable at sight on presentation of the required documents at the counters of a bank in London that had advised the credit. The credit permitted partial shipments. The claimant made two shipments and presented documents to the bank in London but the defendant failed or refused to pay under the credit. The claimant commenced proceedings in England against the issuing bank for damages for breach of contract and applied for per­ mission to serve process outside the jurisdiction on the ground that the contract was made within the jurisdiction or that the contract was made by or through the advising bank, as agent trading within the jurisdiction for the issuing bank which was out of the jurisdiction or on the ground of breach of contract within the jurisdiction (that is to say, the refusal to pay at the counters of the advising bank in London). The defendant bank did not dispute that the claim fell under either of the jurisdictional grounds but it contended that the claimant had not established a sufficiently strong case on the merits. The bank argued that it was entitled to refuse to pay because the documents were discrepant. The House of Lords gave the claimant permission to serve process on the bank abroad on the ground that there were

111CPR6.37(l)(b).

112Chemische Fabrik Vomiab Sandoz v. BadischeAnlin undSoda Fabriks (1904) 90 LT 733 at 735, per Lord Davey, referring to the equivalent requirement under the former Ord 11, r 4.

113CarvillAmerica Inc v. Camperdown UKLtd [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 457 at [24].

114Ibid., at [45].

115The Republic o fPakistan v. Zardari [2006] EWHC 2411 (Comm) at [136].

116[1994] 1 AC 438.

317

Conflict o f Laws

serious issues to be tried on whether the bank was entitled to reject the documents as noncompliant. Hie House ofLords also confirmed that for permission to serve process out of the jurisdiction to be granted it must be shown that: there is a good arguable case that the claim fell within one of the jurisdictional grounds of RSC Order 11 rule l(l),n ow C P R 6B P D 3 .1; there was a serious issue to be tried on the merits; and England was theforum conveniens.

(Hi) Forum conveniens

1 3 .5 1 Under CPR 6.37(3) the court will not give permission to serve abroad unless it is satisfied that England ‘is the proper place in which to bring the claim’. This requires the court to consider the question offorum conveniens, namely, whether England is the most suitable place for trial in the interests of all the parties and the ends of justice. The same general prin­ ciples that the court applies to determine whether England is aforum non conveniens, where the defendant has been served within the jurisdiction, are applicable mutatis mutandis when the court seeks to determine whether England is theforum conveniens, where permission is sought to serve out of the jurisdiction.117 It is therefore not necessary to repeat those princi­ ples here.118 There is, however, a difference in the burden of proof. Where permission is sought for service out of the jurisdiction the burden is on the claimant to satisfy the court that England is clearly the most appropriate forum for the trial of the action.

 

III. TH E APPLICABLE LAW

1 3 .5 2

After the question of jurisdiction has been decided and the English court has assumed juris­

 

diction over a dispute relating to a letter of credit or demand guarantee, the court will not

 

necessarily proceed to apply English law to the issues. The court may have to decide whether

 

the law to be applied to the issues (the applicable or governing law) is English law or a foreign

 

law. In a number of letters of credit and performance bond cases the dispute about the appli­

 

cable law has arisen in the context of a dispute about the court’s jurisdiction, since the fact

 

that the contract is governed by English law is one of the grounds on which English courts

 

may assume jurisdiction over a defendant who is out of the jurisdiction.119 Since the vast

 

majority of disputes about choice of law in relation to letters of credit and performance

 

bonds are likely to arise in connection with contractual obligations the discussion in this

 

section is focused on choice of law rules in respect of contractual obligations.

1 3 .5 3

The discussion is divided into three main sections. A discussion of the choice oflaw rules in

 

respect of contractual obligations in general is followed by the application of those rules to

 

the various autonomous contracts in letter of credit and demand guarantee transactions. The

 

rules relating to illegality are considered at the end.

 

1. Contractual Obligations in General

1 3 .5 4

The choice of law rules applicable by the English courts have developed significantly in the

 

last three decades. Prior to 1991 the common law rules applied. From 1 April 1991 those

117Spiliada Maritime Corp v. Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460; Deripaska v. Cherney [2009] EWCA Civ 849.

