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EXPANDING THE TARGET MARKET

Victoria's Secret launched its line of Pink products in 50 test markets in 2003. Based on very positive initial results, the company expanded the subbrand quickly to a national level. With the Pink introduction, Victoria's Secret hoped to add a new segment to its base: young, hip, and fashionable customers. "Young" in this case means 18 to 30 years of age. More specifically, Pink is geared toward college coeds. According to company spokesman Anthony Hebron, "It's what you see around the dorm. It's the fun, playful stuff she needs, but is still fashionable."

The company classifies the Pink product line as "loungewear," a very broad term that includes sweatpants, T-shirts, pajamas, bras and panties, pillows and bedding, and even dog accessories. In keeping with the "young and fun" image, the product line includes bright colors (Pink is not a misnomer) and often incorporates stripes and polka-dots. The garments feature comfortable cuts and mostly soft cotton fabrics. To keep things fresh for the younger segment, stores introduce new Pink products every three or four weeks.

According to those at Victoria's Secret, in sharp contrast to the sexy nature of the core brand, Pink is positioned as cute and playful. "It's spirited and collegiate. It's not necessarily sexy—it's not sexy at all—but young, hip, and casual. It's fashion forward and accessible," said Mary Beth Wood, a spokeswoman for Victoria's Secret. The Pink line does include underwear that some might consider to be on par with standard Victoria's Secret items. But management is quick to point out that the designs such as heart-covered thongs are more cute than racy. Displays of Pink merchandise often incorporate stuffed animals, and many articles display Pink's trademark mascot, a pink dog.

Pink is currently a store-within-a-store concept. According to Les Wexner, chairman and chief executive of parent company Limited Brands, the company intended this from the beginning. "Two years ago, we did not believe Pink was a stand-alone concept, and I'm still not sure that it is, but it's possible." But with Pink sales expected to reach $700 million for 2006, the company is giving far more serious consideration to opening freestanding Pink lifestyle shops in several markets by early 2007.

To aid in the expansion of Pink, Victoria's Secret has enlisted the help of the PR firm Alison Brod. Although the company plans to stay committed to fashion-advertising vehicles such as Vogue and Lucky, it also plans to expand its promotional campaigns to include nontraditional avenues. Lisette Sand-Freedman, VP of fashion and lifestyle for Alison Brod, indicates that it "will seek different arenas to be in, ways to get the word out," focusing on "more lifestyle angles and bigger campaigns." The company will also leverage the star power of trend-setting young Hollywood personalities such as Lindsay Lohan and Sophia Bush. This will be accomplished through formal product placements and through the placement of Pink products in the personal wardrobes of celebrities.

A KEY DRIVER OF VICTORIA'S SECRET'S FUTURE GROWTH

Limited Brands has been experiencing good times. Firstquarter earnings for 2006 were up 19 percent over the same period from the year before. Victoria's Secret has been a huge

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part of that success. Already the largest component in the Limited Brands portfolio (which includes Bath & Body Works, Express, and Limited stores), Victoria's Secret accounts for more than 1,000 of the parent company's 3,559 stores and more than half of total sales. For 2005, most of Victoria's Secret's product lines posted better-than-anticipated sales and profits.

But Wexner is not content to let the chain rest. "The Victoria brand is really the power of the business," he says. "We can double the Victoria's Secret business in the next five years." This would mean increasing the division's sales from $5 billion to $10 billion. The umbrella strategy for achieving this growth is to continually broaden the customer base. This will include a focus on new and emerging lines, such as IPEX and Angels Secret Embrace (bras), Intimissimi (a line of Italian lingerie for women and men appealing to younger customers), and Sexy Sport (a collection of sports bras, yoga pants, tennis apparel, and dancewear). Pink is a key component of this strategy.

The future of Victoria's Secret will also include a move toward bigger stores. Currently, the typical Victoria's Secret store is approximately 6,000 square feet. Wexner believes that this is far too small. "We're very undersized, and we've proven that to ourselves. We believe we should have at a minimum stores of 10,000 to 15,000 square feet." Larger stores will allow the company to give more space and attention to the store-within-a-store brands, such as Pink.

BROADENING THE CUSTOMER BASE ... TOO FAR?

