Public Choice In a Representative Democracy

Andreas Freytag

1.Introduction

2.Origins of the State

3.Public Choice in a Direct

Democracy

4.Public Choice in a Representative Democracy

5.Application of Political

Economy Models

6.Normative Public

Choice

Public Choice

Figure 4.7: A uniform distribution of biases

Frequency

hi

Andreas Freytag

1.Introduction

2.Origins of the State

3.Public Choice in a Direct

Democracy

4.Public Choice in a Representative Democracy

5.Application of Political

Economy Models

6.Normative Public

Choice

Public Choice

III. Multi party competition

a) Selecting a representative body

Two party competition is not accounting for differences in voters’ preferences accurately multi party competition.

Imagine s groups with homogenous preferences each; in a representative body there are s seats proportional representation.

Each group sends one representative, so that all kinds of preferences are represented in the assembly. If s still is too big, then one could restrict the size of the assembly to m < s members. Then m – s groups would not be represented. Alternatives (additions) are

© Freytag 2013

Andreas Freytag

1.Introduction

2.Origins of the State

3.Public Choice in a Direct

Democracy

4.Public Choice in a Representative Democracy

5.Application of Political

Economy Models

6.Normative Public

Choice

Public Choice

b) Proportional Representation in Practice

Political practise is still different. In general, it is a compromise between geographical and at large representation.

If more than one person per geographic district is sent to the assembly in the election, a formula to translate votes into seats in the parliament is needed.

Largest remainders rule:

Andreas Freytag

1.Introduction

2.Origins of the State

3.Public Choice in a Direct

Democracy

4.Public Choice in a Representative Democracy

5.Application of Political

Economy Models

6.Normative Public

Choice

Public Choice

The d’Hondt method allocates the remaining seats (after adding I) by repeated application of the largest remainders rule.

Alternatives to the Hare quotient are the Droop quota d:

d = [v/(s+1)] + 1;

and the Imperiali I:

i = v/(s + 2).

See Table 13.1 in Mueller (2003, p. 268).

If not parties but candidates are elected, the single transferable vote (STV) can be applied.

Andreas Freytag

1.Introduction

2.Origins of the State

3.Public Choice in a Direct

Democracy

4.Public Choice in a Representative Democracy

5.Application of Political

Economy Models

6.Normative Public

Choice

Public Choice

c) Electoral rules and the number of parties

Duverger’s law: under plurality rule, the number of parties converges to two. To test this law, one can use the effective number of parties based on the number of votes (ENV) and the number of seats (ENS) a party receives respectively:

Example State Election 3/26/2006

5 parties, 20 per cent of the votes each,

5 party system;

5 parties, 60, 30, 7, 2, 1 per cent of the votes respectively,

2 party system.

Andreas Freytag

1.Introduction

2.Origins of the State

3.Public Choice in a Direct

Democracy

4.Public Choice in a Representative Democracy

5.Application of Political

Economy Models

6.Normative Public

Choice

Public Choice

d) The goals of parties

Two aspects (levels) are of relevance:

• position on the ideological spectrum

• decision on joining a coalition or forming a cabinet after election

Party A Party B Party C Party D Party E

Andreas Freytag

1.Introduction

2.Origins of the State

3.Public Choice in a Direct

Democracy

4.Public Choice in a Representative Democracy

5.Application of Political

Economy Models

6.Normative Public

Choice

Public Choice

It is very difficult to say theoretically how both aspects are dealt with in politics. Parties tend to settle into certain ideological positions and remain there (empirical observation).

Party D

Party C

Party B

Party E

Party A

© Freytag 2013

Figure 4.9: Party positions with a nonuniform

distribution of voter ideal points

37

Andreas Freytag

1.Introduction

2.Origins of the State

3.Public Choice in a Direct

Democracy

4.Public Choice in a Representative Democracy

5.Application of Political

Economy Models

6.Normative Public

Choice

Public Choice

A B C D E F G

If a single party does not hold an absolute majority, a coalition is necessary. There are 61 possible coalitions that form a majority in the above scenario.

A coalition is called a minimal winning coalition if the removal of any one member (party) is changing it into a minority coalition. These are:

BE, ABF, ACE, ADE, AEF, AEG, ABCD, ABCG, ABDG, CDEF, DEFG.

A minimum winning coalition contains the smallest number of seats of all minimal winning coalitions (CDEF).

Andreas Freytag

1.Introduction

2.Origins of the State

3.Public Choice in a Direct

Democracy

4.Public Choice in a Representative Democracy

5.Application of Political

Economy Models

6.Normative Public

Choice

Public Choice

Not all of the eleven possible coalitions are equally likely to start existing.

First, smaller coalitions with respect to the number of parties are easier to run, as negotiations take shorter time and as the probability of survival is higher.

Second, there should be an ideological closeness of the coalition members. This minimal connecting winning hypothesis reduces the number of likely coalitions to four (ABCD, BCDE, CDEF, DEFG).

Trade off between these two hypotheses.

Another important aspect is the number of dimensions. With more than one issue, cycling becomes possible, coalitions may become unstable.

Andreas Freytag

1.Introduction

2.Origins of the State

3.Public Choice in a Direct

Democracy

4.Public Choice in a Representative Democracy

5.Application of Political

Economy Models

6.Normative Public

Choice

Public Choice

Figure 4.8: Cabinet formation in the German Bundestag in 1987

Foreign

Policy

IC