118See discussion at paras 13.43 to 13.46 above.

119CPR 6BPD 3.1 (6)(c). See discussion above at para 13.48.

318

III. The Applicable Law

 

rules were replaced by the provisions of the 1980 Rome Convention on the law applicable

 

to contractual obligations120 which established uniform rules for choice of law between EU

 

Member States. For contracts concluded on and after 17 December 2009 the Convention

 

has been replaced by the Rome I Regulation121 on the law applicable to contractual obligations.

 

The Rome I Regulation applies to all EU Member States except Denmark. The Regulation

 

also applies in the case of conflicts between the laws of different parts of the UK.122 A number

 

of changes have been introduced into the Regulation and as a result it differs in certain

 

respects from the Convention. However, the primary objectives remain the same (securing

 

party autonomy, legal certainty, flexibility, and protection of weaker parties)123 and the

 

general structure of the Regulation remains the same as that of the Convention.

 

A. Common law

 

The general approach of the common law is based on the doctrine of the ‘proper law of

1 3 .5 5

the contract’. According to this doctrine, identifying the law that governs a contract (i.e. its

 

proper law) involves three stages.124 In the first stage the question is whether the parties have

 

made an express choice as to the proper law. If so, the court will give effect to the parties’

 

choice provided that it is bona fide, legal, and not contrary to public policy.125 Where the

 

parties have not made an express choice the court proceeds to the second stage to determine

 

whether the parties have implicitly agreed on the proper law.126 In that exercise the court

 

takes into consideration a range of factors, such as whether there is an arbitration clause or a

 

jurisdiction clause.127 If there is no implied choice, the court proceeds to the third stage to

 

identify the system of lawwith which the contract has its closest and most real connection.128

 

At this stage the court is concerned with objective connecting factors such as the place

 

where the contract was made,129 the place where it was to be performed,130 and the place

 

of residence or business of the parties.131 In financial transactions, where a particular place is

 

chosen for performance (i.e. payment), this is normally an important factor, often a decisive

 

one132 and little importance is attached to the place of residence of the party making the

 

payment.133

 

B. Rome Convention and Rome I Regulation

 

The basic structure of the choice of law rules of the Convention and the Regulation involves

1 3 .5 6

a two-stage process. First the court considers whether the parties have made a choice of

 

120Implemented in the UK by the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990.

121Council Regulation (EC) 593/2008 of 17 June 2008, [2008] OJ L I77/6).

122See reg. 5 of the LawApplicable to Contractual Obligations (England and Wales and Northern Ireland) Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/3064) and reg. 4 of the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Scotland) Regulations 2009 (SSI 2009/410).

123See, e.g. Recitals 11, 16, and 23 of the Rome I Regulation.

124e.g. Wahda Bank v. Arab Bank [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 470 at 472.

125Vita Foods Product v. Unus Shipping Co Ltd [1939] AC 211.

126Amin RasheedShipping Corp v. Kuwait Insurance Co [1984] AC 50, a case concerned with service out of the jurisdiction on the ground that the contract is governed by English law.

127e.g. Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation SA v. Compagnie dArmementM aritime SA [1971] AC 572.

128Bonython v. Commonwealth o fAustralia [1951] AC 201 at 219.

129 Cantieri Navali Riuniti SpA v. NV Omne Justitia, 'The Stolt M armaro [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 428 at

433-435.

130TheAssunzione [1954] P 150.

131ReAnglo Austrian B an k\Vm\ 1 Cti Jacobs v. Credit Lyonnais (1884) 12 QBD 589, 600, 602.

132Bonython v. Commonwealth o fAustralia [1951] AC 201 at 219—220.

133Samcrete Egypt Engineers and Contractors SAE v. Land Rover Exports Ltd [2002] CLC 533 at [39J.

319

Conflict o f Laws

applicable law. Where there is no choice the Convention and the Regulation contain provi­ sions on how to identify the applicable law in the absence of choice.