Although Victoria's Secret's introduction and expansion of Pink seems well founded, it has raised some eyebrows. As young and cute Pink's line has expanded rapidly, it has become apparent that the brand's appeal goes far beyond that of its intended target market. Some women much older than 30 have shown an interest (41-year-old Courtney Cox Arquette was photographed wearing Pink sweats). But stronger interest is being shown by girls younger than 18. Girls as young as 11 are visiting Victoria's Secret stores to buy Pink items, with and without their mothers.

Two such 11-year-olds, Lily Feingold and Brittany Garrison, were interviewed while shopping at a Victoria's Secret store with Lily's mother. As they browsed exclusively through the Pink merchandise, the two confessed that Victoria's Secret was one of their favorite stores. Passing up cotton lounge pants because each already had multiple pairs, both girls bought $68 pairs of sweatpants with the "Pink" label emblazoned on the derriere. The girls denied buying the items because they wanted to seem more grown up, instead saying that they simply liked the clothes.

The executives at Victoria's Secret are quick to say that they are not targeting girls younger than 18. Perhaps that is due to the backlash that retailer Abercrombie & Fitch experienced not long ago for targeting teens and preteens with sexually charged promotional materials and merchandise. But regardless of Victoria's Secret's intentions, Pink is fast be-

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coming popular among teens and "tweens", one of the newest generational market segments, loosely defined by a range of about 8 to 14 years of age. Most experts agree that by the time children reach 10, they are rejecting childlike images and aspiring to more mature things associated with being a teenager. Called "age compression," it explains the trend toward preteens leaving their childhoods earlier and giving up traditional toys for more mature interests, such as cell phones, consumer electronics, and fashion products.

Tweens are growing in size and purchase power. The 33 million teens (ages 12 to 19) in the United States spend more than $175 billion annually (over 60 percent have jobs), and the 25 million tweens spend $51 billion annually, a number that continues to increase. But even more telling is the $170 billion per year that is spent by parents and other family members directly for the younger consumers who may not have as much income as their older siblings. Although boys are a part of this group, it is widely recognized that girls account for the majority of dollars spent. With this kind of purchase power behind them, as they find revenue for their older target markets leveling off, marketers everywhere are focusing on the teen and tween segments.

Although executives at Victoria's Secret deny targeting the youth of America, experts disagree. David Morrison, president of marketing research agency TwentySomething, says he is not surprised that Victoria's Secret denies marketing to teens and preteens. "If Victoria's Secret is blatantly catering to seventh and eighth graders, that might be considered exploitative.' Morrison also acknowledges that the age group is drawn to the relative maturity and sophistication of the Pink label.

Natalie Weathers, assistant professor of fashion-industry management at Philadelphia University, says that Victoria's Secret is capitalizing on a trend known as coshopping— mothers and tweens shopping together. "They are advising their daughters about their purchases, and their daughters are advising them," she said. This type of activity may have been strange 20 years ago, but according to Weathers, the preteens of today are more savvy and, therefore, more likely to be shopping partners for moms. "They are not little girls, and they aren't teenagers, but they have a lot of access to sophisticated information about what the media says is beautiful, what is pretty, what is hot and stylish and cool. They are very visually literate."

In general, introducing a brand to younger consumers is considered a sound strategy for growth and for creating long-term relationships. Marketers of everything from packaged foods to shampoo use this strategy. In most cases, it's not considered controversial to engender aspirational motives in young consumers through an entry-level product line. But many critics have questioned the aspirations engendered in tweens as they identify with Pink because of what they are aspiring to. Based on years of experience working as a creative director for ad agencies in New York, Timothy Matz calls Pink "beginner-level lingerie." Matz does not question the practice of gateway marketing (getting customers to use the brand at an earlier age). But he admits that a "gateway" to a sexy lingerie shop may

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make parents nervous. "Being a 45-year-old dad, do I want my 10-year-old going to Victoria's Secret?"

Thus far, Victoria's Secret has avoided the negative reactions of the masses who opposed Abercrombie & Fitch's blatant marketing of thong underwear to preteens. Perhaps that's because it adamantly professes its exclusive focus on young adults. Nonetheless, many question Victoria's Secret's appeal to the preadult crowd, whether intentional or unintentional. Big tobacco companies have been under fire for years for using childlike imagery to draw the interest of youth to an adult product. Is Pink the Joe Camel of early adolescent sexuality? Are Pink's extreme low-rise string bikini panties the gateway drug to pushup teddies and Pleasure State Geisha thongs? These are questions that Victoria's Secret may have to address more directly at some point in the near future.

Questions for Discussion

1.Analyze the buyer decision process of a typical Pink customer.

