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orders, 4th Battalion of the 12th Marine Brigade landed on the southern shore of the fjord and by 11 o’clock had reached the nearby hydro- electro-station, where it took up defensive positions. They found that the hydro-electric station was in working order. The 3rd Battalion of the Brigade (made up of 450 men), under the command of Captain V.D. Artamonov, having landed on the north-western shore of the fjord, separated into two groups.

Towards the end of the day the units reunited on the eastern shore of Jar Fjord, having combed the peninsula between the fjords. The troops did not find any traces of the enemy other than a blown up battery at the cape. The third landing was made by 176 infantrymen of the 125th Marine Regiment under the Command of Senior Lieutenant B.F. Peterburgskii, who landed on the south-western shore of the fjord. Having met no resistance, during the day the group completed a forced march to the settlement of Kroftfeterbukht on Jar Fjord, where it stayed overnight having deployed in a hedgehog for all round defense. They had successfully cleared the coast from Kobbholm to Jar Fjord.24

In the meantime the battle for Kirkenes moved to its concluding stage. Troops of the 14th Army of the Karelian Front proceeded to the decisive assault on the town. However, little did they know that by that time only a field-engineer platoon and small rearguard units remained in the town.25 Core units of the 19th Corps, as well as 40,000 tons of supplies had been evacuated earlier. The last steamers of the final convoy left Kirkenes at noon on 24 October.26 Their principle cover was being provided by five destroyers of the 4th German Flotilla. The latter arrived in Kirkenes on 21 October and facilitated evacuation of the town, escorted convoys and provided fire-support for the defending garrison for ten days, encountering no opposition of any significance to its activities.27

Naval reconnaissance aircraft were first to discover one of the evacuation convoys. It was the first of six convoys, approaching Tana Fjord. Soon reconnaissance aircraft located the remaining five convoys. In their composition, pilots counted more than 80 medium and large-sized units.28 A belated pursuit started. Of three submarines in position at that time, only “S-102” came into contact with a convoy and attempted an attack. However it was forced to turn back to base as a result of damage caused by depth charges dropped from escorts. During that day five groups of aircraft flew out to intercept the ships. Four were able to locate targets and

24RGA VMF.f.767.op.2.d.68.ll.81–82.

25TsAMO.f.363.op.6230.d.38.l.29.

26Op. cit.l.37.

27Rohwer and Hummelchen (note 5) p. 310.

28OTsVMA.f.General Headquarters of the Navy.d.13163.ll.383–384.

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Bök Fjord, reach Kirkenes and provide assistance to the units of the 14th Army in the liberation of the city. Command of the landing force was given to the head of 63rd Marine Brigade colonel A.I. Kulich.

Early in the morning two groups of boat with more than 800 marines on board entered Holmengrå Fjord and laded troops on the bridgehead, earlier prepared by the reconnaissance detachment. The landing sites were being illuminated by the sinister glow of fires in Kirkenes. The glow lit up the way for battalions that immediately started to comb the eastern shore of Bök Fjord. From the air the marines were covered by ten Aerocobras. During the twenty four hour period the 3rd Battalion of the brigade, under the command of Major I.N. Krasil’nikov, having inspected the lighthouse and a battery blown-up by the Germans battery at Cape Bök Fjord, turned towards Kirkenes. At the same time 2nd Battalion of Captain S.F. Belousov, having now encountered the enemy, reached Ropelv, where it bivouacked for the night. By the end of next day both battalions arrived at Elvenes, in order to then make their way to Hergenes for some rest.30 Thus was completed the last major landing operation of the Northern Fleet.