(i)Where there is a choice o flaw

13 .5 7 Under Article 3(1) of the Convention and the Regulation a contract is governed by the law chosen by the parties. This is subject to the provisions on mandatory rules and public policy.134

13 .5 8 Article 3(1) of the Convention provides that choice may be express ‘or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case’. Thus where there is no express choice it is necessary to determine whether choice could be inferred or implied. Choice may be inferred from the terms of the contract where, for example,135 the contract contains a clause conferring jurisdiction on the courts of a particular country or an arbitration clause for arbitration to take place in a particular country or where the agreement is in a standard form which is known to be governed by a particular system of law.13617In Egon Oldendorffv. Liberia Corp137 the court inferred choice of English law from a clause providing for arbitration in London. Choice may also be inferred from the circumstances of the case. Examples of such circumstances, according to the Giuliano and Lagarde Report138 include a case where there has been a previous course of dealing under contracts containing an express choice and this choice of law clause is omitted in circumstances which do not indicate a deliberate change of policy by the parties and a case where there is an express choice in a related contract.139

13 .5 9 The Regulation has introduced a couple of changes to implied choice. First, under Article 3(1) of the Regulation the choice is to be clearly’ demonstrated rather than demonstrated with ‘reasonable certainty’. It is not clear whether any change in substance is intended here. Secondly, Recital (12) provides that a clause conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of a Member State should be one of the factors taken into account in determining whether a choice of law has been clearly demonstrated. This clarification has been introduced because under the Convention courts in some Member States were not as keen as the English courts to infer choice of law from a jurisdiction clause.140 Since Recital (12) only mentions a juris­ diction clause conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of a Member State, it is not clear whether this factor will carry the same weight where the jurisdiction clause gives exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of a non-Member State.

(ii)Absence o fchoice

13 .6 0 Where there is no choice, the applicable law is determined in accordance with Article 4 .141 There is, in paragraph (1), a general rule that in the absence of choice the contract is governed

134Special rules apply in the case of certain consumer contracts (Art. 5) and individual employment contracts (Art. 6).

135See Giuliano and Lagarde Report, 15-17.

136Gan Insurance Co Ltd v. Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd [1999] I L Pr 729; Cadre 571 v. Astra Asigurari [2004] EWHC (QB); Dornach Ltd v. Mauritius Union Assurance Co Ltd [2006] Lloyds Rep. 475 at [43].

137e.g. Egon Oldendorffv. Liberia Corpn [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 64; [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 380.

138At 17.

139But choice will not be inferred in every case where there is express choice in a related contract. See, e.g.

ISS Machinery Services Ltd v. Aeolian Shipping SA [2001 ] Lloyd’s Rep. 641.

140See Green Paper of 14 January 2003 on the Conversion of the Rome Convention, COM (2002) 654 final, 23-25.

141There are special provisions for certain types of contract such as certain consumer contracts (Art. 5) and individual employment contracts (Art. 6).

320

III. The Applicable Law

 

by the law of the country with which it is most closely connected. To achieve certainty, para­

 

graph (2) makes provision for a general presumption designed to identify the country with

 

which the contract is most closely connected. In paragraphs (3) and (4) there are two special

 

presumptions for two specific types of contract.142 Finally, in order to retain some degree of

 

flexibility, paragraph (5) allows for the presumptions to be disregarded if it appears from the

 

circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected with another country.

 

The conceptual structure of Article 4 has given rise to some difficulty. For example, it is not

 

clear whether one starts from paragraph (1) or directly from the presumptions in paragraphs

 

(2), (3), and (4).