2.Apply the concept of aspirational groups to Victoria's Secret Pink line. Should marketers have boundaries with regard to this concept?

3.Explain how both positive and negative consumer attitudes toward a brand like Pink develop. How might someone's attitude toward Pink change?

4.What role does Pink appear to be playing in the selfconcept of preteens, teens, and young adults?

Sources: Alycia De Mesa, "Marketing and Tweens," BusinessWeek Online, October 12, 2005; Fae Goodman, "Lingerie Is Luscious and Lovely—For Grown-Ups," Chicago Sun Times, February 19, 2006, p. B02; Vivian Mclnerny, "Pink Casual Loungewear Brand Nicely Colors Teen Girls' World," The Oregonian, May 7, 2006, p. Ol3; Randy Schmelzer, "Victoria's Secret Has Designs on Putting Everyone in the Pink," PR Week, March 13, 2006, p. 3; Jeffrey Sheben, "Victoria's Secret to Expand," Columbus Dispatch, May 18, 2006, p. 01B; Jane M. Von Bergen, "Victoria's Secret? Kids," Philadelphia Inquirer, December 22, 2005.

Saturn: An Image Makeover

Things are about to change at Saturn. The General Motors brand had only three iterations of the same compact car for the entire decade of the 1990s. But Saturn will soon introduce an all-new lineup of vehicles that includes a midsized sport sedan, an eightpassenger crossover vehicle, a two-seat roadster, a new compact, and a hybrid SUV. Having anticipated the brand's renaissance for years, Saturn executives, employees, and customers are beside themselves with glee.

But with all this change, industry observers are wondering whether Saturn will be able to maintain the very characteristics that have distinguished the brand since its inception. Given that Saturn established itself based on a very narrow line of compact vehicles, many believe that the move from targeting one segment of customers to targeting multiple seg-

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ments will be challenging. Will a newly positioned Saturn still meet the needs of one of the most loyal cadres of customers in the automotive world?

A NEW KIND OF CAR COMPANY

In 1980, GM recognized its inferiority to the Japanese big three (Honda, Toyota, and Datsun) with respect to compact vehicles. The Japanese had a lower cost structure, yet built better cars. In an effort to offer a more competitive economy car, GM actually turned to the enemy. It entered into a joint venture with Toyota to build small cars. Soon, a Toyota plant in Northern California was turning out Corollas on one assembly line while making very similar Chevy Novas on a second. Meanwhile, in a long-term effort to make better small cars, GM gave the green light to Group 99, a secretive task force that resulted in formation of the Saturn Corporation in 1985.

From the beginning, Saturn set out to break through the GM bureaucracy and become "A different kind of car. A different kind of company." As the single-most defining characteristic of the new company, Saturn proclaimed that its sole focus would be people: customers, employees, and communities. Saturn put significant resources into customer research and product development. The first Saturn cars were made "from scratch," without any allegiance to the GM parts bin or suppliers. The goal was to produce not only a highquality vehicle, but one known for safety and innovative features that would "wow" the customer.

Saturn's focus on employees began with an unprecedented contract with United Auto Workers (UAW). The contract was so simple, it fit in a shirt pocket. It established progressive work rules, with special emphasis given to benefits, work teams, and the concept of empowerment. At the retail end, Saturn selected dealers based on carefully crafted criteria. It paid service personnel and sales associates a salary rather than commission. This would help create an environment that would reverse the common customer perception of the dealer as a nemesis.

Finally, in addition to customer and employee relations, Saturn focused on social responsibility. Human resources policies gave equal opportunities to women, ethnic minorities, and people with disabilities. Saturn designed environmentally responsible manufacturing processes, even going beyond legal requirements. The company also gave heavy philanthropic support to various causes. All of these actions earned Saturn a number of awards recognizing its environmentally and socially responsible actions.

When the first Saturn vehicles rolled off the assembly line on July 30,1990, the company offered a sedan, a coupe, and a wagon in two trim levels each, all based on a single compact vehicle platform. In spite of this minimal approach, sales quickly exceeded expectations. By 1992, Saturn had sold 500,000 vehicles. That same year, the company achieved the highest new-car sales per retail outlet, something that had not been done by a domestic car company for 15 years.