However, in addition to the ivecompleted f operations, according to the memoirs of the head of the Northern Fleet headquarters during the wartime, Admiral I.V. Platonov, the headquarters planned one more operation on the northern shore of Varanger Fjord, in the area of Vadsö and Vardö. Occupation of Varanger Fjord’s northern shore would have given control over the whole of the bay, which would have prevented the movement of enemy ships in it. The Fleet’s headquarters were planning to start the operation the day after the occupation of Petsamo. Beforehand, the Fleet’s torpedo boats and aircraft had carried out reconnaissance. Troops were already loaded onto boats, when People’s Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov communicated the cancellation of this operation.31

The causes of the cancellation of the landing of troops at Vardö and Vadsö were most likely connected to the necessity for engagement of significant forces of the Fleet in such an operation, and, with the likely result of heavy losses. Therefore the Soviet naval command preferred using bomber strikes and bombardment from the sea in operations against these German bases. For the duration of the war, the towns of Vardö and Vadsö were secondary targets for the aviation and ships of the Northern Fleet.32 One of these ports similarly was a secondary target during the biggest operation of surface forces of the Northern Fleet of the war in October 1944.

30OTsVMA.f.11.d.14059.ll.88–89.

31Platonov (note 4) pp.283–284.

32During the war, Vadsö was subjected to 131 and Vardö to 263 sorties by the aircraft of the Northern Fleet. - RGA VMF.f.12.op.1.d.78.ll.15–20.

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THE BOMBARDMENT OF VARDÖ BY DESTROYERS ON 26 OCTOBER

Reports of withdrawal from Kirkenes of an armada of boats and ships with German combat units and supplies required decisive action the command of the Northern Fleet. Operation “West” was threatened with failure. As if to justify errors in the execution of the blockade, the commander decided to send a pursuit consisting of four destroyers after the westward bound German convoys: the flotilla leader “Baku” and the destroyers “Razumnii,” “Gremiashchii,” and “Raz’iarennii.” In a “verbal order” (sic!) A.G. Golovko charged Rear-Admiral V.A. Fokin to lead out the squadron at night for the reconnaissance of the area from Tana Fjord to Vardö and on the way back to open fire on the port.

During the night destroyers completed the planned route. Radar did not discover a single target. They turned back towards the base and at 06:20 approached Vardö. Fires peacefully lit up in the port, simplifying targeting. At 06:39, the first salvo was heard from the leader. All the other ships corrected their fire accordingly. German batteries on the shore opened return fire four minutes later and immediately found the range of the destroyers. The ships were forced to maneuver. Still, as a result of fire from the shore batteries one of the destroyers (“Razumnii”) suffered a number of dents and shot-holes in the superstructure. The bombardment lasted for 39 minutes. A total of 597 high-explosive shells were fired at the city. As was later shown by reconnaissance, three moorings, and a number of city buildings suffered extensive damage. A drifter was also sunk.33

The convoys that had not been discovered by the squadron of destroyers were located the same day by crewmen of the 118th Air Reconnaissance Regiment in the region of the Tana, Sylte and Bats Fjords. During the daylight, the Fleet’s aircraft completed five major sorties on the convoy, sinking a landing barge and three motor boats. On the next day the aircraft repeated sorties on the ships in the area of Tana Fjord. According to the reports of the crew, bombs dropped from the “height of 2700 meters” (sic!) damaged some enemy ships.34

During the next 24 hours the weather near the shores of Northern Norway suddenly worsened, which could only impact on the level of activity against enemy convoys. At the same time poor weather however assisted the successful completion of another objective, which at the time was of greater significance - the passage of the next Allied convoy to Russia. On 27 October the operational zone of the Northern Fleet was entered by

33RGA VMF.f.767.op.2.d.68.ll.104–106.

34Op. cit.f.12.op.1.d.77.ll.268–269.

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the ships of JW-61. During the final stage of the operation “West,” all the attention of the Fleet’s command was focused on the successful passage of the convoy. All forces of the Fleet were charged with this task. Up to the beginning of November, i.e., up to the end of the operation “West,” aircraft and torpedo boats were engaged in reconnaissance and surface forces in minesweeping and convoy escort work. Submarines were in position near the shores of Northern Norway. Operation “West” was over.