 

Article 4(1) provides that in the absence of choice of law by the parties, ‘the contract shall be

1 3 .6 1

governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely connected’. This requires

 

consideration of objective factors connecting the contract to a particular country. The search

 

is not for the intention of the parties but rather for objective connecting factors. This includes

 

factors such as the place where the contract was concluded, where it was to be performed,

 

and the place of residence or business of the parties. Under Article 4(1) a severable part of the

 

contract which has a closer connection with another country ‘may by way of exception be

 

governed by the law of that other country’. 143

 

There is a general presumption144 in Articles 4(2) which states that:

1 3 .6 2

it shall be presumed that the contract is most closely connected to the country where the party

 

who is to effect the performance which is characteristic of the contract has, at the time of

 

conclusion of the contract, his habitual residence, or, in the case of a body corporate or unin­

 

corporated, its central administration. However, if the contract is entered into in the course of

 

that party’s trade or profession, that country shall be the country in which the principal place

 

of business is situated or, where under the terms of the contract the performance is to be

 

effected through a place of business other than the principal place of business, the country in

 

which that other place of business is situated.

 

This requires identification of: (a) the performance which is characteristic of the contract,

1 3 .6 3

and (b) the habitual residence or central administration, or principal place of business or

 

other place of business of the party who is to effect that performance. Concerning the

 

characteristic performance’, the Giuliano and Lagarde Report states that it is usually the

 

performance for which payment is due, such as the delivery of goods or the provision of

 

services. For example, it has been held that under a contract of guarantee the characteristic

 

performance is the payment of money by the guarantor. Therefore, under the presumption,

 

the governing law of a guarantee is the law of the place where the guarantor is located.145

 

Concerning the second factor, it is not the place of performance but rather the place of

1 3 .6 4

habitual residence or, in the case of a company, the place of central administration of

 

the party who is to effect the characteristic performance that is presumed to be most closely

 

142Contracts involving a right to immovable property or a right to use immovable property and a contract for the carriage of goods.

143For an example of severance, see Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co [1989] QB 728, decided

before the Convention entered into force.

144This work is not concerned with the specific presumptions in para (3), relating to immovable property, and para (4), relating to contracts for the carriage of goods.

145Samcrete Egypt Engineers and Contractors SAE v. Land Rover Exports Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 2019

at [38].

321

Conflict o f Laws

connected to the contract. Where the contract is concluded in the course of the trade or profession of that party it is the country where that party’s principal place of business is situ­ ated that is presumed to be most closely connected to the contract. And where, under the terms of the contract, performance is to be effected at another place of business, the pre­ sumption is that it is the country where that other place of business is located that is most closely connected to the contract. It has been held that in the case of a bank account contract the characteristic performance is that of the bank in repaying the money deposited by the customer and that performance is effected through the branch where the account is kept. Therefore the law of the country where the branch is situated is the governing law.146

1 3 .6 5 The presumption in Article 4(2) is subject to Article 4(5) which provides that the presump­ tion is not applicable in two situations. The first is where the characteristic performance cannot be determined. This is unlikely to arise in many letter of credit or demand guarantee cases. The second is where it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected with another country. Where, under Article 4(5), the presumption does not apply, the applicable law is to be determined under Article 4(1). The English courts have adopted a two-stage approach to the application of Article 4 by which the court first identifies the country with which the contract is most closely connected by applying the presumption in Article 4(2) and then considers whether there are factors that justify disre­ garding the presumption under Article 4(5).147

1 3 .6 6 The question of what weight should be given to the presumption in Article 4(2) or the strength to be attached to the connecting factors that are taken into account in determining whether the presumption should be disregarded has been one of much controversy. Some courts took the view that the presumption is not a strong one and so may be displaced when­ ever there is another country that is more closely connected to the contract.148 Others took the contrary view that the presumption is a strong one, and should be disregarded only if, in the special circumstances of the case, the place of business of the party who is to effect the characteristic performance has no real significance as a connecting factor.149 However, more recently, in ICF (Intercontainer Interfrigo) SC v. Balkenende Oosthuizen BV,,150 the European Court ofJustice has laid the controversy to rest. The court, relying on the natural meaning of the wording of Article 4(5), rather than the overall Convention objection oflegal certainty and predictability, rejected the view that the presumption should be displaced only where the connecting factors applied by the presumption (place of residence or business of character­ istic performer) do not have any genuine connecting value. Instead it held that the presump­ tion in Article 4(2) should be displaced where it is clear from the circumstances as a whole

146Sierra Leone Telecommunications Co Ltd v. Barclays Bank Pic [1998] 2 All ER 821.