Indeed, customers were drawn to all the things that Saturn had hoped they would be. They loved the innovations, such as dent resistant body panels, the high-tech paint job de-

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signed to resist oxidization and chipping longer than any in the industry, and safety features such as traction control, antilock brakes, and unparalleled body reinforcements. They were overwhelmed by the fresh sales approach that included no-haggle pricing, a 30-day return policy, and no hassle from the sales associates. The noncommissioned associates spent as much time with each customer as they wished, even going on extended test drives. Absent were typical high-pressure tactics so commonly used by automotive salespeople.

By 1994, Saturn had developed an unusually loyal customer base. The depth of customer relationships became apparent when 38,000 Saturn loyalists made the trek to company headquarters in Tennessee to celebrate the first five years at the company's Spring Hill Homecoming. It was "just like Woodstock without all the patchouli oil," beamed one proud SL2 owner. The homecoming set the mold for many company-sponsored customer gatherings to follow.

As Saturn's customer base grew, it became apparent that the Saturn brand was attracting customers who would not have otherwise purchased a GM vehicle. Interestingly, the Saturn buyer did not appear to be all that different from a Chevrolet buyer. With respect to household income, age, gender, and education, typical Saturn buyers appeared to represent the same Chevy-like cross section of middle-class America. But Wisconsin megadealer John Bergstrom said his network of 22 GM dealerships draws different types of customers to the two brands. With trucks accounting for 65 percent of his Chevrolet sales, he described the Chevy owner as "a true-blue, bow-tie America consumer." However, "the Saturn guest is a little different guest. They might buy an Asian car or a Korean car or a Saturn. They are very much into safety and value, and how they're treated is critically important. I don't think we'd get those kinds of people in our Chevy stores if we didn't have the Saturn brand."

During Saturn's first years of operations, the accolades rolled in. The list included "Best Car" picks from numerous magazines and organizations, along with awards for quality, engineering, safety, and ease of maintenance. But the crowning achievement occurred in 1995, as the 1,000,000th Saturn took to the road. That year, Saturn ranked number one out of all automotive nameplates on the J.D. Power and Associates Sales Satisfaction Index Study, achieving the highest score ever given by the organization. It would be the only company ever to achieve the highest marks in all three categories ranked by the satisfaction index (salesperson performance, delivery activities, and initial product quality). Saturn earned that honor for an astounding four consecutive years, and it was the only nonluxury brand to be at or near the top of J.D. Power's scores for the better part of a decade.

THE HONEYMOON ENDS

Despite the initially strong sales levels, overall Saturn revenues tapered off quickly (sales peaked in 1994 at 286,000, settling in at an average of about 250,000 units per year). This may have been due partly to the fact that Saturn released no new models in the 1990s. Finally, in the 2000 model year, Saturn introduced its long-awaited mid-sized L-

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series with an optional V6 engine. But unlike the S-series, the L-series was reviewed as a generally bland and forgettable car.

In 2002, Saturn broadened the lineup with the Vue, a compact SUV model. In January of 2003, it replaced the S-series with the Ion, a totally new compact that offered more options than before. But although these new vehicles addressed the issue of a lack of model options, they brought with them a new concern. Saturn's history of high quality and its long-cherished J.D. Power ratings began to slide. In the early part of the new millennium, not only was Saturn's J.D. Power initial-quality rating not near the top, it fell to below the industry average.

Even with the new models, Saturn's sales did not improve. In fact, they declined. This was partly due to an industry-wide downturn in sales wrought by a recession. Still, L- series production ended in 2004, only five years after it began. In 2005, Saturn sales fell to a low of 213,000 units, only about 1 percent of the overall market. It seemed that sales of the L-series and Vue were coming almost entirely from loyal Saturn customers who were trading up to something different, something bigger, and, unfortunately, something not as good.

Looking back, Saturn unquestionably defied the odds. To launch an all-new automotive company in such a fiercely competitive and barrier-entrenched industry is one thing. To achieve the level of sales, the customer base, and the list of awards that Saturn achieved in such a short period of time is truly remarkable. But as GM and Saturn executives faced the reality of declining quality, plummeting sales, and annual losses of up to $1 billion, they knew they had to do something dramatic. In 2006, Saturn general manager Jill Lajdziak said, "Saturn's initial image as a smart innovation small-car company was blurred by bumps in quality and slow model turnover. We didn't grow the portfolio fast enough, and this year we're growing in a huge way."

A NEW KIND OF SATURN

With all that Saturn has done wrong, the fact that dealers still moved 213,000 vehicles in 2005 against competitors with better reputations and better cars testifies to the things it has done right. With its rock-solid dealer network, high mirchase process satisfaction ratings, and loyal customer base, Saturn has valuable assets to build upon.