As part of the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation, operation “West” had been, without doubt, of strategic significance, since it contributed to the success of liberation of the Russian Arctic, the Pechenga district and made a way for the liberation of Norway.

On the other hand, objectives that had been formulated by the command were only partially completed. The Fleet indeed successfully escorted all the convoys on internal and external routes and neutralized scores of mines. By landing troops on the shore crews of the Northern Fleet rendered significant assistance to the maritime flank of the forces of Karelian Front. This principally concerns the first three landing operations, because the latter were late in being executed and did not have much influence on events unfolding at the front. Planned landings in the areas of Vardö and Vadsö constituted a lost opportunity, which possibly could have had the potential to speed up the liberation of Kirkenes, and equally, would have prevented the German removal of equipment and supplies from eastern Finnmark. Unfortunately, these were by far not the only missed opportunities.

The commander-in-chief of the Fleet gambled in relying on aviation and torpedo boats, having reduced the employment of large surface and submarine forces to a minimum. The Fleet’s flagship, the battleship “Arkhangel’sk” whose appearance alone in Varanger Fjord would have influenced the outcome of the whole operation, lay idle at the Fleet base throughout October. Never once did the cruiser “Murmansk” put out to sea. Belatedly and with many precautions, on the “oral” command of the commander-in-chief, the squadron of destroyers performed its one and only ‘raid’ during the operation.

While having a powerful fleet, the commander-in-chief never dared to bring it into battle. Much more decisive were the enemy’s actions. During the last 10 days of October, five German destroyers provided for the withdrawal of convoys from Kirkenes and regularly fired at the positions of the units of Karelian Front. However these ships never became the subject of special attention of the Fleet’s command. As a result, a significant part of the German Army of Lapland and huge amounts of equipment and supplies were withdrawn from Varanger on board more than a hundred ships. The main objective of Operation “West” — to sabotage “the evacuation of enemy forces by sea via ports of Varanger Fjord in the Kirkenes-Hammerfest

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region and destroy all vessels during the enemy’s attempt to withdraw by sea” — had not been completed.

One is not disposed to cast doubt on the personal courage of the com- mander-in-chief, a man who had been through two wars and organized more than one daring operation. I also do not support the thought that the caution exercised by the commander-in-chief was dictated by his desire to save the lives of hundreds of sailors of the Northern Fleet. Probably, A.G. Golovko had been given an order or “verbal” instructions prohibiting him from using the large ships. Having looked at the many interpretations of what caused the commander-in-chief’s particular “caution” in this operation, we tend to see one as the most significant. Even if the Admiral had not been given an order prohibiting the use of larger naval units, as a “man of the system” he clearly understood what was expected of him, with damage to even a single destroyer being politically undesirable. “Beria syndrome” was no doubt inhibiting him, together with menacing orders that arrived from Moscow after the sinking of soviet destroyers in the Black Sea in 1942 and especially in the autumn of 1943. Not everyone would have dared, for the sake of glory, to risk their life and career, especially at the end of the war.

Does this fear explain the unbelievable figures for enemy losses, suggesting the total defeat of all the German forces in the Russian Arctic, that are still frequently cited in publications about the Northern Fleet during the war? First these figures were introduced in the commander-in-chief’s reports on operation “West.” According to the reports, in only 20 days in October the Northern Fleet sunk 156 (!) enemy ships, with a total displacement of 139,000 tonnes and destroyed 56 enemy aircraft.35 On verification it transpires that these figures have been inflated 2–3 times at a minimum.

An accurate account of the Northern Fleet and its participation in World War II has not yet been written. It would have been too presumptuous for this article to suggest that it is the basis for a new interpretation of this history. Let this publication simply make us realize that the history of the Fleet requires attention. If this article attracts the attention of researchers, one may consider the principal objective of this article has been achieved.