147Samcrete Egypt Engineers and Contractors SAE v. Land Rover Exports Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 2019 at [37].

148e.g. Credit Lyonnais v. New Hanpsbire Insurance Co [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 1 at 5, describing the presump­ tion as ‘very weak’. See also Ennstone Building Products Ltd v. Stanger Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 3059 (CA).

149e.g. Caledonia Subsea Ltd v. Microperi Sri, 2002 SLT 1022 at [41], following the approach in Societe Nouvelle des Papeteries de LAa v. M achinefabrik BOA, Hoge Raad, 25 September 1992, NJ No 750, noted E.H.D. Strucyken, [1997] LMCLQ 18. For a mild version of this view, see Samcrete Egypt Engineers and Contractors SAE v. Land RoverExports Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 2019 at [41], stating that the presumption should

be regarded as ‘a rule of thumb’ to be displaced only where ‘a preponderance of contrary connecting factors’ is established. See also Ennstone Building Products Ltd v. Stanger Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 3059 at [41 ],per Keene L.J.;

P I Pan Indonesia Bank Ltd TBKv. Marconi Communications InternationalZfe/[2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 72 at [44], per Potter L.J.

150 Case C -133/08, 6 October 2009.

3 22

III. The Applicable Law

 

that the contract is more closely connected with a country other than that identified by

 

applying the presumption.151

 

Article 4 of the Regulation adopts a simpler structure to that of its counterpart in the

1 3 .6 7

Convention. There are two main parts. First, fixed choice of law rules are provided in para­

 

graphs (1) and (2). Then paragraphs (3) and (4) provide for circumstances when the fixed

 

rules may not be applied. Paragraph (1) provides a list of specific choice of law rules for the

 

most commonly encountered types ofcontract (Article 4(l)(a)-(h)). This includes, for exam­

 

ple, a contract for the sale of goods, which shall be governed by the law of the country where

 

the seller has his habitual residence,152 and a contract for the provision of services, which shall

 

be governed by the law of the country where the service provider has his habitual residence.153

 

Where the contract is not covered by any of the types listed in Article 4(l)(a)-(h) or where

 

the contract is covered by more than one ofthe types listed in Article 4( 1 )(a)-(h), Article 4(2)

 

states that the contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the party who is to

 

effect the characteristic performance has his habitual residence.

 

Under Article 4(3) where it is clear from all the circumstances that the contract is ‘manifestly’

1 3 .6 8

more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs (1) or (2), the

 

law of that other country shall apply. It is not clear whether the use of the word ‘manifestly’

 

will affect the approach which the English courts have so far adopted when applying

 

Article 4(5) of the Convention. However, in applying the escape provision in Article 4(3),

 

Recital (20) of the Regulation expressly allows courts to take into account the fact the

 

contract has ‘a very close relationship with another contract or contracts’. This is an endorse­

 

ment of the approach adopted by the English court when applying Article 4(5) of the

 

Convention especially to the chain of autonomous contracts arising under a letter of credit

 

or performance bond transaction, as discussed in the paragraphs that follow. Where the

 

applicable law cannot be determined under paragraphs (1) or (2), paragraph (4) provides

 

that the contract shall be governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely

 

connected.

 

The habitual residence of a natural person acting in the course of his business activity is

1 3 .6 9

defined as his principal place of business.154 In the case of a company, Article 19(1) defines

 

habitual residence as the place of central administration. However, where the contract is

 

concluded in the course of the operations of a branch, agency, or other establishment, or if the contract, by its terms, is to be performed by a branch, agency, or other establishment, the habitual residence is the place where the branch, agency, or other establishment is located.

2.Letter of Credit and Demand Guarantee Transactions

A.Effect of the independence principle

When applying the general rules relating to the applicable contractual relationships in 1 3 .7 0 a letter of credit or demand guarantee transaction an issue to bear in mind is whether the independence principle has any effect. Where the parties have made a valid choice there is no

151At [64].

152Art. 4(1) (a).

153Ib id ., at (b).

154Art. 19(1).

323