And GM plans to do just that as it addresses product quality and model selection problems. GM is currently investing heavily in a Saturn turnaround. Showering $3 billion on Saturn, it hopes to perform a makeover between 2006 and 2008 that is similar to the one achieved with Cadillac earlier this decade. GM, the world's biggest carmaker, lost $10.6 billion in 2005. It's clearly putting some faith in one of its smallest brands to help turn the tide. GM wants to raise Saturn's sales to 400,000 units by the end of 2007. If all goes as planned, sales could reach 500,000 not long after that. With higher prices and margins, this would represent an even greater growth in revenues and profits.

Key to the Saturn makeover will be an infusion of European styling from GM's German division, Opel. In fact, some of the new cars already hitting showrooms are largely re-

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badged Opels. In the future, new-product development will be carried out in a jointventure fashion between the two divisions. For a company that in the past has been known as making the "car for people who hate cars," this is a 180-degree turnaround. Saturn clearly hopes to change its humdrum image to boost profits with higher-priced vehicles.

If the first of four new Saturn models is any indication, Saturn is moving in the right direction. The Sky two-seat roadster hit showroom floors in early 2006 with long waiting lists. Based on the Opel GT, the Sky is a head-turning performance vehicle, dubbed by one observer as the "cubVette." For dealer John Bergstrom, this new model presented an unexpected but welcome dilemma. "Sky is just a flat-out home run," said Bergstrom, referring to the waiting lists that he has started at all six of his dealerships. "I've never had that before," he says, noting that those on the waiting lists are people who have never even considered a Saturn before.

In the fall of 2006, Saturn launched 2007 models of the mid-sized Aura sport sedan (based on the Opel Vectra) and the eight-passenger Outlook crossover vehicle (based on GM's Lambda platform being sold by Chevrolet, Buick, and GMC). For 2008, after a year without a compact car, Saturn will replace the Ion with a mildly changed Opel Astra, already a European hit in its fifth generation. The new lineup will also include the Green Line, which will add hybrid technology to multiple models, starting with the 2007 Vue. The Green Line promises to make full-hybrid technology available at a price much lower than any other hybrid offering.

"The biggest advantage to rebranding Opel vehicles as Saturn is it doesn't mean additional costs to GM," said Guido Vildozo, a senior market analyst and industry forecaster at Global Insight Inc. "And since Opel is a kind of sporty European brand, Saturn will adopt this image too, or at least that is what they hope to happen." Some industry analysts suggest that because Saturn is such a new company, it can reposition itself more easily than other brands.

GM makes it clear that with Saturn, it's not trying to make another Chevrolet. Chevrolet will remain the only GM brand positioned as "all things to all people." Along with the other GM brands, Saturn will play a niche role and target a specific segment of the market. In fact, GM says that it's just trying to help Saturn do more of what it has been doing all along—reach the type of import-buying customer it can't reach with any of its other brands. Indeed, top executives at GM acknowledge that many Saturn owners already believe their car is an Asian brand, not a domestic one. "Saturn has always been the one brand in the GM lineup suitable for attracting import-intenders," says a GM executive.

However, some questions remain as to what segment Saturn will actually target. After seeing the new Saturn lineup at the New York auto show, Tom Libby of Power Information Network says he's confused about what the brand is trying to do. He's worried that Saturn will stop focusing on the retail experience and shift to emphasizing styling. "What's the message they're trying to get out?" he asks. "I'm just puzzled by the whole thing." Is Saturn losing focus, or is it simply adding style to its current image of providing

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a good value and an honest dealer experience? Many analysts believe that because Saturn's current image is only loosely based on the actual car, the company has plenty of room to add style to the formula.

Questions for Discussion

1.Using the full spectrum of segmentation variables, describe how GM has segmented the automobile market.

2.What segment(s) is Saturn now targeting? How is GM now positioning Saturn? How do these strategies differ from those employed with the original Saturn S-series?

3.Describe the role that social responsibility plays in Saturn's targeting strategy.

4.Do you think that GM will accomplish its goals with the "new Saturn"? Why or why not?

5.What segmentation, targeting, and positioning recommendations would you make to GM for future Saturn models?

Sources: Leslie J. Allen, "Saturn's Rebirth Vexes Chevy Dealers," Automotive News, February 20, 2006, p. 1; Sharon Silke Carty, "Saturn Puts Its Models Where Its Mouth Is," USA Today, April 21, 2006, accessed at www.usatoday.com; Barbara Powell, "GM's Saturn Seeks to Shake Up Humdrum Image," Ottawa Citizen, April 12, 2006, p. F7; David Welch, "Saturn's Second Liftoff?" BusinessWeek Online, April 13, 2006, accessed at www.businessweek.com; and "Our Story," accessed at www.saturn.com, May 2006.

Converse: We Love You, Chucks!

The first Olympic basketball team wore them; they dominated the basketball courts— amateur and professional—for more than 40 years; Dr. J made them famous; Kurt Cobain died in them. What are they? Converse All Stars—more particularly the famous Chuck Taylor All Stars, known around the world as Chucks.

Compared to today's marvels of performance engineering, Chucks have always been very basic shoes. The first Chucks were introduced in 1923 as high-top canvas laceups with rubber-covered toes in black, white, and red with a blue label on the back that read "Made in the U.S.A." More than 80 years and 750 million pairs later, that formula has changed very little. They may be basic, but they are also downright affordable. A standard pair of Chuck Taylor hightops still costs only about $38.

Converse invented basketball shoes, and by the mid-1970s, 70 to 80 percent of basketball players still wore Converse. But by the year 2000, the company's market share had dwindled to only about 1 percent of the total athletic shoe market. In 2001, Converse declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy and was purchased by an investment group. In 2003, Nike bought the wavering company for $305 million. What would a behemoth like Nike want with a bankrupt brand? Before dealing with that question, let's look at Converse's history.

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THE LEGEND BEGINS

Converse was founded in 1908 in North Reading, Massachusetts by Marquis. In 1917, the company introduced a canvas, high-top called the All Star. By 1923, it was renamed the Chuck Taylor, after a semiprofessional basketball player from Akron, Ohio. After his basketball career ended, Charles "Chuck" Taylor became an aggressive member of the Converse sales force. He drove throughout the Midwest, stopping at playgrounds to sell the high-tops to players. Some consider Taylor to be the original Phil Knight, Nike's CEO, who also started out selling his shoes at track meets from the back of his van. Throughout the '30s, '40s, '50s, and '60s, Chucks were the shoes to have.

By the early 1980s, with a secure hold on the basketball shoe market (it thought), Converse branched out, introducing both tennis and running shoes. This strategy appeared to be successful, helping to boost revenue in 1983 by 21 percent to $209 million. By 1986, however, Converse's fortunes had taken a turn for the worse, and it was acquired by consumer products maker and retailer Interco for approximately $132 million. By the late 1980s, Converse had been overtaken by a host of competitors. In 1989, the top four athletic shoe companies were Nike with a 26 percent market share, Reebok with 23 percent, L.A. Gear with 13 percent, and Converse with 5 percent. Strangely, while Nike was grabbing basketball shoe sales at a rapid clip, Converse was still the official shoe of the NBA, which gave it the right to use the NBA logo in its advertising.

By 1993, an ailing Converse had changed its positioning strategy. Instead of focusing on basketball and Chucks, it aimed at capitalizing on an image that was both sexy and streetwise. Converse launched a provocative, edgy ad campaign where nothing was sacred. And without the aid of advertising, the venerable Chuck Taylor All Star was dissociated from basketball and given new life as a fashion statement. Candy Pratts, fashion director of shoes and accessories at Vogue, used high-top canvas sneakers on models in numerous layouts. The best part, according to Candy, was that this trend didn't come from advertising, but from the kids on the street.

But financially, things only continued to get worse for Converse. In 1992, it was forced to abandon the treasured "Made in the U.S.A." label, sending manufacturing to India in order to cut costs. In 1996, Converse restructured, cutting 594 jobs from a little over 2,000 and reorganizing its product line into four categories: basketball, athletic-leisure, crosstraining, and children's. (Notice the absence of tennis and running shoes, although Converse had once been big in those areas.) To boost its basketball shoes, Converse put the famous Chuck Taylor signature patch on a new line of performance wear—the All Star 2000 collection.

Encouraged by the successful relaunch of the All Star 2000, the company chose to launch another new line called Dr. J 2000. A remake of a '70s shoe, it was backed by heavy advertising. Dr. J was chosen because kids told Converse researchers that Dr. J was cool enough to have a shoe. The campaign tagline was "Take the Soul to the Hole," and

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